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Abstract 
 
 
In this thesis, I discuss the organism’s self-organization from the perspective of 
relational ontology. I critically examine scientific and philosophical sources that 
appeal to the concept of self-organization. By doing this, I aim to carry out a 
thorough investigation into the underlying reasons of emergent order within the 
ontogeny of the organism. Moreover, I focus on the relation between universal 
dynamics of organization and the organization of living systems. 
I provide a historical review of the development of modern ideas related to self-
organization. These ideas have been developed in relation to various research 
areas including thermodynamics, molecular biology, developmental biology, 
systems theory, and so on. In order to develop a systematic understanding of the 
concept, I propose a conceptual distinction between transitional self-organization 
and regulative self-organization. The former refers to the spontaneous emergence 
of order, whereas the latter refers to the self-maintaining characteristic of the living 
systems. I show the relation between these two types of organization within 
biological processes. 
I offer a critical analysis of various theories within the organizational approach. 
Several ideas and notions in these theories originate from the early studies in 
cybernetics. More recently, autopoiesis and the theory of biological autonomy 
asserted certain claims that were critical toward the ideas related to self-
organization. I advocate a general theory of self-organization against these 
criticisms. 
I also examine the hierarchical nature of the organism’s organization, as this is 
essential to understand regulative self-organization. I consider the reciprocal 
relation between bottom-up and top-down dynamics of organization as the basis of 
the organism’s individuation. To prove this idea, I appeal to biological research on 
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molecular self-assembly, pattern formation (including reaction-diffusion systems), 
and the self-organized characteristic of the immune system. 
Finally, I promote the idea of diachronic emergence by drawing support from 
biological self-organization. I discuss the ideas related to constraints, potentiality, 
and dynamic form in an attempt to reveal the emergent nature of the organism. To 
demonstrate the dynamicity of form, I examine research into biological oscillators. I 
draw the following conclusions: synchronic condition of the organism is irreducibly 
processual and relational, and this is the basis of the organism’s potentiality for 
various organizational states. 
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General Introduction 
 
 
This thesis will address the emergent nature of the organism as an ontogenetic 
process. A main idea is that emergence is ontological, which requires a new 
understanding of causation concerning part-whole relations.1 I criticize the attitude 
to neutralize emergence based on analysing the organization of a whole as an 
arrangement of parts in the spatial context, and a deterministic input-output relation 
in the temporal context (see Chapter 4). Considering the problems such as non-
locality in physics, reducing emergence to a matter of arrangement of parts does 
not provide an exhaustive solution to all the relevant philosophical implications. 
There are problems that remain unsolved because of the atomistic conception of 
parts according to which interrelations are considered subsidiary and external. In 
my thesis, I criticize this mechanistic conceptualization and consider the unsolved 
causal basis as a fulcrum of my discussion of the organism. On this basis, I 
postulate that there is a limit to localize the sub-components of a relational whole. 
This implies that a whole cannot be reduced to the sum of its parts because parts 
are not distinct from each other as static entities. Instead, the whole is laden with a 
constant state of potentiality so that there is a certain extent of indeterminateness 
within the part-whole relations. As this is a postulate, I do not develop a 
comprehensive argument that demonstrates an indisputable link between 																																								 																					
1  Another aspect of the investigation into causation is circular causality that has significant 
implications for temporality. A cause precedes its effect. However, a feedback loop adds a 
convoluted situation to the temporal order of a basic cause-effect relation. In the case of a feedback 
loop, the effect of a cause affects the initial causal agent resulting in a circular synergetic situation 
from the initial cause-effect relation. In selected effects, or similarly, in second order causation, a 
similar convoluted situation is involved. In these types of causation, the effect of a cause is its 
persistence over time (Hitchcock, 1996). This is explicit in the case of natural selection, but in fact 
selected effects are also evident through part-whole relations within the organism. In this case, the 
part affect the whole, but this is contextual to the whole that determines whether the initial causal 
relations will be maintained among alternative paths of development. Of course, feedback loops 
and selected effects do not imply a direct anomaly in the temporal order of causal relations; instead 
they are cases of complexification and self-maintenance. However, circular causation might also 
have more profound implications concerning the unsolved problems of causation (see: Heylighen, 
2010). 
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biological research and more puzzling questions of physics.2 Rather, my argument 
relates to questions in modern physics indirectly, and mainly addresses the issues 
in biology. I argue that the limit to localize the parts of a relational whole is evident 
in the potentiality of relations in the ontogeny of the organism. Moreover, the self-
organization of the organism is possible due to this relational basis of producing 
organizational potentials. The elaboration of my argument will mostly consider 
biological processes, whereas in this introduction, I aim to clarify certain points 
concerning a broader context that involves general philosophical claims. 
In this thesis, I discuss the question of ontogeny within two different implicit 
dimensions. One of them concerns a discussion in philosophy of biology, namely, a 
critical attitude toward the neo-Darwinian paradigm, which is prevalent in several 
contemporary areas of research including levels of selection, neutral theory of 
molecular evolution, evolutionary developmental biology, systems biology, etc. 
Self-organization provides support to the critique of neo-Darwinism by emphasizing 
that the organism’s form is not solely determined by natural selection. In addition to 
the role of selective pressures, self-organization emphasizes the internal 
relationality of the organism. Moreover, it is related to the idea that form is not 
predetermined by genes, but it is acquired through the ontogeny on a basis of 
contingency. The other dimension of this thesis relates to a broader context 
concerning the nature of causation. Self-organization defines a causal capacity 
emerging in dissipative systems, whose understanding helps to challenge the 
notion of inert matter. In dissipative systems, the components become sensitive to 
the rest of reactions. As Prigogine and Stengers (1984/2017) state: “In equilibrium 
the matter is blind, but in far-from-equilibrium conditions begins to be able to 
perceive, to take into account, in its way of functioning, differences in the external 
world” (p. 14). This is a core idea in self-organization that supports a critique of 
inert matter in favour of emergence. In this thesis, I examine this idea in relation to 																																								 																					
2 Despite this, the ideas concerning quantum non-locality is a source of inspiration for the argument 
in this thesis. The idea has gained support due to John Bell’s research, which demonstrated that 
local hidden variables do not extensively underlie statistical results with entangled particles. 
Brandon and Carson (1996) claim that the argument against hidden variables also supports an 
indeterminist view concerning biological processes. A discussion of determinism based on the 
research in physics is not within the scope of this thesis, and therefore I will not go into the details of 
their argument. 
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the emergent nature of the organism. I argue that the ontogeny of the organism is 
a process which is determined by potentiality through interrelations that can 
produce different organizational networks. This argument involves the application 
of relational ontology to the organism’s self-organization. 
Let me first explain the dimension that relates to philosophy of biology. In a 
classic paper within the critique of the adaptationist programme, Gould and 
Lewontin (1979) argue that the neo-Darwinist view gave up Darwin’s pluralism 
towards the underlying reasons of evolution, and ascribed any evolutionary change 
to natural selection, sometimes even at the expense of accepting speculative tales 
about possible factors that created selective pressure. They claim that, contrary to 
this attitude, “organisms must be analysed as integrated wholes” (Gould & 
Lewontin, 1979, p. 147). They also remark that the attitude they promote was once 
dominant in Continental Europe under the name of developmental morphology, 
which investigated Baupläne of species based on internal constraints. This 
research perspective was later overshadowed by the adaptationist programme. A 
similar attitude was held in the research of D’Arcy Thompson. Thompson examined 
the mathematical basis of physical dynamics that created certain geometrical forms 
in living systems. However, contrary to the contemporary ideas on self-
organization, Thompson developed his theory not as a complement, but as an 
alternative to Darwinian theory. The research perspective focusing on the organic 
form has gained a new dimension with the discovery of nonlinear dynamics, which 
also involved a step toward a broader and unified understanding of self-
organization. This is supported by research into feedback processes, self-
catalysing chemical activities, and formation of patterns due to responses toward 
external gradients. This research has not only offered support to the view that 
biological form is dependent on internal constraints, but also that it is a generative 
process through the relation between internal and external. Researchers such as 
Brian Goodwin and Stuart Newman are among the pioneers of this new 
understanding concerning biological self-organization. 
Another relevant perspective within the philosophy of biology is the 
organizational approach, which promoted the notion of biological autonomy. 
Theories of cybernetics and autopoiesis are considered within the scope of this 
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perspective, and more recently, the theory of biological autonomy developed by 
Moreno and Mossio – referred to as the autonomous perspective – reinterprets the 
claims of autopoiesis and the notion of closure in particular (Ruiz-Mirazo & Moreno, 
2012; Mossio, Bich, & Moreno, 2013; Moreno & Mossio, 2015). Although I embrace 
a critical attitude towards some of the ideas in these theories (see Chapter 2), the 
general position of organizational approach is essential to develop an organism-
based alternative against reductionist and gene-centric explanations. Criticism of 
preformationism characterizes another aspect of this position. Against the 
preformationist idea that the organism is genetically determined, which denies the 
organicist dimension of organization by reducing it to theories of molecular biology, 
I draw support from the modern account of epigenesis, which emphasizes that 
processes in higher levels are also essential for the organism’s form (Moss, 
2003).3 In a similar vein, developmental systems theory (DST) asserts that form is 
acquired through ontogeny (Oyama et al. 2000; Oyama, 2001a), and the organism 
is self-organized on a contingent basis (Griffiths & Gray, 1997). I broadly agree 
with these ideas, however I shall argue that the role of contingency is 
overestimated and morphogenetic basis of formal stability is underestimated in 
DST (see Chapter 4). 
The abovementioned developments relate to the self-organization at the 
organism level, whereas relationality also has consequences in a broader context. 
This brings us to the other dimension of this thesis. In this regard, the main issue of 
this thesis is the role of self-organization in ontogeny in relation to a critical analysis 
of causation.4 The underlying philosophical theme here is relational ontology and 
its consequences for living systems. In the specific context of self-organization, 
relationality refers to emerging reciprocal relations within a complex system, and 
any type of pattern formation or self-constraining effects. Not only biological 																																								 																					
3 The reason for referring especially to its modern conception is that the original ideas of epigenesis 
can be traced back to Aristotle. In the beginning of the modern theory, Hans Driesch’s ideas on 
embryonic development, which also promotes an attitude based on potentiality, is fundamental. 
4 Here, instead of specific problems of causation in modern philosophy such as explanation versus 
causation, Bayesian models, or transitivity, the mentioned aspect relates to reconsideration of 
causation in relation to an ontological understanding of diachronic emergence. This also involves 
the implications of process philosophy, e.g. temporality of form (see Chapter 4). 	
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processes in population dynamics and ecosystems, but also physical and chemical 
processes involve certain outcomes of relationality, which usually arise as 
spontaneous order in the relevant systems. Stuart Kauffman’s (1993) work which 
investigates spontaneous order is well known. He put forward an extensive theory 
of relationality in population dynamics by appealing to the notion of self-
organization. In his approach, self-organization denotes the emerging order in 
population dynamics due to epistatic relations between genes. Beyond this, 
Kauffman (1996, 2000) uses self-organization in the context of a universal 
tendency for the self-constraining character of energy flow. I use the concept of 
self-organization in a similar way to that of Kauffman’s work, and I think his 
approach is fundamental for any attempt to understand self-organization. Despite 
this, I will not discuss the details of Kauffman’s Nk model in my review in the first 
two chapters because, in my opinion, a review on point in terms of both the 
negative and positive aspects of Kauffman’s theory is already given by Moss 
(2003). Here, Moss points out that Kauffman’s work is valuable due to 
demonstrating the far-from-equilibrium nature of life and identifying the role of 
epigenetic mechanisms as opposed to genetic reductionism. However, Moss 
claims that Kauffman’s work still exhibits instrumental reductionism because it 
oversimplifies the implications of “wet biology” beyond the epigenetic dimension of 
life. Relationality between genes is included in Nk model (N denotes the number of 
genes, and k denotes the number of relations between genes), but obviously 
genes do not function due to inputs from other genes in real biological processes, 
in discordance with the represented relations in Kauffman’s model (Moss, 2003, 
pp. 98-107). 
New ways of understanding causal relations that are also essential for the 
study of living systems, such as nonlinear dynamics, call into question the 
mechanistic understanding of causality, and compel us to seek new philosophical 
perspectives. One of the theoretical approaches put forward to grasp the causal 
nature of life in contemporary philosophy of science is based on mechanisms. This 
new approach of mechanicism, which emerged as a post-positivist philosophy, has 
attempted to analyse complex systems with nonlinear characteristics in relation to 
an entity-based approach in part-whole relationships. This approach examines the 
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issues such as modularity, aggregativity, levels of organization, type-token 
distinction, etc. (Wimsatt, 1997; Menzies, 2012; Craver & Darden, 2013). Although 
these are genuine problems – some of which are addressed in this thesis – and the 
solutions offered by the mechanistic approach are successful to a certain degree, 
new mechanicism does not address the essential problems specific to the self-
organization of the organism. This is because of an implicit reconciliation with the 
traditional claims of Cartesian philosophy. New mechanicism acknowledges that 
life is a matter of organization. Yet, this approach presupposes that non-living 
matter is inert, and life is primarily a matter of mechanistic configurations of certain 
elements within the relevant systems. As matter is considered inert, the dynamicity 
of relations is extrinsic to static entities. Even though philosophy of mechanisms 
attempts to examine the processual nature of things within the scope of complexity 
research, an underlying claim of substance ontology is either directly endorsed, or 
left unquestioned in this approach. Thus, a mild Cartesianism permeates through 
the conceptualization of lower-level components that constitute the “parts” of a 
whole, or the “matter” of an organized system. A dualism between static entities 
and dynamic relations characterizes the relevant worldview. A proponent of this 
view might claim that the analysis of mechanisms is free from theory-laden 
assertions because it is only concerned with the empirical basis of things. In fact, 
this dualism itself is a hidden theory-laden source that is implicitly endorsed in 
many supposedly natural accounts. This is indicative of the influence of substance 
ontology residing in the roots of Western philosophy. 
Process philosophy criticizes this atomistic understanding by claiming that a 
constant state of flux underlies what appears as static. In process philosophy, a 
landmark study, in which ontological status of the organism is central, was 
developed by Alfred N. Whitehead. Whitehead was critical of the Newtonian 
approach that considered matter as purposeless, relationality as external, and 
temporality as the succession of durationless instants (Desmet & Irvine, 2018). For 
instance, Whitehead (1934/2011) considered the theory of electromagnetism as a 
remedy for the restrictions of the Newtonian view, as the former depends on a 
general field of force. Over time, Whitehead’s philosophy appealed to some 
theoretical studies in biology, whereas it is hard to say that a widespread 
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application of the philosopher’s ideas holds. A more recent development has 
occurred in philosophy of biology, as Dupré and Nicholson (2018) offered to reform 
this field in line with a process ontology. In addition, some other studies offered a 
similar perspective both in philosophy of biology and general philosophy of 
science, focusing on replacing substance ontology with process ontology (Salmon, 
1984; Seibt, 1990; Dupré, 2012). The general implications of these studies in 
process philosophy support my arguments in this thesis. In particular, Whitehead’s 
alternative approach that emphasizes relationality as well as processuality is 
valuable. Although not necessarily by examining Whitehead’s views in detail,5 I aim 
to contribute to process ontology by focusing on the relationality aspect of the 
organism. In other words, I will promote the idea that things are not only 
processual, but also relational. In contrast with the abovementioned mechanistic 
dualism between static entities and dynamic relations, I think a radical 
reconceptualization of relationality concerning the nature of causation is necessary. 
What appears as an entity is a product of relationality. In other words, things are 
nothing but relations. The implication of this statement can only be understood 
from the viewpoint of process philosophy. Relationality cannot be established 
without temporality, hence a better way of phrasing relations would be relationing. 
It should be emphasized that claiming that everything consists of relations is 
different from claiming that everything is in relation with each other, as the latter 
does not challenge the atomistic conception of things. The former claim suggests 
that things are actualized through relationing: there are no absolute properties of 
things that can actualize in a context-independent way. The self cannot exist 
without its relation to the non-self. 
This might seem controversial to common sense. We refer to relations 
between the object and the subject, or between the part and the whole, but it is 
also possible to conceptualize the object or the part as isolated from any 
relationality. In fact, an understanding of context-independent things or properties 																																								 																					
5 Whitehead’s (1978/2010) views on biological processes are contextualized within a complex 
system of concepts offering a new process philosophy, hence they require a careful philosophical 
analysis before being used as a source. In other words, the main reason that Whitehead’s claims 
are not directly discussed in this thesis is the extent of his work, which would divert my main focus 
away from the examination of biological processes. Still, I concede that this is a limitation of this 
thesis. 
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in isolation from relationality depends on decontextualizing them via operations of 
thought, i.e. making abstractions of actual cases that are always relational. 
Actuality is relational because contrary to an entity that is envisaged in an isolated 
state, a real entity exists within certain historical conditions (at a certain location 
and moment). When we make abstractions of historical conditions, we presuppose 
that the decontextualized entity can be re-contextualized within any possible 
surroundings. Ascribing certain absolute properties to an entity is derived from the 
experience of relations between the entity and the rest of the world. Can we say 
that being red is inherent in an apple? Assuming so would obviously mean 
disregarding the relational basis of colours in which a colour emerges in the 
context of certain background conditions, i.e. the principles of optics or the 
dynamics of visual perception are dependent on the relationing between the apple 
and the rest of the world. How should we interpret decontextualized entities or 
properties, then? Without a careful examination of the situation, we might not 
realize that there is a shift in the modality underlying any presupposition of isolated 
entities, which are mentally derived from actualities. The shift of modality is from 
relational necessity (actuality) to possibility for other relationalities. A property that 
is supposed as absolute is in fact a possibility that cannot be realized without 
alternative relationalities. Historical actualities are situations that have already been 
realized. By experiencing reality, we can derive knowledge concerning the inherent 
nature of things, but in fact inherent properties or isolated entities only denote 
possibilities concerning relational and processual confrontations. What we assume 
to be inherent is in fact a disposition for an event that can be potentially manifested 
due to fulfilment of certain conditions. For example, aside from the more complex 
organizational context of pigments that gives the apple skin its red colour, even the 
redness of a piece of iron oxide as a compound that has a simpler structure is 
context-dependent. A quantity of this compound exhibits red colour only if it is big 
enough for the emergence of colours, as colours do not exist without an assembly 
of molecules. Therefore, when we think of inherent properties or isolated entities, 
what we actually do is postulate that certain relational events are realized by a 
wide range of possible encounters between an individual and variations of 
surrounding conditions. In the supposition of a non-relational property, there is a 
potential confusion due to ignoring that the individual and surrounding conditions 
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are subjectively distinguished. This is because an assumption of a non-relational 
property in fact disguises a fictional disassociation of a condition of relationality. 
We consider relational possibilities as dispositions due to individualizing an event 
(observation of red colour) and possible environmental conditions that ensure the 
manifestation of the event. However, we should not overlook that in this way of 
thinking, there is no ontological justification for prioritizing the individual object of 
this event, and doing so would lead to the misconception of absolute properties 
inherent in the object. Instead, what occurs in any actualization of relationality is an 
encounter of different causal backgrounds (either as individuated bodies, fields, 
flows with multiple components) having their own potentialities that can be 
manifested in different ways. In other words, an actual event is not a manifestation 
of a one-sided disposition, but a bi-directional (or multi-directional in cases of 
several components) synergetic confrontation that occurs as a case of relationing. 
The abovementioned statement seemingly leads to a deadlock for the 
objective analysis of individuality. Considering that what appears as entities is the 
actualization of relationalities producing qualitative properties under different 
conditions, does it not follow from this that all there is left for individuality is a 
subjective identification? I believe that the answer is no, and that it is possible to 
reconstruct individuality on this relational and dynamic basis by focusing on the 
objective relation between self-organization and individuation. Individuation 
denotes the philosophical investigation concerning the basis of the individuality of 
things, which relates to issues such as identity, distinctness, unity, and haecceity, 
and which could be explained by appealing to spatiotemporal contiguity, matter, 
form, and so on. For instance, if the individuation of entities is claimed due to their 
matter, i.e. by asserting that individuality of an entity is due to being comprised of 
specific atoms without any replacement from the non-individual, then identity and 
form of many types of entities at higher levels of organization would be deemed 
temporary and fragile. This is because atoms become scattered and reconfigured 
on several occasions, and thus any rearrangement of atoms would lead to a 
disruption of the individuation that is based on a unity of specific atoms, even if the 
initial matter of the individual is replaced by new atoms. As an alternative, 
individuation can also be ascribed to the dynamicity of interactions. This alternative 
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conceptualization prioritizes the identity of processes against the specificity of 
matter, and provides a more realistic description concerning the perpetuating 
nature of processes at higher levels. For example, an eye of a storm is not 
persistently composed of the same atoms in the course of the storm, yet we can 
still observe the eye from beginning until the end of this weather event. Only the 
process based individuation identifies and explains the actuality of this higher-level 
phenomenon. Collier (2004) provides an explanation associating individuation and 
self-organization on this basis. He points out that self-organization produces 
individuation, which is characterized by the cohesive unity of dynamical processes 
that provides the integrity of relevant systems (Collier, 2004, p. 165). 
Understanding this dynamic basis of individuation is essential for acknowledging 
the extended scope of self-organization that includes both living and non-living 
systems. More importantly, individuation of biological systems is exhaustively 
dynamic because of the constant circulation of matter between these systems and 
their environment. 
Above, I discussed relationality and individuality in the context of actuality, 
whereas the more interesting implications of relationality lie in potentiality. 
Potentiality refers to causal capacities that have not been actualized, yet can be 
actualized upon stimulation, or due to the will of the agent as the source of 
potential. However, the ontological implications of potentiality are controversial. 
Potentiality is a mode of the non-actualized, and attributing potentiality to a real 
process (both in the sense of non-imagined and actual) seems problematic 
because this would mean that the actualized and the non-actualized co-exist within 
the conditions of individuality. Denying the ontic dimension of potentiality and 
acknowledging only logical possibilities (imaginations or actions of the subject) and 
flexibility of things (e.g. potential shapes that can be given to wax) in the context of 
potentiality might offer a solution by reducing potentiality to a common 
understanding of possibilities and dispositions. However, as I discuss below, 
potentiality has further implications, although the investigation of this ontological 
aspect of potentiality in contemporary philosophy pales in comparison with the 
literature on dispositions. 
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Aristotle’s understanding of potentiality recognizes both the dimension of 
logical possibilities and the dimension of real powers that relate to motion and 
being. In Aristotle’s view, potentiality does not correspond to a strict distinction 
between mind and matter, or pure actuality and pure potentiality, but it is a 
condition that determines the transformation of the form of the matter (Aygün, 
2017). In this sense, the material cause offers potential that is to be actualized, but 
its actualization is due to natural motions including the agency of animals. In the 
sublunar world,6  there is the intertwined existence of realized and unrealized 
potentials, decay and growth (Aygün, 2017, p. 44).7 With the scientific revolution 
that was pioneered by Galileo and Newton, the Aristotelian distinction between 
actuality and potentiality was replaced by a mechanistic view that was restricted to 
the study of efficient causes. Modern attempts to revive the ontological conception 
of potentiality did not go beyond Whitehead’s work on this aspect of causation in 
relation to process ontology (Bschir, 2016, p. 28). In a similar vein, Werner 
Heisenberg (1989) stated that quantum mechanics gives ontological potentiality a 
fundamental status, claiming that co-existent potentialities underlie a quantum 
state (p. 127). Yet, this kind of philosophical remark was not enough to fully 
recover the notion in contemporary scientific theories.8 
In order to reconsider the theoretical option of real potentiality, it is necessary 
to replace the understanding that is restricted to the non-actualized with an 
understanding of a causal capacity as a condition of yet-to-be actualized. This 
latter condition can be realized in alternative conditions of individuality without itself 
being a precise preformation of any of these individualities. In other words, this 
type of potentiality is a possibility space without involving any specific individuated 
conditions. Gilbert Simondon’s philosophical investigation of individuation is helpful 																																								 																					
6 In Aristotelian cosmology, sublunar world refers to causal relations on Earth, which is imperfect, in 
contrast with the celestial revolutions that represent perfection. 
7 As will be explained in the fourth chapter, in Aristotle’s view, the events in our world are finite but 
not random. The potential is about possibilities, and realization of possibilities requires both the 
materiality that is to be determined by external imposition and the formal cause that acts upon the 
material cause. When it comes to organism, materiality and formal cause are unified in the sense 
that the former is determined and the latter is determining. 
8 Some of the recent attempts aimed at rehabilitating the notion of potentiality in physics are 
discussed in Stapp (2009); Anderson (2011); Gabora, Scott, and Kauffman (2013); Cohen et al. 
(2013); and Eastman, Epperson, and Griffin (2016). 
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to acknowledge this potentiality aspect. Simondon (2004) criticizes distinguishing 
the principle of individuation from the actual individuation process itself, which he 
asserts to be evident in atomistic and hylomorphic philosophies (see Chapter 1 and 
Chapter 4 for the details of these approaches). In atomism, the principle of 
individuation lies in the infinity of atoms, and each atom’s principle is its own 
existence. Thus, individuality is presumed before processes. In hylomorphism, the 
principle of individuation lies in the duality of matter and form, and temporality of 
the individuation process is explained by appealing to form that puts the matter into 
work. Thus, individuality is presumed to have formed after processes. Unlike these 
two approaches, Simondon (2004) asserts that an actual process of individuation is 
not separable from the principle of individuation. The approaches that only focus 
on the individual ignore the fact that individuation begins with pairing between the 
individual and its environment, in which the environment is far from being 
homogeneous and passive. He refers to the concept of ontogenesis to characterize 
the becoming of being. The notion of ontogenesis implies “being insofar as 
becoming”, which reflects Simondon’s process philosophy that takes into account 
the potentiality aspect. According to this, conservation of being occurs through 
becoming, which presumes a constant exchange between the structure and 
operation of systems (Simondon, 2004, p. 6). This is to be considered as a 
fundamental understanding of processuality: operation of systems is conserved – 
or solidified – as their structure, which in turn acts back on the ongoing operations. 
Furthermore, the notion of “being insofar as becoming” implies a perpetuated 
condition of potentiality. Simondon (2004) emphasizes that individuation is an 
operation of the complete being, which suggests a condition of unity. However, this 
does not mean that processes of individuation are devoid of internal dynamism. 
The individual relates to itself by sustaining the initial incompatibilities that are 
internal to the system, and the form is dynamically maintained before any final 
resolution of these internal tensions occurs. The potential of pre-individual reality is 
not consumed once and for all. In fact, consuming the potential for change 
corresponds to an equilibrium condition. The living system is in a metastable 
condition in which internal dynamism is maintained by the system’s operations by 
utilizing its own potential. Thus, structuration of the living system is a new type of 
equilibrium vis-à-vis non-living systems for which equilibrium means the loss of 
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potentiality. For living systems, metastable condition is characterized by the 
perpetuation of potentiality. The organism does not simply modify its relationing 
with the environment, which can be already done by the machines, but beyond 
that, it modifies itself “by inventing new internal structures and by completely 
introducing itself into the axiomatic of vital problems” (Simondon, 2004, p. 7). 
Consider an embryonic stem cell. Is it a neuron-to-be, placental cell-to-be, or a 
bone cell-to-be? Obviously, none of them specifically, but all of them. The 
developmental path in which a stem cell differentiates into a specific body cell is an 
individuated process. Hence, what is observed through the differentiation process 
is an initial state of unshaped possibility, which involves possibilities for multiple 
end-states. Possibility turns into a certain state, and the capacity to differentiate 
into other types of cells is lost. This means that potentialities might arise and 
disappear depending on the situation. How should we interpret this type of 
dynamicity in potentiality? An interpretation of potentiality that is restricted only to 
dispositions underlines the fact that a certain capacity in an object9 is manifested 
upon the fulfilment of certain external conditions. An ontological claim for 
potentiality does not need to exclude the aspect of dispositions, but it is dependent 
on further claims that extend beyond contemporary discussions of dispositions. 
Potentiality is an unprecedented condition within physicality; a condition that is not 
preformed within temporally deterministic cause-effect relations, but only externally 
demarcated by the influence of the external condition. Therefore, it refers to a limit 
of the spatiotemporal condition to shape the internal relationality. A localized 
actualization is antagonistic to a possibility space. It should be noted that this 
argument is not exactly same with a kind of indeterminism that can be 
presupposed from a single cause to multiple possible effects. The latter kind of 
indeterminism is still limited to postulating individuated causes and individuated 
effects. Instead, the view of potentiality that I propose involves indeterminacy due 
to the limits of penetration of the causal effect, and a questioning of the internal 
particularity of causal interactions. The unformed space has the potential for 
multiple ways of individuation. This ontological type of potentiality has profound 																																								 																					
9 In an approach based on dispositions, it is claimed that potentialities are rooted in objects (Vetter, 
2015, p. 3). I think this is controversial, but I will not go into a discussion of this issue here. 
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implications for part-whole relationships in a complex system of organization. Non-
preformed potentiality space gives the whole a functional capacity to determine its 
own components depending on the requirements of the system in its relationing 
with the outer world. In other words, the whole determines its lower-level 
components. In the case of a self-organized system, the whole’s viability and its 
interaction with the outer world are determining factors. 
Potentiality is a physical capacity, but it is only utilized to a greater extent in 
biological processes, as only a self-organized living system can establish extensive 
internal functionality that is implemented through multiply realizable networks of 
organization. The idea that certain physical capacities are only actualized in living 
systems, and therefore we need to understand biology to be able to understand 
physics, was held by the pioneers of relational biology, namely, Robert Rosen and 
Howard Pattee. Rosen (1991, 2000) analysed living processes as transformations 
of relational wholes, and examined the formal cause acting on the initial conditions 
that are considered as the equivalent of the material cause.10 In this sense, the 
attitude of relational biology is closely linked with a relational ontology, as the 
proponents of this view emphasize that the real implications of relationality can 
only be understood by examining living systems.  
One might suggest that these fundamental claims concerning causation such 
as ontological potentiality should primarily be examined in relation to physics. 
However, research concerning the mechanistic understanding of non-living 
systems cannot be primary to a study of living systems, as the theory of living 
systems cannot be reduced to the theory of mechanical forces. I agree with the 
claim of relational biology that only the biological system involves a full realization 
of certain physical capacities. This is specifically relevant for relationality in biology, 
which is more complex in living systems due to the high degree of potentiality. I will 
not develop a detailed argument in favour of non-reductionism here, as this is not 
the main problem of this thesis. It is sufficient to state that even though one thinks 
that relationality can only be tested via physics, it is possible to find support for the 
																																								 																					
10 See Chapter 4 for a discussion of the Aristotelian basis of this way of thinking. 
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relationality view.11 Relational quantum mechanics interprets the interactions at 
sub-atomic level by opposing the notion of an absolute event (Rovelli, 1996; Rovelli 
& Smerlak, 2007). According to this approach, properties of a system are 
determined merely in relation with another system. The first remarks 
foreshadowing this theoretical approach were made by Heisenberg, who stated 
that “the position of the electron is only determined in relation to a certain observer, 
or to a certain quantum reference system” (Rovelli & Laudisa, 2013). Relativity 
theory also provides support for this radical basis of relationality. According to 
special relativity, there is no absolute notion of simultaneity of events, as the 
simultaneity is decided due to the relation between two frames of reference. 
This thesis puts forward a chain of arguments that combines ontological claims 
concerning relationality, processuality, and potentiality with an empirical and 
scientific examination of the organism in relation to subjects such as 
thermodynamics, nonlinear processes, pattern formation, and regulatory networks. 
A general claim that I defend is that self-organization of the organism provides a 
case for diachronic emergence. I will attempt to demonstrate the abovementioned 
claims concerning relationality by examining how the phenomenon of self-
organization appears as a process of individuation. Self-organization is 
fundamental for the ontogeny of the organism, where the functional 
interdependence through part-whole relationships is manifested extensively. Yet, 
individuation dynamics are not restricted to the organism, as they appear in 
different ways due to far-from-equilibrium conditions of a system. The organism’s 
self-organization is a special case in terms of canalizing the internal potentiality 
within a system. Components of the organism can be utilized in several ways due 
to the formation of higher-level entities, and functions can be implemented in 
multiple ways. In virtue of this special individuation condition, the self-maintaining 
capacity of the organism involves the idea of the organism as the sum of 
processes constantly utilizing its internal potential for change throughout its 
lifespan. In contrast, self-organization in a non-living system exhausts the potential 
of its far-from-equilibrium condition as the relevant process ends. Moreover, 
																																								 																					
11 More importantly, quantum mechanics supports the idea of potentiality (see above). 
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organizational hierarchy and regulative networks are characteristic to the 
organism’s organization. However, associating self-organization with both bottom-
up emergence of order and relationality of the organism creates a conceptual 
ambiguity (Witherington, 2014). On this basis, I define the condition of the 
organism as regulative self-organization, whereas the formation of attractor states 
such as Benárd cells, reaction-diffusion systems, and oscillations, I define as 
transitional self-organization. This distinction is not completely new, as Pattee 
(2012) pointed out that organismic processes and spontaneous order constitute 
different aspects of self-organization. Pattee defines the organism’s self-
organization as information-dependent. Since I prefer avoiding the philosophical 
controversies around the notion of information, I use the notion of regulation 
instead of information. Transitional self-organization defines the bottom-up 
emergence of order. Emergent order is incorporated within the regulative system of 
the organism through kinetic factors in bio-molecular processes and pattern 
formation in the development of the embryo. Within the organism, the underlying 
element of spontaneous order that arises in systems such as reaction-diffusion 
processes co-exists with genetic regulation, and therefore it is not possible to 
differentiate the contribution of transitional self-organization as an isolated element 
in biological processes. It is a misconception to suppose self-organization as 
inconsistent with organizational hierarchy. In transitional self-organization, bottom-
up dynamics refer to the emergence of top-down control acting upon the system. 
Thus, the system’s transition to a correlated state is a hierarchical condition by 
definition. In regulative self-organization, bottom-up dynamics are coupled with top-
down control of the organism in a more complex way. Centralized functions such 
as the operation of the immune system form the top of organizational hierarchy. 
The implementation of functions within the organizational hierarchy depends on 
centralized mechanisms using lower-level elements as a potential to realize certain 
goal-directed activities.  
The development of my argument to this point has been based on a 
description of biological processes within the organism, and interpretation of them 
from the perspective of self-organization. This is preliminary to an examination of a 
more fundamental philosophical issue, which concerns the relation between self-
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organization and emergence. Self-organization is often mentioned in support of 
arguments for emergence. However, an understanding of the ontological condition 
of emergence requires an examination of its relation to potentiality. This issue also 
connects the organism’s self-organization to the theory of relational ontology 
previously explained. Interrelations within the organism provide formal stability due 
to alternative organizational networks. This means that the parts of the organism 
can be utilized within the whole in alternative organizational networks. Therefore, in 
terms of both centralized functions and part-whole relationships, the organism as a 
whole can utilize its own parts as the potential for its metastable condition, as its 
viability can be ensured in multiple ways. Nonetheless, one could still argue that 
this way of understanding potentiality and emergence does not involve any 
inconsistency with the atomistic view that I criticized above. I explained that a 
perspective that restricts emergence to the arrangement of parts considers parts 
as static entities and reduces the emergence to an issue concerning the 
configurations of the parts. In other words, if the role of relationality and potentiality 
are excluded, then an emergent condition can be associated only with an 
actualized state. This kind of understanding reduces emergence to an empirical 
issue: nothing really emerges through a process because the output is already 
preceded in the input. Thus, in this understanding, emergence is epiphenomenal 
(Kim, 1996). On the other hand, an alternative consideration insists that 
emergence is real and diachronic (Mitchell, 2012), i.e. emergence is not preceded 
in a previous condition. Hence, the particularity of things is an end-state of the 
individuation process. The temporal basis of emergence depends on the unformed 
condition of the components when the dynamics of individuality acts upon itself. On 
this basis, proponents of epigenesis against preformationism emphasize that form 
is acquired through processes. The ontogeny of the organism exhibits incessant 
transformative processes from unshaped initial conditions to functionally formed 
self-production. This is not only restricted to the potentiality of stem cells, e.g. a 
folded biomolecule is also a potential that can be utilized in different forms at a 
higher level. In this sense, what we observe in ontogeny is the actualization of the 
dynamic form through the levels of organization and materialization of nonlinear 
processes. 
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At this point, we need to focus on the foundations of self-maintaining form. The 
form of the organism is like a boat that is constructed by its own passengers on a 
wavy sea.12 Continuity of the form must face internal and external contingency 
elements. How is this possible? Dynamicity of the organism is coupled with the 
stabilization of the form. In this way, ontogeny is a process of constant change and 
relative formal stability at the same time. This condition is also related to diachronic 
emergence. In the organism, the synchronic condition is irreducibly diachronic. For 
instance, let us consider the form of the cell. The system spontaneously decays 
because of the entropy increase, which is why the parts of the membrane must be 
replaced constantly. Closure must also be sustained for maintaining the chemical 
processes of the cell. For any synchronic moment, we have a certain picture of the 
cell that appears as the form at that moment. However, considering processual 
actuality, the form in the synchronic condition is not possible without the underlying 
diachronic condition, which is the constant renewal of the parts of the cell. This 
situation is also relevant to the case of organism. In general, the organism’s form is 
based on the cohesion of processes with different paces. Relatively stable 
elements of the organism also constrain more dynamic processes, such as the role 
of enzymes in catalyzing chemical activities (Moreno & Mossio, 2015). Through 
ontogeny, form is vitally dependent on the materialization of nonlinear dynamics, 
e.g. limit cycles appear as biological oscillators within the organism, which 
determine developmental rhythms, dynamic cell states, and circadian clocks. How 
should we understand diachronic emergence in these processes? I argue that the 
materialization of the processes is not reducible to a deterministic input-output 
relation because the synchronic condition at any moment is characterized by 
potentiality, that is, an unformed basis of individuation. This unformed basis does 
not correspond to any condition of actuality, as it only refers to a readiness 
situation that can be utilized by centralized functions. In other words, a diachronic 
process of stability that determines the synchronic condition cannot be considered 
as a sequence of consecutive moments in which there are particularized entities. 
The synchronic condition itself is a de facto condition that involves both a spatial 
limit for the further particularization of micro-level components, and a temporal limit 																																								 																					
12 I borrow this metaphor from Otto Neurath (1944), who used it for the methodology of science. 
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for dividing the process into frozen moments including static entities. At a basic 
level, spatiotemporality is not individuated. For the organism, a complex situation of 
individuation is involved, due to the cohesions between fluctuations with different 
frequencies, changing and relatively unchanging elements, and short-term and 
long-term processes. This means that determination of the form in the organism is 
qualitatively different from the form of a non-living entity that lacks certain aspects 
of dynamism and potentiality. The organism is a self-organized process in which 
path-dependent constitution of materiality underlies its dynamic form. The 
actualization of the organism does not correspond to a strict material identity, but to 
a self-maintaining process based on the toleration of contingent elements that 
potentially endangers its viability. 
I develop my arguments in four chapters. The first three chapters mostly 
discuss previous ideas relating to self-organization. In the last chapter, I develop 
my main argument concerning diachronic emergence in the light of the 
philosophical implications of relationality and potentiality. All chapters include 
certain sections that can be considered as the review of previous literature and 
historical developments of relevant ideas: theories that are developed based on the 
idea of self-organization are explained in the first chapter; the second chapter 
consists of a critical discussion of alternative theories, namely, autopoiesis and the 
theory of biological autonomy; I review the biological research that has contributed 
to the theory of self-organization in the third chapter; and finally, I examine 
philosophical arguments concerning the problem of emergence in the fourth 
chapter. 
In the first chapter, I offer a distinction between regulative and transitional 
dynamics of self-organization. This is essential for my thesis, as it focuses on the 
connection between the emergent nature of the organism and a universal 
dimension of emergence as increasing complexity. In this sense, transitional 
dynamics describe the causal potential in multiplicity to become ordered, which is 
formulated by Ilya Prigogine’s account of far-from-equilibrium conditions. 
Regulative dynamics refer to self-organization in ontogeny, which is in line with the 
Kantian definition of self-organization that focuses on the reciprocal and self-
producing nature of the organism. I also explain the thermodynamic basis of life’s 
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organization, and in particular, Schrödinger’s pioneering ideas concerning this 
issue, which involves a distinction between statistical laws and dynamic laws. 
Finally, I explain theories on autocatalytic sets, as autocatalytic sets are essential 
for exposing the intersection between regulative and transitional dynamics of self-
organization. 
In the second chapter, I discuss different views within the organizational 
approach, and explain why self-organization is preferable to alternative accounts. I 
also develop a brief summary of the early philosophical ideas relating to self-
organization. I argue that self-organization is a universal tendency, and the 
organism’s self-organization must be understood as a reflection of this general 
basis. In contrast with autopoiesis and the theory of biological autonomy (the 
autonomous perspective), only self-organization provides an interpretation for the 
connection between ontogeny and universal dynamics instead of developing a 
theory specific to biological processes. 
In the third chapter, I describe the organism’s self-organization due to a bi-
directional interactivity between top-down and bottom-up dynamics. On this basis, I 
claim that it would be a misconception to think that organizational hierarchy and 
self-organization are inconsistent. On the contrary, self-organization concerns the 
emergence of hierarchy. Levels of organization are systematically involved in a 
dynamic form only in cases of regulative self-organization. In this sense, 
centralized function takes place at the top of organizational hierarchy. I explain how 
spontaneous order is utilized as an interlevel causation factor, and how immune 
system serves as a centralized function. 
Finally, in the last chapter, I develop my main argument concerning self-
organization. I argue that diachronic emergence is defendable in biological 
processes, as the synchronous condition of the organism is nothing but a de facto 
situation that sets a limit to diachronic particularity of causal relations. This is 
fundamental for acknowledging the emergent nature of the organism due to 
potentiality within internal relations, that is, relations determine the causal role of 
components. I adopt a view of relational ontology, and claim that nothing is exempt 
from relationality, hence organization. On this basis, I criticize 
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distinction between matter and form, as matter is itself nothing but an actualization 
of relationality at a lower level. I also examine the connection with different 
philosophical attitudes in biological research. Self-organization promotes the idea 
of organization at the organism level, which contributes to the critique of genetic 
reductionism. DST offers a similar criticism towards gene-centric explanation, and 
promotes the idea of self-organization. However, DST is not completely consistent 
with the approach of self-organization developed in this thesis, as it 
overemphasizes the role of contingency. Finally, I address the role of biological 
oscillation. Oscillators are essential in many aspects: they help to understand how 
processual dynamics are materialized through development, how nonlinear factors 
are incorporated in regulative self-organization, and how processes with different 
rhythms become cohesive in the organism. 
I conclude this thesis by arguing that self-organization proves diachronic 
emergence. My conclusions concerning the potentiality of the organism, and the 
relational basis of ontogeny are more evident in comparison with my assumption 
concerning the limit of synchronicity. The latter includes more fundamental 
arguments concerning the nature of causation, which might seem to tend toward 
speculation. This is partially because this general assumption is indeed intuitive in 
certain aspects, hence it requires further philosophical investigation and scientific 
verification. Partially, this is because this thesis focuses on biological processes, 
and therefore it is not possible to explain these principles in relation to their broader 
implications. 
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Chapter One 
Order, Disorder, and Self-Organization 
 
 
Introduction 
Systemic patterns or properties can arise through self-organization based on 
the reciprocal relations among the components of a system independent from any 
form of predetermination, templates, or external agents. According to this 
definition, any kind of endogenous dynamics leading to ordered structures can 
theoretically be attributed to self-organization, whereas a variety of questions 
would remain unanswered in this broad context: What is the self that becomes 
organized? Is a process of self-organization necessarily subject to individuality 
from the beginning, or is it characterized by a tendency for individuation? Or, is 
self-organization an objective quality, or is it a specific way of modelling systems? 
The answers of these questions partly depend on what kind of phenomena is 
associated with self-organization. For instance, in the cases such as order from 
noise, self-organization refers to the emergence of an attractor state (Heylighen, 
2001). This form of self-organization explains how a system explores alternative 
variations of its state-space until a new order arises due to the indeterminacy of the 
system (Heylighen, 2001). A similar phenomenon is order through fluctuations, 
which considers the amplification of fluctuations by creating a new order in 
dissipative structures (Nicolis & Prigogine, 1977). The focus of these studies is the 
synergetic relations within the system appearing in such a way that the relevant 
system ends up with fewer degrees of freedom (Bak, Tang, & Wiesenfeld, 1987). 
However, emergence of attractors is only a general way of defining self-
organization, whereas not only an attractor state might appear in many different 
ways, but also self-organization is crucial for researching dynamics of complexity 
that are beyond attractors. For example, in biology, self-organization is mentioned 
for the group behaviour of social insects, or, in a Kantian manner, regulatory nature 
of the organism. Physicists mention concepts such as self-organized criticality in 
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phase transitions, and chemists refer to the notion in relation with nonlinearity of 
reactions. Interdisciplinarity of the studies on self-organization creates the problem 
of potential inconsistencies between definitions as well as an opportunity for a 
multifaceted approach. As I will explain in this chapter, biological self-organization 
in particular cannot be separated from the theoretical implications of different fields 
such as thermodynamics, nonlinear dynamics, and chemistry. Therefore the 
diversity in using the concept is not a problem in principle, yet we must be cautious 
of the possible ambiguities that might arise. Using the concept in the context of an 
emerging pattern, a social insect colony, or an organism might create confusion as 
to the meaning of self-organization as well as conflation of different underlying 
dynamics. 
I believe that a conceptual analysis of self-organization is necessary to deal 
with these ambiguities. The focus of research concerning self-organized systems 
can be broadly sub-divided into two categories: either the group dynamics which 
place emphasis on multiplicity, or the individual dynamics which regard a system 
as vitally dependent on the interdependency of its parts such as in the case of 
organism.13 In either case, self-organization refers to the dynamics of individuation, 
which implies that becoming of the individual is an ontogenetic process before the 
individual, and not vice versa (Simondon, 2009). Gilbert Simondon’s (2009) 
emphasis on the process nature of individuation is fundamental to the 
understanding of self-organization in this chapter, which implies the emerging 
condition of reciprocal relations within a system that enables it to act as a whole. 
Individuation appears as a tendency in many situations, and it is the degree of 
individuation that underlies the differentiating nature of self-organization between 
an ecosystem, colony, or organism. In biology, there is a wide spectrum of forms of 
individuation, which creates difficulties when assessing whether certain entities or 
processes are characterized by individuality such as in the case of holobionts or 
the quasi-multicellular form of the social amoeba. In this thesis, I will be examining 
the individuation dynamics of the organism, and the question of how we should 																																								 																					
13 An understanding of the organism involves certain philosophical problems, some of which I will 
dwell on in my thesis in relation with self-organization. As I need certain postulates to begin with, I 
am not referring to any potential controversy at this point. Thus, here, the organism refers to an 
empirical consideration, typically, of a multicellular organism. 
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understand the self-organization dynamics in the ontogeny in relation to the 
universal implications of self-organization. 
Self-organization is usually associated with the emergence of order, but how 
should we understand the increase of order? The second law of thermodynamics 
states that things go into decay, or in other words, there is a natural tendency for 
the increase of disorder. This is why living things have to be in a constant state of 
activity in order to “repair” their internal order. On the other hand, studies on 
nonlinear systems have demonstrated that self-sustaining order is not limited to 
living systems, and causal interdependencies arise in such a way that the local 
order of these systems increases. Hence, self-organization is a universal 
phenomenon that is manifest in both living and non-living systems, and life cannot 
be thought as independent from this nonlinearity basis. Organization creates 
patterns in which new constraints on the release of energy are introduced, which in 
turn leads to the more effective use of this energy, in Kauffman’s phrasing, by 
“extracting work” (Kauffman, 2000). This is a fundamental characteristic of the 
physical basis of life’s organization. 
The abovementioned problems concerning the universal nature of self-
organization demonstrates that the ontogeny should be considered from the 
perspectives of various disciplines engaging in related issues. In this chapter, I 
describe the scientific background of the problem. A conceptual analysis 
concerning self-organization is necessary due to the diverse approaches toward 
the notion in the literature. This will identify both the theme common to all these 
approaches and their differences. In some cases, self-organization is associated 
with the emergence of certain patterns, whereas in others, it is associated with the 
intradependent regulatory structure of the organism (Kant, 1790/2008; Goodwin, 
2001). The implicit idea in the former is the emergence of order (Bak, Tang, & 
Wiesenfeld, 1987; Kauffman, 1993). In this case, interdependency is not a 
precondition, but it arises through processes. Thus, this type of self-organization is 
limited to the dynamics of a certain process. In the latter case, self-organization is 
understood in terms of the organism, which cannot be derived by appealing solely 
to spontaneous factors of order in nature, since downward determination from the 
whole is a necessary condition of individuality. 
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This chapter offers a distinction between regulative and transitional types of 
self-organization, which is a necessary preparation for the account of self-
organization in ontogeny developed through this thesis. In transitional self-
organization, the components of a system are not interdependent from the 
beginning, but they become so through a transformative process due to contingent 
effects within the internal interactions of the system. A typical case of transitional 
self-organization is a nonlinear process such as the formation of a vortex. In 
transitional processes, relatively uncorrelated interactors become correlated, which 
could create a novel condition of organization, whereas regulative self-organization 
is a condition of individuality that sustains its own activity. Regulative self-
organization is exclusive to living systems,14 while transitional self-organization can 
be observed both in living systems (e.g. social organization, ecological 
transformation) and non-living systems. However, regulative and transitional forms 
of self-organization don’t have to realize as distinct from each other. On the 
contrary, these are quite intertwined dynamics in living systems, since transitional 
self-organization can appear at any level of biological processes from molecular 
interactions to macro-evolutionary dynamics. Organisms, as regulatory systems, 
are subject to macro-evolutionary transitions, hence to transitional dynamics 
through the evolution of populations. Furthermore, nonlinear dynamics at the 
molecular level, which are also transitional, are embodied within the organism.15 
The conceptual distinction that I offer in this chapter is preliminary to the ideas on 
the peculiarities of the organism’s organization. By distinguishing dynamics of 
spontaneous order and regulation, which are both associated with self-organization 
in different ways, I aim to deal with the possible ambiguities with the concept. I also 
emphasize that the self-organization of the organism requires the spontaneous 
emergence of order, yet this alone is insufficient to explain the emergence of the 
self-organizing capacities specific to the organism. 
																																								 																					
14 Although self-organization (usually as guided self-organization) is also mentioned for artificial 
systems (Kernbach, 2008; Prokopenko, 2009; Nurzaman, Yu, Kim, & Iida, 2014), whose 
organization can be considered as regulative, machines are created by design, which is why their 
self-organized nature is controversial. 
15  As I will explain in more details in the following chapters, also nonlinear dynamics are 
incorporated in regulative self-organization. 
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1. Meaning of Self-organization From a Historical Perspective 
Self-organization is a concept that is loosely defined. Its meaning varies 
between philosophical approaches and disciplines. Although the core ideas 
belonging to the concept are explicitly shared across the variety of perspectives, 
the scope of the phenomena considered as applicable to self-organization differs 
extensively. For example, self-organization can refer to the formation of organelles 
as described in cellular biology (Karsenti, 2008) as well as to the emergence of 
cosmological order interpreted in a Hegelian fashion (Jantsch, 1980). These 
differences also correspond to possible qualitative distinctions: does self-
organization involve some type of agency determining its own principles, or is it 
simply the emergence of certain patterns; is there an objective criterion of 
orderliness implicit, or is self-organization merely a certain way of modelling 
systems (Gershenson & Heylighen, 2003)? In this section, I will try to answer the 
question of whether there is a common theoretical basis underlying these different 
interpretations by approaching this issue historically. This historical analysis will 
show that contemporary conceptions of self-organization are influenced by multiple 
disciplines including thermodynamics, nonlinear dynamics, cybernetics, and 
morphogenesis. 
The problems of self-organization, complexity, and emergence go back to the 
Ancient Greek chaos-cosmos antagonism, which assumes that order in the 
universe has emerged by itself out of chaotic preconditions (Mainzer, 1993; 
Bushev, 1994; Heylighen, 2010). Chaos is the empty, unformed, and unorganized 
beginning of the universe, while the cosmos is a state of complex order. Chaos-
cosmos antagonism originally had the mythical connotation in the ancient 
cosmogony, yet the ideas that are equivalent to modern theories of self-
organization began when the supernatural agency was discarded as an 
explanation. Since an idea of a creator of organization is put forward as an external 
element, if this external agent is ruled out, then, a logical implication is that the 
emergence of organization in nature is a process in itself. In this sense, self-
organization is a hypothesis that immediately appears with bringing the naturalistic 
explanation forward against the creationist myth. 
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This kind of reasoning appears in the ideas of Ancient Greek philosophers of 
nature. According to Anaximander, from the apeiron, which is the indefinite nature, 
regulated structures arise through cyclical changes such as the rotation of the 
heavens (Curd, 2016). This is an insightful idea from the contemporary viewpoint, 
since emergence of causal cycles out of chaos is a basic pattern of the self-
organizing systems. Demokritos and Epicurus, who are the founders of two similar 
atomistic philosophies, claimed that all causal relations are nothing but the collision 
of atoms by chance. Epicurus in particular foreshadows the modern conception, as 
he contemplated that the random aggregation of particles leads to the formation of 
self-organized unities. According to Epicurus, atoms deviate from their course by 
chance while they fall, which is a phenomenon that is referred to as clinamen 
(Lucretius Carus, trans. 1994). On this basis, he considered that contingency has a 
key role in the appearance of organized relations, and embraced a non-
deterministic worldview. 
How relevant are these ideas in terms of the contemporary notion of self-
organization? A modern equivalent of this ancient idea is a concept that is known 
as “spontaneous order”, “emergent order” (Holland, 2000), or “order from disorder” 
(Schrödinger, 1967/2013), implying that the order arises by itself. This is a 
phenomenon that is both local and universal. It is local because the organized 
patterns come into being here and there without the involvement of an omnipresent 
will or direct downward determination of a global power. It is universal because the 
local appearance of organized patterns here and there reflects a general tendency 
of the arising of systemic relations in nature. 
One of the early usages of the concept in the modern literature was in 
Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Judgement. Kant claimed that the organism is self-
organized because its parts exist only due to the whole’s functioning, which in turn 
depends on the interdependency between parts (Kant, 1790/1978). The organism 
is self-organized both as an individual, since it produces its parts, and as a 
species, since it reproduces.16 According to Kant, the organism is a natural end, 
since it is both the cause and the effect of itself, unlike the artefact which is always 
																																								 																					
16 The differences between self-organization for Kant and contemporary accounts will be discussed 
in detail in the next chapter. 
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the product of an external designer. On the other hand, Kant was sceptical towards 
the randomness basis of order that has been promoted both in ancient atomism 
and evolutionary theory. Rather, his ideas on biological organization were 
influenced by the idea of Bildungstrieb (formative drive) that was embraced in the 
eighteenth century biology (Lenoir, 1980). 
These ideas were formative to the development of the concept of universal 
evolution – not necessarily Darwinian, but as an organic transformation – that 
leads to complex, self-determining structures. This is evident in the idea of organic 
progress, which is formulated as the “transformation of the homogenous into the 
heterogeneous” (Spencer, 1891, p. 10). Herbert Spencer pointed out that this is an 
idea that has been developed by German thinkers such as Goethe, van Baer, and 
Wolff. He integrated this idea into Darwin’s evolutionary theory, and considered 
that all developmental processes, including the historical evolution of society, 
followed this organic law. Differentiation of a homogeneous body and arising of 
complex systems such as the division of labour in social insects and human 
societies increase the stability of the systems involved. Spencer’s organic law was 
precursor to self-organization in evolution and the related issue of the emergence 
of complexity, which I discuss further in the last chapter. 
Another theory of this period that influenced contemporary ideas on self-
organization was thermodynamics. With the discovery of the laws of 
thermodynamics in the nineteenth century, a conceptual distinction between 
chemical equilibrium and biological steady states had become possible. Due to 
understanding the principles of energy transformations, it was established that a 
perpetual motion that recycles its own energy source with full efficiency is not 
possible because a certain amount of energy is always wasted from the system as 
heat. Hence, the energy that can be used for work reduces in time. On this basis, 
Rudolf Clausius thought that, instead of energy, a new term is necessary to refer to 
a system’s incapacity to do work, which he called entropy, denoted with S. In 
reversible processes, entropy is measured by the exchanged heat divided by the 
temperature (Feistel & Ebeling, 2011, p. 20). 
Ludwig Boltzmann developed the ideas based on this concept in statistical 
mechanics by introducing the notion of irreversibility in thermodynamic processes. 
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A main idea here is that a randomization will occur when two heterogeneous 
bodies come into contact. For example, when a hot gas and a cold gas are mixed, 
the temperature will spontaneously equalize between them. The molecules of the 
hot gas have higher velocity, so when a molecule with higher velocity and higher 
kinetic energy collides with a molecule that has lower velocity, the collision 
decreases the speed of the faster molecule, whereas it increases the speed of the 
slower molecule. In this way, the velocity of each molecule gradually approaches 
an average speed. The second law of thermodynamics identifies this process 
based on a ratio between a macrostate and the possible microstates that produce 
that macrostate. This is formulated as S = kB log W, where S is the entropy, kB is 
the Boltzmann constant, and W is the number of microstates that are consistent 
with the given macrostate. A closed system evolves in such a way that the number 
of possible micro-configurations with certain macro-conditions of pressure, volume, 
and energy will either stay the same or increase. This corresponds to the increase 
of entropy. A Boltzmann analysis establishes that the gas molecules in a closed 
vessel will incline to the final state of macroscopic uniformity and microscopic 
disorder. In a closed vessel, gas molecules will diffuse from where they are highly 
concentrated to where they are less concentrated, thereby making the system 
more homogeneous. In the first state, the gas molecules are dense in one region, 
the molecules are squeezed in a smaller volume, and therefore there is a smaller 
number of possible micro-configurations. Whereas in the later state, the molecules 
are scattered, and there is a bigger set of alternative microstates that gives the 
same macrostate. The relevant randomization process is irreversible, and it is 
highly likely that the system will go into a more disordered state. 
Organisms are also influenced by the increase of entropy, as they dissipate 
heat through their metabolic activities. After the late 1920’s, chemists and 
biophysicists reconciled their views of chemical non-equilibrium and biological 
steady states (Keller, 2008), and the order in life was reinterpreted from the 
perspective of thermodynamics. It was revealed that the stability of life processes 
actually disguises underlying chemical instability. The macro-level stability of 
organisms is sustained because of the constant chemical activity that keeps the 
system in a far-from-equilibrium condition. Since chemical equilibrium means death 
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for organisms, metabolic work needs to be constantly performed. Therefore, there 
must to be a constant flow of free energy into biological systems to maintain a state 
of chemical non-equilibrium. 
This new thermodynamic understanding made it possible for a new concept of 
homeostasis to be introduced in order to discern biological stability from chemical 
equilibrium (Keller, 2009). Homeostasis refers to the active regulation of organisms 
that is necessary for maintaining stable conditions. Biological stability was already 
known before the chemical dynamics of biological order were revealed. However, 
with thermodynamics, it is now known that biological stability corresponds to 
chemical dynamism. The principles of order were first abstracted from its biological 
materiality, and biological stability was then re-contextualized in a more inclusive 
understanding of orderliness.17 As I explain below, this paved the way for research 
into the role of non-equilibrium dynamics in life, which is a fundamental idea in self-
organization. 
From the 1940’s and 1950’s onwards, self-organization was discussed in the 
field of cybernetics as a concept which focused on controlling complex systems. 
Cybernetics emerged from the ambitions of developing machines with the 
inspiration derived from organisms. Thus, Wiener defined cybernetics as “the 
science of control and communications in the animal and the machine” (Wiener, 
1961). The tension between the natural decay of systems and the evolution of 
living systems with a specific focus on the role of information, was a main issue 
that this approach addressed. Cybernetics is most-widely associated with the 
projects such as the design of a self-correcting weapon system, which was led by 
Norbert Wiener. Some of the other main ideas in cybernetics were concerned with 
understanding circular causality and feedback loops in biological regulation, and 
developing artificial intelligence on this basis. A main source of inspiration that 
drove cyberneticists to design controlled systems was the homeostasis of living 
systems. For example, Ross Ashby (1960/2013) focused on the activity of the brain 
as the basis of the organism’s capacity for self-organization. His approach 																																								 																					
17 On the other hand, equilibrium condition in thermodynamics does not include the kinetics of the 
system. As I will discuss in the third chapter, only a specific type of interactions that appear as 
kinetic factors can explain how dynamic instability instead of thermodynamically favoured stability 
occurs within living systems. 
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considers the brain as a performative device rather than a cognitive device that is 
engaged in representational activity (Pickering, 2009). The brain plays a crucial 
role in the organism’s ability to adapt to its environment. It performs this function by 
randomly modifying the organism-environment interactions when this relationship 
is disturbed, so that a dynamic equilibrium between the organism and its 
environment is sustained in the face of new conditions. 
On the other hand, Keller (2009) claims that the common narrative that refers 
to Kant and cybernetics as the pillars of the modern theory does not tell the whole 
story. The cybernetics project that was led by the U.S. Navy after the Second 
World War was abandoned by the early 1960’s. This was also a time when the 
studies on nonlinear dynamics, which Keller claims to be the main theoretical 
source, have started to become appreciated in the Western world. Both in living 
and non-living systems, nonlinear characteristics of causal relations are a main 
theme in the emergence of order. The concept of nonlinearity refers to the uneven 
quantitative relation between the cause and the effect in an interaction, or between 
the inputs and the outputs in a system. More precisely, it suggests that a big effect 
might yield a relatively small change or a small incidence might create a big 
impact. This has a crucial role in part-whole dynamics because it marks the radical 
basis of context-dependency: the causal contributions of parts are finalized 
depending on their context in the whole system of interactions. Nonlinearity offers 
an explanation of systems as conflicting, dynamic, and open. The research on 
nonlinear dynamical systems has started with the Russian mathematician A. M. 
Lyapunov and has been a developing field in the Soviet Union from the early 
twentieth century. The introduction of this theory in control engineering was a 
significant source of influence that has triggered a long-term change in scientific 
culture and shaped today’s understanding of self-organization. In control 
engineering, a main problem concerns stabilizing a certain output as a 
consequence of a certain input. Before the application of nonlinear approach, the 
output was considered as a linear function of the input, even though most of the 
real processes are nonlinear. When American scientists became aware of the 
studies on nonlinearity in an engineering conference held in Moscow, this area 
started flourishing in Western science, and the contemporary understanding of self-
organization was developed on this basis (Keller, 2009). 
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Another essential moment in the development of research relating to self-
organization in chemical reactions was Alan Turing’s classical paper in 1952. 
Turing formulated a mathematical theory on the spontaneous appearance of 
patterns out of a homogeneous solution, which is known as the reaction-diffusion 
coupling (Turing, 1952; see Chapter 3). Turing’s theoretical prediction that 
reaction-diffusion coupling could be a basis for biological structures has been 
validated by the observation that hexagonal, striped, and mixed patterns can be 
formed in chemical reactions from a uniform background (Ouyang & Swinney, 
1991). The problem specific to biological systems is that this type of direct 
spontaneous order never appears as a sole factor of form. However, reaction-
diffusion coupling has been proven to be relevant as a supporting factor in the 
morphogenesis of the embryo, e.g. in the formation of limbs in vertebrae skeleton 
(Newman & Müller, 2005). 
A turning point in the development of the contemporary understanding of self-
organization is the work of Ilya Prigogine on the dynamics of dissipative systems 
(Nicolis & Prigogine, 1977). The entropy production of systems has been explained 
above. Prigogine’s approach points to another aspect of increasing entropy, 
according to which self-organization is defined as “an irreversible process, that is, a 
process away from thermodynamic equilibrium which through the cooperative 
effects of subsystems leads to higher complexity in spatial structures and temporal 
behaviour of the system as a whole” (Feistel & Ebeling, 2011). Self-organization 
appears in far-from-equilibrium conditions in which a constant flow is maintained 
due to energy input into the system. In an equilibrium system such as a crystal, the 
flow of free energy is minimized, whereas in far-from-equilibrium conditions, the 
system’s fluidity is perturbed by a continuous application of an external force. The 
particles in this type of system respond to an external gradient in a way that they 
become correlated, creating heterogeneity. As a result, the system is trapped in a 
state where there is a constant flow of free energy into the system. Any relevant 
external force acts as a constraint on the system, after which the far-from-
equilibrium system continues to become dynamic depending on its particular 
condition. Main examples of these systems are Bénard cells (see Section 2) and 
weather phenomena such as vortexes. A vortex is formed as a persistent motif of 
turbulence in the cloud patterns. Water molecules in the form of vapour are 
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arranged in the cloud streets either moving upwards or downwards. Matter 
becomes condensed through the centre of the vortex, in which the swirling shape 
is formed. This type of self-organization appears as the reduction of the degrees of 
freedom within the system. In physics, Hermann Haken (2013) has developed his 
studies with a similar perspective, focusing on laser physics. In a laser device, a 
glass tube with mirrors at both ends is filled with molecules. Some of these 
molecules are excited by an electric current and become the control parameter, 
enslaving the individual molecules. As a result, coherent light emerges. The laser 
is considered a case of self-organization because the light wave within the device 
is not imposed from the outside, but arises through the reciprocal relations 
between the excited molecules. Haken coined the term synergetics as a synonym 
of self-organization, which was put forward as a new discipline, combining the 
theory of nonlinear dynamics, statistical physics, and Prigogine’s approach to far-
from-equilibrium systems. 
Another research area based on similar problems is self-organized criticality, 
which refers to the idea that the nonlinear system can tune itself to tolerate the 
changes of parameters and still evolve into the same critical point (Bak et al., 
1987).18 The relevant studies began when Per Bak and his colleagues (1987) 
wrote a highly influential paper in statistical mechanics. The paper was addressing 
1/f noise (also known as pink noise) that is ubiquitous in nature, which implies that 
the density of a frequency interval is inversely proportional to the frequency of the 
signals or fluctuating processes such as vacuum tubes, the flow of rivers, the heart 
rhythm, and the neural activity (Press, 1978; Bak et al. 1987; Nozaki, Mar, Grigg, & 
Collins, 1999). Simply put, the density and the frequency of a stochastic fluctuation 
in nature is expressed as a power law relation. Bak et al. (1987) claimed that 1/f 
noise can be explained by self-organized criticality. In this idea, the basic model is 
based on a rule of adding units into random tiles, which will slide into neighbouring 
tiles upon reaching a maximum. Small slides would be more frequent, and big 
slides would be more rare. In the long-term, the emerging pattern is an 
accumulating tension that approaches to a critical limit before a global chain of 
slides. This is explained by the metaphor of a sand pile. When the grains are 																																								 																					
18 Self-organized criticality is a case of transitional self-organization (see Section 2.1 and 2.2). 
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dropped to accumulate in a pile, the grains that go on to the top of others slide to 
nearby locations by creating avalanches with different sizes depending on the 
slope. In this model, criticality basically implies that random inputs to a system lead 
to the transformation of this system until reaching a critical state. In this state, a 
small perturbation will trigger a big avalanche, and after this critical state is relaxed 
by a global slide, avalanches with different sizes will be repeated with a chaotic 
periodicity. This model is put forward as a representative of the 1/f noise, since a 
certain size of avalanche is found to be inversely proportional to its frequency. 
In the following years, the idea of self-organized criticality has been applied to 
several phenomena including earthquakes, financial markets, and evolutionary 
biology. Sneppen, Bak, Flyvbjerg, and Jensen (1995) claimed that self-organized 
criticality can be conceptualized as a macro-evolutionary pattern that explains 
major catastrophes where the majority of species have gone extinct. In this model, 
they simulate the dynamics of an evolutionary system with randomly assigned 
barriers of change between species. The simulations assumed that random 
mutations that change the fitness of a certain species affect other interacting 
species either positively or negatively. Simulated evolution starts with uncorrelated 
species that have low fitness barriers, which means that a triggering effect of a 
random mutation in a neighbouring species would end up in a relatively small 
avalanche. It is found out that there will be local optima of the fitness value for each 
species. As species reach the local optima, they can survive without being forced 
by other species to evolve into a different species. As a result, randomly assigned 
barriers lead to convergent stable states for each species in which a species 
cannot evolve without a big chain of mutations. The pattern that emerged in the 
simulations reflects self-organized criticality: rare large avalanches of mutations 
lead to the rapid evolution of species through a domino effect between interacting 
species, since these avalanches rule out the convergent states for species in the 
previous conservative condition. Sneppen et al. (1993) claim that their model could 
explain sudden extinctions without necessarily presuming the involvement of 
externally imposed catastrophes such as the impact of an asteroid. They argue 
that a sudden extinction of species might occur because of a criticality state in the 
inter-species dynamics. Self-organized criticality is also suggested as an 
explanation of the underlying dynamics of punctuated equilibrium (Gould & 
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Eldredge, 1993), as punctuated equilibrium presupposes long periods of relative 
stability and occasional dramatic changes in the evolution of species (Bak & 
Sneppen, 1993; Sneppen et al. 1995).19 Although hypothetical, this model serves 
as an example of how self-organization might be relevant to the emergence of 
certain patterns in the co-evolution of species. 
In the 1980’s, when complexity science and chaos theory were widely 
acknowledged as new fields, physics was the home of the studies on self-
organization along with the studies on nonlinear chemical dynamics (Keller, 2009). 
Soon after, the ideas that originated in statistical physics found an interdisciplinary 
application, as the researchers started to investigate the implications of concepts 
such as complex adaptive systems. Later on, as the relevant literature diversified 
and became multi-disciplinary, the central role of physics has disappeared (Keller, 
2009). The consequence of the shift from physics towards other disciplines has 
been a broadening of new areas of research considering biological systems as 
irreducible. Biological self-organization has become an independent topic in recent 
studies (Collier, 2004; Stewart, 2014), in which a systems approach has been 
emphasized. Social self-organization has been widely addressed under different 
topics as well, e.g. social evolution (Adams, 1988), antagonisms of modern society 
(Fuchs, 2004), the models of political behaviour (Galam, 2005), emergence of 
markets (Vriend, 1995), etc. 
Kauffman’s (1993) work is a paradigmatic example of how the ideas in 
statistical mechanics can be applied to other areas, as he did this for adaptive 
landscapes in evolutionary biology. He investigated self-organization by analysing 
several hypothetical conditions concerning the epistatic relations between genes. 
In his well-known work, The Origins of Order (1993), Kauffman specified this idea 
by investigating how some particular regulative combinations of genetic networks 
are expected to be effective depending on the degrees of intractability between 
genes. His work is mainly theoretical, but the relevant ideas have been applied to 
empirical cases in complex adaptive systems such as resilience mechanisms at 
																																								 																					
19 Frigg (2003) criticizes this model for being too simplistic in comparison with the complexity of real 
evolutionary process (p. 625), and for not providing any better explanation over other possible 
explanations for explaining 1/f noise. 
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molecular, organismic, and ecological levels (Desjardins, Barker, Lindo, Dieleman, 
& Dussault, 2015).  
Beyond biological self-organization, Kauffman’s theoretical approach is 
contextualized in a cosmological view. He states that “the universe might select its 
own laws and, somewhat like a biosphere, co-construct itself” (Kauffman, 2000, p. 
xi). The view of a co-evolving universe is based on the idea that law-like 
characteristics of systems are formed historically. Nature is complex, and 
complexity develops in ecosystem-like environments, having their own 
autonomous dynamics that are created within each system. Since the sub-systems 
evolve by constructing their own rules, this also calls into question the 
homogenous universality of the laws of nature (Mitchell, 2000). In a similar vein, 
theoretical physicist Lee Smolin discusses self-organization in this cosmological 
context. Smolin (2003) claims that we are living in a self-organized universe, and 
just as the biosphere on Earth is an evolving system by forming the laws that are 
characteristic of its internal structure, it might be the case that the universe has 
been expanding by constructing its laws in the intertwined subsystems. On this 
basis, he asserts that self-organization might explain fundamental characteristics of 
our universe. It has been calculated that the universe is old enough to have already 
reached thermal equilibrium. However, the actual increase of disorder is less than 
is expected to occur from the beginning of the universe. This is due to gravity, 
which counteracts the increasing entropy and dehomogenizes the systems by 
attraction. In this regard, gravity is the self-organizing force that is effective in 
infinite range and that keeps the universe from reaching thermal equilibrium 
(Smolin, 2003). This perspective is related to the role of self-organization in the 
universal emergence of complexity, which I discuss in the last chapter. 
Contemporary understandings of self-organization mostly concern the 
transformation of a system with multiple components. For non-living systems, 
populations, or co-evolving species, the implicit idea is that specific patterns will 
appear in the transformation of the system due to endogenous factors. This basic 
idea is applied to model relationships in several disciplines. In life sciences, prey 
and predator relationships, slime mould aggregation, social insects, neural 
networks, and formation of macromolecules are some of the examples of a vast 
range of phenomena that are associated with self-organization. In addition to the 
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natural sciences, self-organization is referred to in technological applications such 
as the working principles of lasers, or social sciences such as in the re-creation of 
society. Although there are some differences between these vast interdisciplinary 
applications of self-organization, they share a general emphasis on the idea of 
emergent order. 
In biology, the most common application of the concept concerns the emergent 
properties of group-level behaviours instead of the organism level. In particular, 
self-organization is a pattern that is attributed to social insects such as honeybees, 
ants, and termites. Self-organization in sociobiological systems implies that 
organization is not established by a leader, blueprint, or well-defined instruction, 
but by rules of interactions that are “executed using only local information, without 
reference to the global pattern” (Camazine et al., 2003, p. 8). Complex structures 
such as termite nests are built by a large number of individuals, and the 
sophisticated group behaviour depends on the iteration of relatively simple rules of 
local interactions (Camazine, 2003). Typically, social insects are known to have 
complex systems for division of labour. Ants, for example, use pheromones to 
communicate with each other. Their trails bifurcate depending on stochastic 
elements, and experienced ants can lead others along these trails. They can also 
synchronize and alter the patterns of their foraging activities. In this kind of 
organization, the colony can discover alternative ways of regulating its collective 
activity, and tune its behaviour depending on the changes in the environmental 
conditions (Bonabeau, Theraulaz, Deneubourg, Aron, & Camazine, 1997). Self-
organization in social insect colonies is so efficient at creating a tendency for 
individuality that these colonies are called superorganisms (Detrain & Deneubourg, 
2006). As pointed out by Swenson (2010), this approach depends on “the 
collective behavior of already highly evolved multicellular organisms” (p. 167) 
instead of directly spontaneous order that is observed in non-living systems. This 
type of self-organization is a systemic property as a result of local interactions 
between agents that have limited information concerning the system. Although it is 
a case of multiple agents, the self-organized group acts as one, and the 
organization is not restricted to a single process, which is the case in transitional 
self-organization. In this regard, social insect self-organization exemplifies the 
regulative type just like an organism (see Section 2). 
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For example, the mechanism behind complex termite structures is the self-
organization of the colony. African termites build large mounds as nests, which 
may reach 30 meters width and 6 meters height (Camazine, 2003). The mound is a 
castle for the colony: it includes walls for protection and acclimatizing the inner 
nest, a well-preserved chamber for the queen to lay her eggs, pillars to support the 
structure, channels for air circulation, and special combs to grow fungus. In the 
construction activity of termites, positive feedback mechanisms lead to the 
coordination of the activity, which also shows how random variations become an 
element of the organization. At the beginning, termites carry pellets independently, 
and randomly deposit them somewhere. Over time, pellets accumulate in certain 
places slightly more than others just by chance. As these small bumps of pellets 
act as a stimulus for termites, they start to deposit on these accumulations, and a 
self-reinforcing activity becomes prominent. Instead of a direct communication 
between individuals, the activity of termites becomes coordinated due to the 
information obtained from work in progress, which is a mechanism called stigmergy 
(Camazine, 2003). Stigmergy is a case of how the local interactions lead to a 
system’s organization. Members of a social insect colony might also communicate 
via signals. For example, signals are used when ants of a colony scatter on the 
ground for foraging, and one of the ants finds a valuable food source such as a 
dead animal. In this case, the ant deposits a chemical trail as it travels back to 
nest, and the other ants follow this chemical trail. 
Although self-organization appears extensively in the existence of complex 
systems of division of labour, group-level behaviour based on local interactions 
might arise with other species that have different degrees of complexity and 
hierarchy as well. This type of self-organization is observed with fish, birds, and 
primates. For example, fish schools evade predators by manoeuvring rapidly: 
splitting into two, expanding, or shifting direction. The group behaviour of the 
school is performed by the propagation of specific responses of a few individuals 
(Camazine, 2003, pp. 167-179). Geese fly in a V-shaped pattern so that the air 
resistance is minimized, and starling flocks constitute certain organized patterns 
when they fly (Mitchell, 2009). All these organization patterns emerge at the group 
level, and in general, feedback relations resulting in simple behavioural patterns 
are responsible for the emergence of group organization. 
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Self-organization of Dictyostelium discoideum, known as social amoebae, is 
one of the paradigm cases of biological self-organization. Conditions of emergent 
order are created by the social organization of the amoeba, and there is a 
controlled process of transition that constitutes a regulatory activity. Members of 
this species live as unicellular organisms, although they can also aggregate in 
order to form structures that behave as a multicellular organism. When there is 
enough food for all the cells, individual amoeba cells move in their substrates 
randomly. However, due to the population growth, the cells at the centre of the 
colony begin to starve, as they are not able to reach the food source. In response, 
these cells secrete a chemo-attractant known as cAMP (cyclic adenosine 3:5′ 
monophosphate). The waves of cAMP trigger a chemotactic cell movement, and 
cells form a temporal multicellular body, so that depending on the environmental 
signals, the colony gains new capacities to migrate, control the cell reproduction, or 
form a new colony (Weijer, 2005). Secretion of the chemo-attractant creates the 
patterns of streaming by positive feedback. Transition between these two states is 
a regulative activity, as the colony goes back to a non-organized state of the 
individual cells after the scarcity is dealt with. 
As the abovementioned examples show, self-organization can refer to 
processes at the level of cosmological transformation as well as to certain pattern 
of local dynamics within a system. Hence, there is a vast diversity of self-organized 
processes. Even though emergent order and self-maintaining characteristics are 
common to all cases of self-organization, this diversity creates a problem for 
demarcating the boundaries or applicability of the concept of self-organization. As 
a result, in many cases, the underlying conditions that are associated with self-
organization might be similar in certain aspects, yet the systemic context of 
emergent order might differentiate. For example, depending on the condition that 
self-organization is realized, the noise-driven aspect of the processes (Von 
Foerster, 2003), the emergence of heterogeneity depending on feedback relations 
(Newman & Frisch, 1979), the homeostatic control within the organism (Beer, 
1984), or the bifurcations due to internal randomness (Prigogine & Stengers, 
1984/2017) might be emphasized. 
In order to develop a systematic approach to this diversity, several criteria have 
been suggested for classifying self-organized processes. One of these distinctions 
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relates to whether there is a reduction in the degrees of freedom or not (Haken, 
2013). In the example of lasers, certain control parameters enslave the rest of the 
system, which creates an attractor situation, whereas in some robotic systems of 
self-organization, the agents involved coordinate their activities without losing 
decision-making capacity. Hence, there is no reduction of the degrees of freedom 
within the system (Kernbach, 2008). 
Another distinction relates to the difference between conservative and 
dissipative types of self-organization, which respectively refer to static and dynamic 
cases (Mainzer, 1993). Snow crystals are the products of the conservative type. 
The bifurcating solid structure of a snow crystal is self-organized in such a way that 
the system has low energy and the phase transition is reversible. In dissipative 
self-organization, however, the end product is an irreversible process with far-from-
equilibrium conditions. A similar distinction is highlighted between self-organization 
and self-assembly. In the former, the system is a dissipative one, and therefore a 
constant energy input is necessary to keep the system in the non-equilibrium 
condition, whereas in the latter, the system approaches towards equilibrium (Halley 
& Winkler, 2008b). In thermodynamics, only self-assembly is a spontaneous 
process, as spontaneity refers to a tendency for equilibrium without any energy 
input. On the other hand, despite the fact that a process of self-organization 
requires an energy input, spontaneity is also mentioned in the context of self-
organization. Here, spontaneous formation of patterns obviously does not refer to a 
negative change of free energy, but it refers to the fact that the process occurs by 
itself. In either case, the common basis of self-organization is a condition of 
individuation, in which reciprocal relations that are endogenous to the system are 
in place. 
Another classification relates to living vs. non-living systems. For example, the 
case of self-organization in social insects (see above) obviously involves the 
manifestation of agency that is specific to organisms. It has been correctly 
emphasised that biological self-organization is not a simple reworking of the self-
organization in the inanimate world, as the case is not simply replacing molecules 
with ants in the equations (Detrain & Deneubourg, 2006). Yet, this qualitative 
difference does not mean that self-organization is limited to non-living systems, or 
non-living and living types are distinct from each other in every aspect. Instead, it 
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points to the fact that biological autonomy is a multifaceted problem that extends 
beyond self-organization. On this basis, it is suggested that living systems are self-
maintained, but not self-organized (Moreno & Mossio, 2015). However, I argue that 
the way that Moreno and Mossio (2015) consider self-organization potentially 
overlooks the common themes between living and non-living systems, such as the 
role of far-from-equilibrium conditions and feedback relations that is observed in all 
types of self-organization (see Chapter 2). 
Gershenson and Heylighen (2003) argue that self-organization does not refer 
to a type of systems, but to a specific way of modelling systems. This is because 
the relations that are studied in the context of self-organization are everywhere, 
and the observer decides where there is organization by ascribing purposefulness 
to the system. This claim is derived from the cyberneticists’ argument that the 
criteria of order are determined subjectively. Indeed, Ashby (1962) proclaimed that 
“organization is partly in the eye of the beholder” (p. 258). He argued that the value 
of organization is determined by the functions with multiple variables, and the 
possibility space of organization is constrained by the communication between the 
parts of a system. Different observers might derive organizational possibilities from 
the actual set of components, and therefore the theory of organization deals with 
“properties that are not intrinsic but are relational between observer and thing” 
(Ashby, 1962, p. 258).20 As I will show in the following chapters (see Chapter 2 for 
a discussion on autopoiesis, and Chapter 4 for a discussion on external vs. internal 
conditions of a system), this is a controversial claim, as it could lead us to 
misconstrue the criteria of organization as primarily subjective principles. 
The notion of self signifies that the process occurs without any relation to an 
external source of design. A question that could be asked at this point is why self-
organization, rather than merely organization? Principally, the notion of self 
suggests an endogenous condition, although the role of the relation between the 
system and its environment cannot be ignored. The answer to the question, above 
all, lies in the role of reciprocal relations within the system. Reciprocity between 																																								 																					
20 According to Ashby (1962), there is no clear distinction between an observation by an observer 
that is also a part of the system and an observation from an external viewpoint. Despite this, Ashby 
expresses a preference for the former option, i.e. an attitude of second order cyberneticists claiming 
that as to organization, the systems are observed from within (see Chapter 2). 
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internal components creates a basis for self-sustaining processes. Therefore, any 
emerging condition of reciprocity is also potentially a transition from an 
uncorrelated state to an individuated state (Collier, 2004). As will be explained in 
the fourth chapter, whilst beginning of this transition might be contingent, it is the 
potentially self-sustaining character of relationality that enables the contingent 
establishment of the relation to become a basis of self-organization. This is why, 
for this type of processes, the relevant concept is self-organization rather than 
mere organization.  
On the other hand, diversity of the concepts that are coined in this way, e.g. 
self-assembly, self-organization, and self-maintenance, indicates that several types 
of causal relations can be investigated due to the dynamics that are intrinsic and 
peculiar to the system. In general, if there is an organizing process, then this 
implies that the parts of a whole are arranged in a manner of utilizing energy to 
sustain specific relationality within the system. This brings cyclical causal 
processes into consideration (see Chapter 2), and due to causal cycles, the 
amount of work that is done through the cascades of energy release. In this 
context, self-organization can be considered as an umbrella term for investigating 
the ways that systems become work-efficient due to the interrelations. Yet, the 
details of how the work-efficiency is realized are essential: Does the process occur 
as a regulation or a transition? Is there reinforcement or inhibition with the causal 
relations? Or, is there an aggregation dehomogenizing the system or a dissolution? 
These differences point to a vast possibility area of diverse interactions. 
In this section, I have discussed the variations in defining self-organization and 
explained the common theoretical basis across notions of self-organization. For 
instance, the notions of self-organized criticality in macroevolution, self-
organization of a social insect colony, a self-organizing field as the morphogenetic 
development of an organism refer to very different phenomena. Still, they all are 
associated with the same concept and all share a common aspect, which is 
described as individuation (Collier, 2004). In the following section, I will explain 
what this common basis of individuation means, and continue my conceptual 
analysis by further exploring the distinction between transitional and regulative 
dynamics of self-organization that is consistent with these diversifying phenomena. 
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2. Transitional and Regulative Dynamics of Self-organization 
In the previous section, I discussed various approaches to self-organization, 
and mentioned some of the classifications. Now, I consider another candidate for 
classifying self-organization. As mentioned above, the way that Prigogine defines 
self-organization denotes emerging order in far-from-equilibrium conditions due to 
the amplification of chance factors, whereas Kant defines self-organization based 
on the internal reciprocity of the organism. I believe that both of these approaches 
can be incorporated into a broader conception of self-organization as they 
correspond to different aspects of individuation dynamics. Self-organization due to 
far-from-equilibrium conditions is transitional, and it is widespread as a reflection of 
nonlinear causality, whereas self-organization of the organism – inclusive of, but 
beyond nonlinearity – is regulative. Therefore in this section, I offer a distinction 
between transitional and regulative types of self-organization. I also argue that 
there is still a common basis of these two types, which must be understood in 
connection with the role of spontaneous order. I begin by addressing Schrödinger’s 
views on life, as his questioning is helpful to demarcate the problem of order in the 
context of thermodynamics, despite the drawback of preformationism implicit in it 
(Moss, 2003). Then I show how transitional and regulative dynamics correspond to 
different forms of self-organization, yet they are intertwined dynamics of biological 
processes. Finally, I discuss the role of autocatalytic sets, which are prevalent 
amongst explanations relating to the self-organized beginnings of life. Autocatalytic 
sets help to acknowledge the unified character of transitional and regulatory 
dynamics, since they set an example for the spontaneous emergence of bio-
chemical regulation. 
2.1 The question of life: Order from order or order from disorder? 
In this section, I examine Schrödinger’s approach to life’s order and its critical 
treatments. The questions that Erwin Schrödinger (1967/2013) asked concerning 
the nature of life are highly important. Firstly, he approaches the question of life 
from two different understandings concerning its physical basis, namely, dynamical 
laws that are investigated at the micro level and statistical laws that appear as the 
properties of aggregated masses at the macro level. Secondly, he reflects on life 
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as a phenomenon of order vis-à-vis entropy. He explains life as a case of order 
from order, as life depends on dynamical laws at the micro level instead of the 
statistical laws. Statistical laws are relevant due to macro-level properties that 
emerge as averaging effects out of micro-level disorder. However, emergence at 
the macro level due to self-organization is not involved in this relatively early 
theoretical approach towards life. This is pointed out by Moss (2003), who 
develops a critical account by emphasizing the far-from-equilibrium nature of 
organisms. Although Moss rightly criticizes the preformationist conception of 
Schrödinger, I argue that Schrödinger’s phrasing of order from order can be made 
relevant to a modern theory of self-organization by replacing micro-level 
determination with organism-level regulation in the explanation. Lastly, I claim that 
a description of emergent order might have different aspects, which lays a basis for 
the distinction between transitional and regulative dynamics of self-organization. 
In a book that deeply influenced relevant discussions in its aftermath, What Is 
Life?, Schrödinger developed a new understanding towards the question of life 
from the perspective of a physicist. Although many of his points are controversial 
and his general approach is criticized for being preformationist (Moss, 2003), his 
ideas have been a main source of inspiration in the theoretical developments in 
molecular biology, including the discovery of the double helix structure of DNA by 
James Watson and Francis Crick (Watson, 2001). Schrödinger identifies the 
antagonism between decay into disorder that is presumed by thermodynamics, and 
the order that is created by evolution.21 As discussed in the previous section, the 
second law of thermodynamics entails an increase of entropy in closed systems. In 
living systems, however, this is not the case. Due to their metabolic functioning, 
organisms manage to reduce stochasticity by constantly exchanging materials with 
their environment. On this basis, he proposed the concept of negative entropy, 
which has found some applications in biological studies later (Jaffe & Hebling-
Beraldo, 1993; Von Stockar & Liu, 1999; Jacob, Shapira, & Tauber, 2006). 
																																								 																					
21 This might seem relatively obvious today, but it was a novel idea back then. Another early remark 
concerning this antagonism has been made by the French philosopher Henri Bergson. As DiFrisco 
(2015) points out, although Bergson’s approach to life was condemned due to its vitalist content, 
the philosopher’s views were in fact in dialogue with the ideas in thermodynamics. 
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Schrödinger (1967/2013) remarks upon the randomness at the molecular level. 
The laws of nature apply on a statistical basis at the macro-scale, which means 
these laws denote approximate relationships that become relevant in so far as 
there is an aggregate of mass. For example, the margin of error in the calculation 
of macro-scale properties such as density, pressure, and temperature of a body of 
gas is inversely proportionate to the mass of gas. At the quantum level, leaps 
between different energy levels are stochastic. There is a higher probability of a 
leap to a higher energy state when heat is applied to the system, but there is no 
deterministic limit in terms of a change of the energy state for each particle. The 
ordered relations are observed only in a large multitude of particles, and physical 
interactions diverge from certain expectations as the size of these interactions 
decrease. 
Life overcomes the stochasticity of the micro level, which led Schrödinger 
(1967/2013) to investigate the basis of molecular order in living systems. He 
hypothesized that genes must be aperiodic crystals. Similar to the atoms of a 
crystal, which are microscopically ordered in a periodic arrangement, living 
systems are molecularly ordered. Yet, their microscopic arrangement is 
hypothesised to be aperiodic because genes are considered as heterogeneous 
bodies that are small but sufficiently large to both keep their structure intact and 
constitute the higher-level order by coding the components of life. In other words, 
structural patterns are thought to constitute the living system due to deterministic 
dynamics at the micro level.22 Contrary to statistical laws that apply at the macro-
scale, the source of orderliness against the decay due to heat is dynamical laws 
that are relevant for the micro-scale. On this basis, Schrödinger presupposes a 
clockwork type of determination from the micro level to the macro level.  
Moss (2003) criticizes this understanding of biological order for being 
preformationist, as the source of order is considered to be in the heritable material. 
Schrödinger’s hypothesis on life depends on the idea of the gene as a coding-
script, which presumes that genes include all the information that is necessary to 
construct higher-level properties of the organism. The notion of order from order 
																																								 																					
22 Although the molecular structure of genes had not been revealed then, the idea of hereditary 
code-script was promoted by Schrödinger (Moss, 2003, p. 54). 
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implies that the micro-scale order determines the macro-scale. Moss (2003) claims 
that this approach is based on a naïve conception that the cell is “a disorganized 
bag of atoms” hence “... the need for a solid-state aperiodic crystal to serve as that 
bedrock of order” (p. 56),23 disregarding the basic claim of self-organization that the 
order arises from disorder. This leads to ignoring the organizational aspect of life, 
which involves the role of intercellular interactions and the role of membrane 
compartmentalization in keeping the system far-from-equilibrium. Cellular 
membrane system is the basis of non-equilibrium condition of the organism. A 
complex system of tagging the biomolecules and molecular signalling enables their 
passage through the membranes according to functionally appropriate contexts by 
utilizing physical processes such as diffusion. Glycoproteins are modified due to 
differentiating enzyme activity in nested compartments. Variations of the 
oligosaccharide chains are provided by adding or removing a certain sugar unit, or 
by chain branching of the molecules (Moss, 2003, p. 86). Depending on the 
variability of glycoproteins, several types of membranes are reproduced. In this 
continuous production of cellular membranes, the processes of self-templating and 
complex feedback loops are essential. In this regard, Moss (2003) highlights the 
regulatory nature of the living systems, which keeps their heterogeneity at the 
organism level, as an alternative to Schrödinger’s claim depending on the 
hereditary code-script as the only executer of order. What Moss (2003) discusses 
is a complex network of compartmentalization in a multicellular organism as a 
basis of far-from-equilibrium condition. Of course, the relevant regulative dynamics 
at the molecular level were mostly unknown when Schrödinger developed his 
ideas, as Moss points out. Thus, Moss’ criticism targets not only Schrödinger’s 
ideas, but also focuses on the persisting idea of gene-centric interpretation of life’s 
order that is inspired by Schrödinger’s discourse. In this regard, the emphasis on 
the regulatory nature of life by Moss provides a basis for a contemporary 
understanding of biological self-organization. His critical stance draws from recent 
scientific developments that offer a more detailed explanation of the organizational 																																								 																					
23 Moss’ (2003) main criticism is that this preformationist conception conflates the Mendelian gene 
that is based phenotypic expression and the molecular gene, although the notion of gene as a 
coding script has failed. I will discuss the criticism of genetic reductionism in more detail in the 
fourth chapter. 
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aspect of biological systems. Schrödinger could not have known about these 
developments or the critical arguments against his view that followed. Still, despite 
these drawbacks, Schrödinger’s book on life was in the vanguard of progress on 
the issue due to pointing out the thermodynamic basis of life, and describing 
metabolic activity as a non-equilibrium condition. 
Goodwin (1987) is another critique of gene-centric preformationism and a 
proponent of self-organization. Similar to Moss (2003), Goodwin (1987) criticizes 
the view that gene as the part can determine the whole, yet he contends that the 
organism is a phenomenon of order from order, albeit from a different perspective 
from Schrödinger’s. He claims that there is a downward determination from the 
whole to the part, and the organism is a self-organizing field. Morphogenetic 
transformation of the fertilized egg is a main example of this self-organization. 
Cleavage patterns in the division of cells are determined geometrically by the 
developmental constraints imposed by the whole. According to this approach, 
Heterogeneity (“parts”) arises as a result of systematic transformations of the 
organized whole, which may be described as the manifestation of states 
selected from a potential set that satisfies a primary property of invariance 
characteristic of organisms. Thus, the organism is not so much a self-
organizing system that generates an ordered state from disordered or less 
ordered parts; it is more a self-organized entity that can undergo 
transformations preserving this state. (Goodwin, 1987, pp. 170-171) 
As mentioned above, both Moss (2003) and Goodwin (1987) are critical to the 
idea of the gene as the code-script that is represented by Schrödinger, and 
emphasize the holistic aspect of the organism’s organization. In this sense, the 
difference in the ways of describing self-organization, that is, order from disorder in 
Moss’ account (sure enough, as a reference to Prigogine’s ideas), and order from 
order in Goodwin’s account, does not necessarily point to a disagreement on the 
main characteristics of life’s organization. These authors do not deny the 
corresponding ideas that are implicit in the alternative uses of the concept: Both 
non-equilibrium dynamics, which is implicit in the idea of order from disorder, and 
downward determination that is geometrically imposed, which is implicit in the idea 
of order from order, are acknowledged within the mentioned approaches in 
different ways (see Chapter 3 and Chapter 4). 
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Why does self-organization seem to be associated with different patterns, 
then? I believe that the distinction between transitional vs. regulative dynamics of 
self-organization underlies the prima facie conflict between order from order and 
order from disorder. Moss (2003) mentions self-organization in the context of 
spontaneous order that also plays a role in living systems, whereas what Goodwin 
(1987) points out is a type of downward determination in which the regulatory 
aspect of the system is prominent. Therefore, an ambiguity in the concept of self-
organization is due to a conflation between regulative and transitional dynamics 
that leads to this prima facie difference. In the Kantian approach to the organism, 
the reciprocity between the parts and the whole is emphasized. The self-organized 
character of life as discussed by Kant mainly, but not exclusively, concerns how 
the order is sustained. This type of self-organization pays specific attention to the 
interdependent relations between the parts of a whole. In a processual respect as 
well, the organism’s organization is understood as a case of order from order, 
since the development and metabolic activities of the organism are maintained as 
a downward determination through its lifespan. In the case of an organism, the 
whole is regulated by itself, but obviously the organism itself is not the initiator of 
this organization. Unlike the self-organization of a flame, life does not arise 
spontaneously, but it regulates itself (Haldane, 1949), and therefore the organism’s 
organization is mainly regulative. In contrast, in the case of far-from-equilibrium 
conditions such as Bénard cells (see below), the system is uncorrelated at the 
beginning, and the interdependency is established through the process. In this 
context, it should be referred to as transitional self-organization. In the following 
section, I will try to delineate this conceptual distinction. 
2.2 A conceptual distinction 
Self-organization is due to a process of individuation both in living and non-
living processes as a consequence of the emergent interdependency between 
components. In processes that are referred to as order from disorder, which 
implies the spontaneous emergence of certain patterns in non-equilibrium 
conditions, self-organization is the very process of the formation of 
interdependency. In the case of the organism’s self-organization, we do not see the 
becoming of organization from an uncorrelated phase, but there is an incessant 
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regulative activity of the organization. This interdependency is a given, as the 
system must be organized from the beginning. On this basis, in this section, I offer 
a distinction between transitional and regulative dynamics of self-organization. In 
transitional self-organization, reciprocal relations between the components drive 
the transformation of the system into a state where the parameters of the system 
drastically change and a new order arises. Whereas the organism’s self-
organization is regulative, and its main characteristic is a constant responsiveness 
to any perturbations that can disrupt its structure. Nevertheless, this distinction 
does not mean that the organism’s regulation is detached from non-equilibrium 
dynamics, since biological stability of the organism includes underlying far-from-
equilibrium conditions. The emphasis on the regulatory character of the organism’s 
self-organization exposes the need for a further condition of individuality in addition 
to the spontaneous dynamics of order. 
First, let me explain why self-organization is due to a general condition of 
individuation, which forms the common basis of the processual nature of living and 
non-living systems. As Collier (2004) states, “the fundamental problem of 
individuation is to understand how parts of a thing can be parts of the same thing” 
(p. 155). There are different ways of answering this problem, e.g. appealing to the 
possession of a common essence or spatiotemporal contiguity. Instead, Collier 
(2004) goes on to claim that the unity relation, which he calls cohesion, is the 
underlying reason of the individuation of systems (p. 155). Cohesion denotes the 
processual basis of relations that enables the system to maintain its integrity 
against internal and external fluctuations (Collier, 2004, p. 165). Self-organization 
creates the condition of cohesion, hence the individuation (p. 169). In a similar 
vein, the French philosopher Gilbert Simondon (2009) puts forward the principle of 
individuation as opposed to the conception of atomism, which considers the 
individuality as a given, and hylomorphism, which presupposes the aspects of form 
and matter as distinct from each other. Atomism considers individuals as given, 
already solidifying the principle of individuation, and thus individuality at higher 
levels is ascribed to chance events in which atoms are reconfigured. 
Hylomorphism assumes that form is the basis of individuation. Considering 
dynamic processes which produce individuality, this corresponds to focusing on the 
end-state of individuation instead of the becoming of individuality, which is the 
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individual that is on the edge of the individuation process. Simondon expresses his 
alternative view as follows: 
There is ... the presupposition of the existence of a temporal succession: first 
there is the principle of individuation, then this principle undertakes an 
operation of individuation, and finally the constituted individual appears. If, on 
the contrary, one supposes that individuation does not only produce the 
individual, one would not attempt to pass quickly through the stage of 
individuation in order arrive at the final reality that is the individual--one would 
attempt to grasp the ontogenesis in the entire progression of its reality, and to 
know the individual through the individuation, rather than the individuation 
through the individual. (Simondon, 2009, p. 5) 
Individuation is a relative condition because the potentiality for new conditions 
of individuation is never completely exhausted. Therefore, there is a constant pre-
individual state of individuals that can be realized through new relations. For the 
living individuals in particular, Simondon (2009) emphasizes a metastable state 
that enables living things to modify themselves “by inventing new internal 
structures and by completely introducing itself into the axiomatic of vital problems” 
(p. 7). This implies that stability is not given at any condition, but it is temporarily 
acquired through multiple processes that produce cohesive structures. 
Furthermore, individuals participate in greater individuation of collective unities, 
and thereby dimensions of individuation are formed step by step through the 
magnitudes of scale (Simondon, 2009, p. 9). 
As a consequence of individuation, the principle of organization is not 
predefined, but it is established due to epigenesis (see Chapter 4). The individual 
cannot precede the process of individuation, but on the contrary, individuation is 
the source of the particularity of an individual (Simondon, 2009). It is this basis for 
individuation that characterizes the universal aspect of self-organization, and 
therefore there is no reason to think that self-organization in ontogeny is isolated 
from broader individuation dynamics in other relational conditions emerging in 
living systems. Transitional and regulative dynamics are both defined within self-
organization, since they refer to different aspect of individuation dynamics. 
Becoming of individuality is mainly a bottom-up process, which is realized through 
a process of epigenesis within a system as a given, or towards the constitution of 
new systemic interrelations. This offers an explanation why self-organization is also 
usually associated with bottom-up factors. In both types of organization that have 
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been discussed, bottom-up factors are involved in certain ways, as the local 
interactions create an integrated whole at a higher level. In self-organized systems, 
in fact bottom-up and top-down dynamics are coupled in a way that the local 
dynamics (bottom-up) lead to a systemic individuality. In transitional self-
organization, when the convenient conditions exist, such as an external gradient, 
bottom-up dynamics would lead to a correlated state, as analysed by dynamical 
systems theory. Interdependent systems, whether they become self-organized or 
they are already self-organized, gain a certain degree of capacity for regulating 
their parts, which means that top-down dynamics dominate (in the case of 
transition) the initial process of emergence. In non-living systems of self-
organization, this regulative capacity is minimal and temporary, and limited to the 
spontaneous dynamics of order, whereas in biological individuals, regulative self-
organization behaves as a long-term unification of processes of exploiting and 
controlling the bottom-up dynamics of spontaneous order. Contrary to a single 
diachronic case of emergence, in the case of regulative self-organization, there is a 
complex system of potentiality which is characterized by the levels of 
organization.24 
Now that I have described the general frame of self-organization due to a 
tendency for individuation, let us look at the role of non-equilibrium dynamics more 
closely, which is the basis of processes that I referred to as transitional self-
organization. In far-from-equilibrium systems, there is an emergent order as a 
result of a transformation that changes the conditions of systemic relations. The 
macrostate of a far-from-equilibrium system is dynamic, as it does not have a solid 
structure like crystals. Bénard cells are regarded as an exemplar of far-from-
equilibrium conditions due to self-organization (Keller, 2009; Swenson, 2013). 
These cells occur when a liquid is heated from below. The heat acts as a constraint 
triggering the pattern formation (see Figure 1.1). In the initial state where there is 
no temperature difference, molecules move in various directions randomly. As an 
effect of heating from below, a temperature difference occurs, causing a density 																																								 																					
24 At this point, the notion of biological autonomy (Moreno & Mossio, 2015) is necessary to 
understand the mechanisms of multiple self-constraints reducing the stochasticity of the organism 
systematically (see Chapter 2 and Chapter 4). 	
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gradient. Due to this, the molecules move upwards from the bottom layer where 
the fluid becomes less dense. After a critical threshold is crossed, whereby upward 
movement of the molecules becomes faster than the average random movement, 
the molecules overcome viscosity and begin rotating either clockwise or counter-
clockwise. Then, these rotations become correlated with each other by forming 
convection cells in different sizes. Many cells are formed at the beginning, and the 
smaller cells are subsumed by the bigger ones throughout the process. As a result, 
emerging macroscopic currents constitute the hexagonally shaped Bénard cells 
(Swenson, 2013). 
The formation of Bénard cells is an example of a far-from-equilibrium condition 
through energy flow, which shows how spontaneous order emerges. This situation 
does not contradict the general increase of entropy. The heated fluid is an open 
system. When Bénard cells are formed, heat still dissipates out of the system and 
contributes to an overall increase in entropy. Yet, through the process that leads to 
Bénard cells, there is an opposite tendency within the system, the emergence of 
self-organized shapes. Of course, the order due to transitional self-organization 
does not reverse the more inclusive increase of disorder, but it appears along with 
the increasing entropy. This occurs by the local emergence of self-organizing 
relations in which energy is used to sustain the temporary boundary of the system. 
Figure 1.1 Bénard cells. T1⟶T2 shows the heat gradient that leads to 
upward movement, and T3⟶T4 shows the increasing surface tension 
caused by the movement of heated molecules (from Swenson, 2013, p. 
168). 	
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As shown in the example of Bénard cells, self-sustaining loops arise through the 
flow due to a constraint that enables overcoming the random dissipation of energy. 
This creates the bedding of nested systemic relations, as the emerging internal 
localities of order are maintained by exploiting the rest of the system. This process 
is caused by self-maintaining cycles appearing within the system under suitable 
conditions. The stability of the self-organized system is based on a viability 
principle by definition: The randomness of a system is accompanied by diversity of 
several interactive ways, and among them, the forms of interaction which became 
more efficient to enforce and maintain a specific order would be more likely to 
sustain themselves. This aspect of self-organization is the emergence of an 
attractor state, which can appear not only in non-living systems such as hurricanes 
and convection cells, but also in biological systems such as the organization of 
social systems and noise-driven evolutionary dynamics. Therefore, this type of self-
organization is a fundamental physical capacity. It is a pattern that arises whenever 
there is a multiplicity of components under suitable conditions. 
As a structural pattern, transitional self-organization is a transformation from an 
uncorrelated state to a correlated state by utilizing the internal randomness of the 
system. Two factors are necessary for the transformation to a correlated state: first, 
a sudden or gradual change in the surrounding conditions that becomes a 
constraint, and second, locality acting as bottom-up dynamics, which determines 
the system’s reaction as a self-constraint. Locality of interactions is due to the 
internal randomness creating a causal asymmetry within the system (Hemelrijk et 
al., 2005). In other words, locality implies the causal effect of contingency that 
contributes to systemic changes in a nonlinear way. Through the processes of 
transition, even though it is known that amplified locality will somehow affect the 
system’s pathway, it is not possible to predict precisely which contingent factors 
will end up in systemic changes and what exact path will be taken. The amplified 
asymmetry in local interactions is always engaged in a higher-level correlation that 
is finalized in the organization of the whole, that is, asymmetries due to micro-level 
contingency become opportunities for a novel condition of coherence condition at 
the systemic level. The appearance of these coherent structures in the macro-
conditions is well acknowledged in the literature on the emergence of complexity 
due to internal dynamics. Feedback loops have a key role in this kind of 
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transformation. In a system with high complexity, positive feedbacks lead to macro-
state asymmetries by enabling the amplification of random elements, which creates 
subsystems acting semi-autonomously. The consequence for the sub-systems is 
an increase of energy efficiency, as sub-systemic loops can drain energy from the 
rest of the global system. Or, these sub-systems can be arranged in ways that can 
drain the potential of the externalized parts, which also corresponds to harnessing 
the usage of energy at the systemic level. The general consequence is that the 
same amount of energy can create more complexity if harnessed through several 
mechanisms, as is well known from metabolic activities. 
Several authors remarked that the abovementioned processes imply a global 
tendency to maximize complex order and production of entropy at the same time 
(Nicolis & Prigogine, 1977; Juretić & Županović, 2003; Salthe, 2004), and some of 
these authors have also suggested that this global tendency should be formulated 
as a fourth law of thermodynamics (Morel & Fleck, 2006; Swenson, 1989, 1991, 
2009). Swenson (1989) put forward this as the law of maximizing entropy 
production. To define this process, he termed the notion of autocatakinesis: 
An autocatakinetic system is a system that maintains its “self” as an entity 
constituted by, and empirically traceable to, a set of nonlinear (circularly 
causal) relations through the dissipation or breakdown of field (or 
environmental) potentials (or resources) in the continuous coordinated motion 
of its components. (Swenson, 1991, p. 50) 
With the notion of autocatakinesis, Swenson (1991) refers to individuation 
dynamics, or more specifically, a natural tendency for individuation in complex 
systems. Thus, he argues that in autocatakinetic systems, the law of maximum 
entropy production applies. This law (or mentioned as a principle in certain studies) 
presumes that complex systems tend to maximize their internal production of 
entropy (Levine & Tribus, 1978; Lorenz & Kleidon, 2005). It is stated as: “A system 
will select the path or assembly of paths out of available paths that minimizes the 
potential or maximizes the entropy at the fastest rate given the constraints” 
(Swenson, 2010, p. 173). The idea under this notion has been discussed in physics 
and the physical basis of living systems since the 1970’s. Furthermore, it has been 
claimed that this principle can show a connection between thermodynamics and 
cognitive autonomy (Wissner-Gross & Freer, 2013). The law of maximal entropy 
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production is also connected to self-organized criticality (Dewar, 2005), although 
this claim has been disputed (Grinstein & Linsker, 2007). In general, this principle 
remains a controversial question in physics (Prokopenko, Ay, & Polani, 2013, p. 6). 
Swenson’s approach suggests that the scope of cases that can be explained in 
terms of transitional self-organization might be much larger than originally 
conceived. However, to formulate a new law out of this type of self-organization is 
significantly more ambitious. I return to this issue in the following chapter. Below, I 
focus on the other side of this debate, and will argue that transitional dynamics of 
self-organization might have dissimilar consequences in different complex systems 
despite the generality of the phenomenon. 
To explore these differences, let us compare two different cases of transitional 
self-organization: Bénard cells, which are generally regarded as the paradigm case 
for non-living self-organization, and an experiment concerning the role of 
contingency in the self-organized evolution of bacteria populations (Swenson, 
Arendt, & Wilson, 2000). In the process of the amplification of contingent factors 
with Bénard cells (as the molecular movements are swept through emerging 
loops), it is not possible to precisely predict of the specific transformation of the 
system at the micro level – albeit one could also argue that this is due to an 
epistemic limitation – whereas it is possible to predict the macro-state of the 
correlated condition that appears as the hexagonic cells. Therefore, the formation 
of Bénard cells is not an open-ended process in terms of creating a condition that 
is latent with other qualitative transformations, i.e. geometrical formations other 
than the hexagonic shape is not expected. On the other hand, in the case of 
bacteria colonies, the role of amplified contingency is different. In parallel evolution 
experiments with quite identical bacteria colonies, it has been demonstrated that, 
due to sampling errors, noise can lead to dramatic differences in the evolutionary 
path between separate microcosms including ecosystem properties such as the 
acidic level of the environment (Swenson et al., 2000, see below). This means that 
contingent factors can lead to divergent paths of evolution in which bacteria 
colonies survive in different ways. It is known that microorganisms always evolve in 
interdependent ways in symbiotic networks such as biofilms, where multiple 
species develop symbiotic networks. This also implies a potential for immense 
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diversity due to alternative symbiotic combinations, which is why a slight difference 
in the beginning condition can create a different end-state. The amplified 
contingency provides alternative options of viability in different populations, and an 
emergent self-organization determines the specific evolutionary path. In this 
regard, it is asserted that self-organization creates a new dimension in the 
parameter space of ecosystem dynamics (Wilson, 2005, pp. 160-164). Different 
from Bénard cells which are not predictable at the specific arrangement of the 
microstate, but only predictable due to the form of their end-state, the self-
organized characteristic of biological evolution has progressive consequences. 
Arguably, this is because biological systems are capable of creating more 
organizational hierarchy and higher levels of interdependent complexity. Moreover, 
this demonstrates that transitional self-organization has far-reaching implications in 
biological systems. 
The abovementioned cases should be understood in terms of bottom-up 
dynamics in transitional self-organization by the amplification of contingency. On 
the other hand, regulative self-organization occurs in living systems in which top-
down dynamics are dominant and perturbations are tolerated. This kind of 
organization is also a matter of interplay between bottom-up and top-down 
dynamics, as the parts and the whole determine each other reciprocally. A 
multicellular organism is an ideal example of regulative self-organization with 
restrictive top-down mechanisms in several important aspects: Regulatory 
feedback has an extensive and fundamental role from cellular activities to 
homeostatic mechanisms; gene-editing mechanisms reduce the possibly negative 
effects caused by copying error; the immune system destroys the cancerous cells 
emerging from mutations, and regulates the microbiota in the body by tolerating 
neutral and beneficial microorganisms and killing possibly harmful ones, etc. In 
addition, there are centralized functions such as the one of the nervous system in 
which external stimuli are coupled with the actions of the organism. In this sense, 
regulative self-organization of the multicellular organism is a case of high-level 
interdependency. It is claimed by different authors that self-organization dynamics 
enable the formation of intradependent structures, which are favoured by 
evolutionary selection (Kauffman, 1993; Batten, Salthe, & Boschetti, 2008; Mitchell, 
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2012). On the other hand, this aspect of self-organization is only possible through 
the regulative basis of organization, which spreads through the reproduction of 
organisms. In other words, reciprocity between the parts is sealed by the regulative 
whole. The origin of the regulative self-organization in a cell is the division of 
another cell, and as to an organism, it is the reproduction of parent organisms. In 
this sense, life is the continuity of this regulative type of order that has persisted on 
Earth for billions of years, as this maintenance of biological organization can be 
understood as a long chain of life cycles. In this regard, albeit not in the exact way 
that Schrödinger defined, the main pattern in life is order from order, typically in an 
organism, since for regulative self-organization, the main pattern is the 
maintenance of order within individuality. 
In summary, self-organization can be defined as a bottom-up emergence of 
systemic relations building the system’s own top-down dynamics. In transitional 
self-organization, the bottom-up emergence of systemic relations is prominent, 
whereas in regulative self-organization, the constant activity of top-down dynamics 
determines the individuality of the system. Organisms are characterized by 
functional integrity, and their functional integrity is based on constant regulatory 
activity such as the replication of genes, production of enzymes, homeostatic 
mechanisms, etc. In homeostatic mechanisms, the intradependency of the self-
organized system is already established at the beginning of the process, and the 
downward determination of the biological processes has a vital function for 
individuation. Therefore, self-organization does not refer to a single transition, but 
to a regulatory control due to feedback relations. In this sense, regulatory 
organization contextualises the phenotypic outcome as a consequence of the 
interconnectivities between the components of the system. This occurs due to 
metabolism, physiology, and gene regulation (Jaeger & Monk, 2014). For example, 
in metabolic activities, feedback processes determine body’s sugar consumption 
and storage. Cells break down sugar, which generates the end product of ATP 
(adenosine triphosphate), and the accumulation of ATP leads to a negative 
feedback, which inhibits the enzyme activity producing ATP. Various similar 
processes depending on feedbacks are responsible for the self-maintenance of the 
organism through homeostatic regulation. 
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Nonlinear dynamics of order are incorporated within the regulative basis of 
organization. Consider the role of the dynamic instability of the microtubules in the 
organism. These are the organelles made of tubulin proteins, dynamically 
shortening or lengthening within the cell, thereby controlling cellular activities such 
as division, transportation of biomolecules, and so on. The dynamic shape of these 
organelles is due to a nonlinear process in which hydrolisation of GTP (guanosine 
triphosphate) into GDP (guanosine diphosphate) leads to the shortening of the one 
end of the tubular structure, or GDP’s reassembling into GTP leads to lengthening 
that end of the organelle. In this way, the organelle can move within the cell, or its 
size can change. Dynamic instability in this example acts as a bottom-up factor in 
the organization of the whole organism. This means that the dynamics of the 
process are not directly controlled by a centralized structure, but their occurrence 
as a bottom-up factor contributes to biological functions at higher levels such as 
cell division. As another example, the role of stigmergy in the organization of a 
social insect colony, which I mentioned in the previous section, can be considered 
in the context of the bottom-up constitution of order due to local interrelations, 
since the organization at the colony level is due to local rules of interactions.25 
Bottom-up factors of this kind are only one aspect of the overall self-organization 
because maintenance of the system depends on the downward determination from 
the whole. As the organism as a whole is a regulatory system, part-to-part 
relationships are bottom-up factors, and the part-to-whole relationship, in line with 
Kant’s definition, is both determined due to, and for the sake of, the whole. 
However, when we consider the role of bottom-up factors in a case of transitional 
self-organization such as the formation of Bénard cells, we see that bottom-up 
factors lead to an emergent pattern that is peculiar to the process, and the 
emergent properties that are created by the local interactions are temporary, as the 
systemic correlation ends when the process is over. Both in transitional and 
regulative types, random variations have a role in the emergence of organization, 
yet with an important difference, bottom-up factors in the case of spontaneous 
																																								 																					
25 I stated that regulative self-organization appears in the organisms. Social insect colonies are 
complex regulatory systems, and therefore, the appearance of this type of self-organization 
supports the claim that they are superorganisms. 
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order are not utilized in higher-level functions and they are not constantly 
regulated. 
The distinction between transitional and regulative dynamics means neither 
that the regulation of an established order is the sole mechanism in living systems, 
nor that the emergence of order is exclusive to non-living systems. In the 
emergence of order, the multiplicity of the components in a system is a key factor. 
This is evident in cases such as Bénard cells where the emergent order relates to 
components that become interdependent. This is a physical capacity, and there is 
no reason to think that life is exempt from it. In fact, emergent order is exploited 
and encapsulated by the regulatory mechanisms of life. This is due the fact that 
self-organization gives an adaptive capacity to the organism, which is improved 
once it becomes the target of natural selection (Mitchell, 2012). Life exploits the 
causal capacity of self-organization, at the biochemical level in particular, as it 
builds on nonlinear processes that can maintain themselves. At the micro level, 
formation of patterns has a crucial role, which appears in cases such as noise-
induced phenomena, morphogenesis, or spontaneous self-assembly (see Chapter 
3). This also explains a basic difference of living systems and self-organized 
processes from aggregates of particles that spend time in possible micro-
configurations evenly, as the former deviate from homogeneity and change in an 
irreversible way. 
As transition and regulation refer to structural aspects of processes, the 
distinction within self-organization is relevant as an abstraction, whereas in actual 
systems, we see nested systemic relations in which these dynamics are 
intertwined. There is a reciprocal relation between these two types of dynamics. 
Emergent order might lead to the creation of regulatory structures as well as 
physical dynamics of transitional self-organization can be exploited by life as an 
element of functional integration. Dynamics of emergent order have a role both at 
the micro level due to emerging patterns embodied within the autonomous system 
of the organism, and at the macro level due to transitional self-organization 
appearing through the co-evolution of ecosystems. Moreover, the organism itself 
represents the unification of regulative and nonlinear dynamics, as I explained 
before that organism’s metabolic activities create a far-from-equilibrium condition. 
Reflections of transitional dynamics can also be found in the developmental 
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processes. Jaeger and Monk (2014) argue that regulatory robustness of organisms 
can be explained due to a way of genotype-phenotype mapping that is similar to 
the attractor basins of dynamical systems. An attractor basin is a sub-region of a 
phase space to which the parameters of a trajectory converge. Due to the 
regulatory nature of the genetic networks that buffer the perturbations of some of 
the mutations, different genotypes might have similar expressions at the 
phenotypic level. Two different genotypes that are almost same with each other 
might correspond to different robust states when they are expressed in the 
phenotype, hence these genotypes would be involved in different attractor basins. 
This approach emphasizes the role of nonlinearity at the intersection of 
evolutionary dynamics and ontogeny. 
The reciprocal relation between transitional and regulative self-organization can 
shed light to theories about the beginning of life. One of the main hypotheses 
concerning the origin of life is the emergence of autocatalytic sets that led to the 
formation of first RNA (see Section 2.3). It is argued that spontaneous emergence 
of these autocatalytic sets from inanimate matter points to the role of chemical self-
organization (Vasas, Fernando, Santos, Kauffman, & Szathmáry, 2012), which 
indicates that transitional self-organization has historically played a role in the 
evolution of organisms as regulatory systems. The Sun is the main source of free 
Figure 1.2 The photon mill. Multiple self-organization 
phenomena are accompanied by the global increase of 
entropy (from Feistel & Ebeling, 2011, p. 89). 	
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energy on Earth. As a result of a continuous flow of photons from the Sun to the 
Earth, entropy is produced proportionate to the thermal gradient between 
temperature of the hot Sun surface (6000 Kelvin) and cold outer space (3 Kelvin). 
The amount of entropy production also corresponds to an upper limit to the 
ecological self-organization on Earth, as living systems depend on utilizing solar 
energy (Feistel & Ebeling, 2011, p. 90). From a cosmological viewpoint, there is a 
local increase of order on Earth because light energy is captured by the process of 
photosynthesis, turned into chemical energy, and harnessed through the metabolic 
activities. Since living systems are characterized by negative entropy, at a global 
scale, the biosphere corresponds to a far-from-equilibrium condition utilizing solar 
energy as an external source. 
The entire chain of processes in which light energy is fixed by autotrophs, 
turned into chemical energy, and then used for the metabolic activities of 
heterotrophs is a case of transitional self-organization, as the global increase of 
order on Earth corresponds to a local increase of order in the universe. However, 
the relation between self-organization and evolution is not limited to this global 
condition. Studies such as Nk model (Kauffman, 1993) and the application of self-
organized criticality to evolution, which I explained in the previous section, involve 
the idea of transitional self-organization that also appears in research into adaptive 
landscapes. An adaptive landscape is a way of modelling that represents the 
fitness of differentiating genotypes, which includes peaks of high fitness and 
valleys of low fitness. Valleys and peaks correspond to fluctuations of 
polymorphism within the population. Valleys are areas of low fitness, in which 
polymorphism increases due to lower selection pressure, while it decreases in 
peaks of high fitness. Typically, a peak in the adaptive landscape is followed by a 
valley due to the expected fluctuations of polymorphism within the population. This 
is expected when mating within the population is random. However, it is found that 
in some cases specific phenotypes equally represent the peak, and the periodic 
appearance of valleys is skipped (Wilson, 2005). This implies that a subset of 
genotypes have adapted in a way that their fitness is maximised collectively, for all 
these genotypes occupy the adaptive peaks due to genetic recombination. In a 
radically epistatic system, even if the inbreeding within the population is random, a 
subset of genotypes with a higher fitness rate can be generated randomly in the 
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phenotypes as a consequence of an inbreeding subset of genotypes (Wilson, 
2005). The epistatic subset consists of intermediate forms in which genotypic 
characteristics arise together. Due to interdependent expression, relevant genes 
collectively survive through this evolutionary process, which sweeps the expected 
decrease in the fitness level, and leads to consecutive peaks in the adaptive 
landscape. The interdependency between genes is expressed in the phenotype, 
and genetically intermediate forms might not be phenotypically intermediate. This 
exemplifies an emergent pattern in evolution as a consequence of reciprocal 
relations established within the system. 
There is strong evidential support in favour of the dynamic relation between 
natural selection and self-organized patterns emerging at the ecological level. 
Dynamics of self-organization can affect evolution in different ways: by the neutral 
mechanism of random drift, by suppressing selection pressure, or by facilitating 
natural selection (Wilson, 2005).  This effect usually occurs through noise-driven 
processes, in which contingent effects and the reciprocity of relations lead to the 
evolutionary pathways that are influenced by self-organization. Emergence of 
interdependency at multiple levels of selection is a basic condition of this 
reciprocity in evolution, which has been observed in different experiments. In one 
experiment, forty replicate yeast populations were isolated and observed for 
several generations (Lang et al., 2013). It was found that different point mutations 
were fixed across the populations, and in certain cases neutral mutations were 
more likely to survive than the adaptive ones. This was because these mutations 
arose in cohort-like structures in which interdependent genes were passed on 
together. Moreover, this reciprocal effect might appear as a nonlinear phenomenon 
by leading to an emergent type of order within an ecosystem. This was shown in 
another experiment, in which almost identical microcosms were formed by 
inoculating microbes from a common source (Swenson et al., 2000). This 
experiment found out that the evolution of these microcosms was sensitively 
dependent on the initial conditions, as the small deviations could be amplified by 
the interrelations within the system. Initial variations due to noise effect, which were 
regarded as small differences between the systems that were negligible, led to 
dramatic divergence between evolutionary pathways after several generations. 
Separated microcosms evolved in such divergent ways that properties at the level 
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of the ecosystem such as the suitable pH level of the environment and degradation 
of toxic materials differed between systems. This demonstrated that heritable 
differences in reciprocal interactions between organisms were responsible for the 
noise-driven evolution (Swenson et al., 2000). 
It should be clear that the emergent patterns in the evolution of ecosystems are 
obviously transitional. On the other hand, since evolving populations in the 
abovementioned examples are comprised of organisms, which are regulatory 
systems, this means that regulatory systems are the sub-elements of transitional 
self-organization. Vice versa is also true: transitional dynamics at the molecular 
level are embodied within the regulatory body of the organism (see Chapter 3). The 
second aspect is usually discussed as part of the physico-chemical basis of life. As 
will be explained in the following chapters, a relevant approach states that the 
dynamics of self-organization are transformed into the multicellular organism due 
to the moulding of natural selection (Newman & Bhat, 2009). Spontaneous 
emergence of higher-level patterns depending on local interactions and far-from-
equilibrium dynamics appear in several biological processes with different scales. 
Dynamic instability of the microtubules, dynamical states of the cells such as 
oscillatory behaviour that are passed on to divided cells, and the role of self-
organized fluctuations in morphogen gradients are some examples of these utilized 
transitional dynamics within the regulatory system (see Chapter 4). 
In this section, I discussed transitional and regulative aspects of self-
organization. I also claimed that these are unified within the organism, and 
intertwined in living processes in general. With this conceptual clarification, I 
considered possible confusions relating to self-organization that arise from a 
conflation between spontaneous dynamics of order and self-maintaining nature of 
living systems. The intersection of these two types of dynamics points to the 
emergence of autocatalytic sets back in the history of life. Therefore, in the 
following section, I examine how autocatalytic sets offer an explanation for the 
evolutionary basis of regulative self-organization. 
2.3 Autocatalytic sets 
Autocatalytic sets, which are collectively catalysing chemical reactions, are 
widely debated due to their role in the origin of life (Hordijk, 2013). They make it 
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possible to extend evolutionary pathways to molecular selection, as chemical self-
organization was a main drive of evolution before the appearance of genetic 
inheritance mechanisms. In this section, I discuss autocatalytic sets as an origin of 
regulative systems that appeared as a consequence of transitional self-
organization in which bottom-up dynamics are dominant. The scientific models and 
empirical findings discussed below indicate the high probability that the first 
biological systems emerged as a result of spontaneously formed self-sustaining 
loops. Hypercycle (Eigen & Schuster, 1977) is one of the first models of self-
organization in this context (see Chapter 2). I focus on the work-constraint cycles 
(Kauffman, 1993), and RAF models (Hordijk, 2013), which have developed from 
the ideas related to work-constraint cycles. These models are essential for self-
organization as they are attempts to explain life’s order in the face of entropy. 
Kauffman (2000) argues that the simplest form of life should consist of a work cycle 
that is able to overcome the increase of disorder. In this view, the basic unit of 
biological autonomy is a work cycle that consists of the coupling of a spontaneous 
and a nonspontaneous reaction. However, although life generally depends on this 
type of coupling, the claim that a simple work cycle can be a minimal condition of 
biological order is controversial. Thus, I will examine a recent revision to this 
account, which considers autocatalytic sets to include some additional elements as 
the nutrient source of the system (Gatti, Hordijk, & Kauffman, 2017). I argue that 
this revision also indicates that the emergence of life’s regulatory structure cannot 
be sufficiently explained without also considering the implications of an ecological 
transformation, which is an issue that I discuss further in the following chapter. 
Furthermore, the question of how spontaneous order contributed to the origin of life 
remains to be controversial, as there are different theories concerning the origin of 
life. This question also relates to the debates concerning the minimum chemical 
conditions for life, e.g., whether membrane closure is necessary for life or RNA 
based catalysis came first. Under any circumstance concerning these alternative 
hypotheses, the chemical decay due to thermodynamic stability and life’s kinetic 
solution to this decay is fundamental, which demonstrates the significance of self-
organization in understanding the origins of life. 
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Eigen’s hypercycle is one of the first studies on the autocatalytic nature of early 
life. Formation and degradation are combined in organisms (Eigen & Schuster, 
1977, p. 547), and therefore biological systems must produce themselves 
continuously. In this context, Eigen worked on the notion of hypercycle in which 
several self-maintaining cycles are connected with each other, proposing one of 
the first models of self-organization based on autocatalytic sets (see Chapter 2). 
Later, Kauffman (1993, 2000) proposed a similar model, which was applied in 
experimental studies and other mathematical theories, sometimes with 
modifications (Hordijk, 2013). According to this model, a simple autocatalytic set 
includes two polymers, namely, polymer A and polymer B. Each of the polymers is 
constituted by two sub-fragments: A’ and A’’ are the sub-fragments of the polymer 
A, whereas B’ and B’’ are the sub-fragments of B. There is a reciprocal relation of 
catalysing between A and B, as A catalyses the binding of B’ and B’’ in order to 
make B, and likewise, B catalyses the binding of A’ and A’’ in order to make A (see 
Figure 1.3). In this way, it is supposed that the entire production of the components 
of the system is to be catalysed collectively (Kauffman, 2000, pp. 31-32). 
Kauffman’s (2000) theory is essential because he proposed that spontaneous 
dynamics of self-organization and life’s regulation are not distinct phenomena. He 
claims that the minimal unit of biological autonomy is a work cycle that couples 
spontaneous and nonspontaneous reactions. In metabolic activities, exergonic 
Figure 1.3 Kauffman’s model of autocatalytic sets. Black squares represent the 
reaction of ligation of the Polymer A and Polymer B. The arrows show the 
reciprocal relation of catalysis between a ligated polymer and the sub-fragments of 
the other group (from Kauffman, 2000, p. 32). 
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reactions are spontaneous, which implies that free energy is released after these 
reactions, whereas endergonic reactions require an input of energy, which is stored 
in chemical bonds. The coupling of these two reactions implies that the release of 
free energy from an exergonic reaction is used to fuel the endergonic reaction by 
forming a self-sustaining chemical activity. Experiments have not verified the 
appearance of the work-constraint cycles without other regulatory mechanisms 
(Kauffman, 2000). However, as will be shown below, some modified versions of 
this model have been supported by empirical evidence. 
One of Kauffman’s (1986) early ideas on autocatalytic sets, named the binary 
polymer model, predicts that in an environment with different chemical reactions, 
randomly established relations between products catalysing other products would 
transform into a set of collectively catalysing chemical reactions. Kauffman also 
presumed a probabilistic calculation, according to which he concluded that the 
emergence of autocatalytic sets would be inevitable at some point. Kauffman’s 
argument concerning the inevitability of autocatalytic sets was criticized for 
supposing a constant logarithmic increase of catalysis of the molecules, which is 
unrealistic for the actual conditions, and for not recognising the evolvability of the 
system (Lifson, 1997; Vasas et al. 2010; as cited in Hordijk, 2013, p. 878). Still, this 
initial model on autocatalytic sets was developed further in other studies. One type 
of models is called RAF (reflexively autocatalytic and food generated) sets (Hordijk, 
2013). In this model, one set is defined for the types of molecules, whereas 
another set is defined for the types of chemical reactions. Also, available types of 
food in the environment are defined as a subset of molecule types. Finally, a 
catalysis set is defined in which specific reactions catalyse specific molecules. 
Accordingly, in a situation where all reactions are catalysed by at least one catalyst 
and all the molecules are produced from a food source, the system is an 
autocatalytic set (Hordijk, 2013, p. 878). In RAF theory, the original representation 
of the autocatalytic network in which catalysts are also the products is modified, as 
the new model defines them separately. It is emphasized that the RAF model can 
include the factors for evolvability (Hordijk, Steel, & Kauffman, 2012), and it has 
found a wider application (Gatti et al., 2017). This mathematical representation 
indicates that, similar to Eigen’s hypercycle, a hierarchy in the organization of 
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autocatalytic sets might appear through evolution. The conjecture is that the 
autocatalytic process alternates between different subsets, and smaller 
autocatalytic cycles are nested in or intertwined with more inclusive cycles. This 
kind of alternation and nonlinear development of autocatalysis also implies 
competition and selection between subsets (Vasas et al., 2012; Hordijk, 2013; 
Hordijk et al., 2012). Also, intertwined RAF sets are more robust to perturbations 
than selfish RNA molecules (Hordijk, 2013, p. 880). 
It is beyond doubt that the existence of life in its current regulatory forms would 
not be possible without catalysis. Enzymes, which maintain the kinetic conditions of 
a reaction that would otherwise thermodynamically occur in a much longer time, 
are the most essential catalysts. A crucial question with autocatalytic cycles relates 
to the capacity for self-sufficiency, more broadly, to a possible concern directed 
toward the “self” in theories of self-organization. Current life forms depend on a 
complex network of reciprocal self-production that includes enzymes, nucleic acids, 
and so on. It is found difficult to model a self-sufficient biological system that is 
simpler than this complex organismic condition because even though RNA and 
DNA molecules are self-instructive, none of these parts are able to replicate 
without the organizing whole. To overcome this problem, in vitro experiments are 
designed to create viable cycles of chemical reactions that could represent more 
simplistic equivalents of today’s complex networks of life. These experiments show 
that this kind of chemical cycles can in fact be created artificially (Hordijk, 2013, 
877). More recent studies focus on the evolvability, emergence, and robustness 
aspects of the problem that requires understanding possible self-driven 
mechanisms enabling the increase of complexity. 
Autocatalysis has crucial implications in terms of the emergence of order in 
biological processes through nonlinear effects. In chemical equilibrium, there is a 
causal cycle between the reactants and the products in a way that the rate of the 
forward reaction that produces the products and the rate of the reverse reaction 
that produces the reactants equal each other. In autocatalytic reactions, however, 
the causal cycle is nonlinear, as one of the products of the reaction also acts as a 
catalyser of the reaction. The chemical reaction has more than one fixed point in 
autocatalytic systems, as it is fixed as a function of the concentration of the 
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reactant that is also produced. This kind of loop also has multiple macro-states 
and, therefore, it is more ordered than a reaction which does not have autocatalytic 
characteristics. As mentioned in the first section, according to entropy formula, a 
system is more ordered if it has fewer possible micro-configurations producing the 
same macro-state. In the case of autocatalytic reactions, the availability of more 
possible macro-states changes the ratio in favour of the ordered macro-state. 
Therefore, the nonlinear nature of autocatalytic sets implies an ordered state 
depending on multiple realizability at the macro level, which might help to reveal 
the emergence of mechanisms that can tolerate perturbations. A metastable state 
at the macro level which is not functionally dependent on a certain microstate is a 
distinctive feature of autocatalytic reactions. In this sense, a multiply realizable 
cycle of nonlinear reactions can be a step to the evolution of systems in which top-
down dynamics are dominant. 
Life consists of intertwined chains of production, hierarchical organization, 
cyclic processes, and mutual dependence characterized by an autocatalytic 
closure at a global level (Kauffman, 2000). In recent studies, autocatalytic sets 
have been analysed in current biological systems. It has been found out that E. coli 
can form autocatalytic networks in which up to 1800 reactions are implemented 
(Sousa, Hordijk, Steel, & Martin, 2015), which is the first empirical affirmation of 
autocatalytic sets in living systems (Gatti et al. 2017). It is claimed that 
autocatalytic loops are likely to emerge within the ecosystems as well, due to the 
symbiotic networks where the participants gain positive selection benefit 
(Ulanowicz, 1997). Emerging networks of mutual selection would drain resources 
from other species that are out of the symbiotic network, acting as a self-catalysing 
loop. The idea of spontaneously appearing autocatalytic sets is no longer just a 
hypothesis. Still, concerning the origin of life, in the absence of an observation of a 
chemical system that can exemplify first transitions to living systems, one could 
object that aforementioned theories are mostly based on models, which remain to 
be empirically proven. 
Studies on autocatalytic sets indicate an interesting potential in terms of 
developing a unified account of self-organization. The experiments and models 
suggest that collective autocatalysis as a form of regulative self-organization does 
	 76	
not have to be a given from the beginning, but it could emerge due to transitional 
self-organization. Moreover, as the autocatalytic sets are dependent on 
establishing reciprocal relations, the emergence of higher organizational levels 
might be possible in nested structures, which is expressed by the notion of 
“autocatalytic sets of autocatalytic sets” (Hordijk et al., 2012), This implies that 
collective production of the system’s parts, which has been defined as a 
characteristic of regulative self-organization, can also emerge spontaneously. In 
other words, conglomeration of the cycles of chemical reactions could be 
transformed into basic forms of biological regulation. Sure enough, this is still far 
from explaining the self-organization of the modern organism. Yet, autocatalytic 
sets are essential in terms of showing the connection between spontaneous 
dynamics of order and biological regulation. In higher forms such as multicellularity, 
it is not possible to prove this connection directly, as in that case spontaneous 
organization cannot lead to biological regulation by itself. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I gave a historical outline of the studies on self-organization 
which was necessary to introduce the diversity of approaches to the account. I 
distinguished emergent dynamics of order from the regulative self-organization that 
is central to biological autonomy. I have identified two different contexts in which 
emergent dynamics of order are involved. One of them is a type of transitional self-
organization, which involves the emergence of patterns, and the other one 
concerns the role of self-organization in the functional integrity of an organism. I 
also argued that these two dynamics are intertwined in real systems, and briefly 
discussed the role of self-organization in evolution. 
The distinction that I suggested between transitional and regulative types will 
be a conceptual basis for developing an integrative approach concerning biological 
organization in the following chapters. As the main problem of this thesis, I focus 
on the self-organization of the organism. In this regard, acknowledging the physical 
basis of life’s organization is essential, which is why it was necessary to review 
theories such as thermodynamics. As will be discussed in the next chapter, there 
are different approaches to the organism’s autonomy, in which the role of either 
self-organization or equivalent concepts is widely discussed. Some contemporary 
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accounts dealing with biological organization struggle to identify peculiarities of life 
within a general understanding of emergent order. This is why the dynamics of 
order in non-living and living systems must be addressed to make it possible to 
both bridge and distinguish these dynamics. 
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Chapter Two 
Life As Organization 
 
 
Introduction 
In the first chapter, I made a distinction between regulatory self-organization of 
the organism and transitional self-organization that brings unprecedented changes 
in the systemic whole. I also emphasized that life’s organization is inclusive of, yet 
beyond the spontaneous dynamics of order. Now, I will focus on life’s organization 
with an aim to clarify the ways in which specific regulatory structures are 
dependent on matter’s potential for organization. Life’s organization is multifaceted; 
hence it is beyond the remit of this thesis to offer an exhaustive account of the 
topic. In this regard, only certain problems will be covered in so far as they 
contribute to the explanation of the organism’s individuation dynamics. More 
specifically, in this chapter, I will discuss the issues within the organizational 
approach, which develops an anti-reductionist view towards life. This is a 
continuation of the historical review that I started in the first chapter, as I consider 
accounts that critically examine the notion of self-organization. With this 
discussion, I intend to show why self-organization is preferable to alternative 
approaches. Within the organizational approach, only some of the theoretical lines 
are open to the notion of self-organization.26 Two philosophical approaches that I 
will address are autopoiesis and the autonomous perspective, which are the 
theories that have been developed to explain biological autonomy. Self-
organization also promotes the idea of biological autonomy. However, the 
perspective of self-organization that I adopt in this chapter has other implications 
beyond biological autonomy. Autopoiesis and the autonomous perspective, either 
openly or implicitly, take a critical attitude towards self-organization. Although some 
																																								 																					
26 This is a controversial issue that depends on how self-organization is defined. Thus, as I will 
mention some cases in this chapter, different scholars sharing the same perspective sometimes 
have different opinions on self-organization. 
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proponents of these approaches are not critical towards using the concept of self-
organization, and even consider the relevant ideas as a theory of self-organization 
(Zelený, 1977; Weber & Varela, 2002), I insist on the inconsistency between self-
organization and its alternatives. This is because, contrary to the attitude of these 
theories that subsume self-organized processes under their title concerning living 
organization, I argue that self-organization represents a universal tendency 
according to which characteristics of living organization are contextualized in a 
broader context. The availability of certain types of patterns such as causal loops 
(see Section 2.2) for building complex organizational structures underlies this 
universal aspect. By elaborating this point, I aim to give a further account 
concerning why I claimed in favour of a systematic approach towards self-
organization in the first chapter. I will also discuss how this universal aspect is 
associated with life’s organization. Self-organization is not to be considered as a 
law of nature, since it is a phenomenon of historicity and evolution. Instead, it is 
related to the self-maintaining nature of certain causal forms such as circular 
causality. 
I start reviewing the ideas on self-organization from the early attempts in 
philosophy, as I trace back the roots of organizational approach (Section 1.1). The 
modern discussion began with John Locke and Immanuel Kant, and from a 
contemporary perspective, organisms are considered Kantian wholes, as they are 
both the means and the ends of themselves (Kauffman, 2014).27 Then, I discuss 
autopoiesis and the autonomous perspective, which were put forward within the 
organizational approach (Sections 1.2 and 1.3). In particular, I address 
controversial issues as to the role of self-organization that I summarized in my 
main argument above. 
After reviewing relevant theories, I try to show why a general theory of self-
organization is to be preferred to the alternative approaches. First, I clarify the 
essential points of my understanding of self-organization: Although there is a 
universal basis, self-organization points to a historical tendency rather than a law-
																																								 																					
27 As mentioned in the first chapter, Kauffman (2014) expanded this notion to his account of 
autocatalytic sets. 
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like explanation of the world (Section 2.1). This is crucially important for my specific 
focus on the ontogeny of the organism in the following chapters. Second, I 
examine the relation between circular causality and self-organization (Section 2.2). 
The circular form of the regulative organization in organisms has the ability to 
regenerate itself against perturbations, which makes organisms more robust in 
comparison with non-living causal cycles. 
1. Quest For the Organism 
Below, I explain how the contemporary ideas concerning the organism have 
been shaped since the Enlightenment, and how a general philosophical attitude, 
which is sometimes referred to as the organizational approach (Moreno & Mossio, 
2015), has developed. Self-organization, the autonomous perspective, and 
autopoiesis are different perspectives within the organizational approach, whose 
common themes are relational ontology (see Chapter 4), biological autonomy (self-
maintaining form of the organism), and circular causality (see Section 2.2). In 
theoretical biology, these themes have been investigated in the research tradition 
of relational biology, which goes back to Nicolas Rashevsky, Robert Rosen, and 
Howard Pattee. As I discuss below, especially the autonomous perspective is 
influenced by the main claims of relational biology, whereas autopoiesis promotes 
relational ontology on a rather interdisciplinary ground. 
1.1 Early attempts in philosophy 
This section examines the historical background in which ideas related to self-
organization of the organism have been shaped. In Critique of Judgement 
(1790/2008), Kant defined the concept of self-organization for the first time, which 
was often found quite convenient for the modern context (Kauffman, 1970; Weber 
& Varela, 2002), and which has been revived in the recent discussions of 
philosophy of biology. Many of these late interpreters have focused on the 
reflections of a controversy between mechanistic worldview and biological 
organization. Below, I consider the historical roots of this controversy as well as 
other philosophical problems of life’s organization that persisted. 
I have mentioned in the first chapter that regulative self-organization concerns 
the dynamics of individuation within the organism. Historically, this way of 
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understanding can be traced back to the first ideas on the material basis of the 
organism’s identity. Realizing that what makes the organism different from non-
living material is nothing but its organization enabled a naturalistic account of these 
individuation dynamics. As a dualist interpretation, René Descartes’ mechanistic 
explanation considered organic matter as internally inert, in contradistinction to the 
soul’s activity that is non-material. McLaughlin (2001) points out that this 
conception has started to change in modern science, which abandoned the idea of 
the soul and considered organism “as a system that remains identical to itself by 
renewing its parts and assimilating anorganic matter to its organic structure” (p. 
173). For the first time, John Locke remarked on the distinction between the 
identity of a mass of particles and the identity of the organism. The former consists 
in the physical identity of the components, as the identity changes when the 
particles change, whereas the latter does not lose its identity when the components 
change because there is a constant activity of replacing the parts. The idea that 
something can be reproduced without being decomposed or losing its identity 
emerged in the seventeenth century and became widespread in the eighteenth 
century biology (McLaughlin, 2001). During this period, reproduction did not have 
today’s meaning of producing offspring, but it meant re-making itself. Georges-
Louis Leclerc de Buffon, who was a prominent naturalist of the eighteenth century, 
united the biological activities of generation, nutrition, growth, and propagation 
under the concept of reproduction, thereby paving the way to an understanding of 
organisms as self-reproducing systems. 
Buffon’s views influenced Kant’s conceptualization of the organism as a natural 
end (McLaughlin, 2001). Kant considers the organism as a natural end (or natural 
purpose) by claiming that it is both the cause and the effect of itself. This is based 
on the fact that the parts of the organism can be united within a form without an 
external agent. An organism is an organized natural product “in which every part is 
reciprocally both end and means” (Kant, 1790/2008, p. 202), since every part of an 
organism depends on and also serves to the existence of other parts. Kant states 
that an organism is self-organized in different aspects: first, as to producing 
offspring, meaning that it reproduces as a species; second, as an individual by 
transforming external substance into its own components; and third, as to the 
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relations between parts, since the growth and reproduction of each part is 
necessary for the whole. In an organism, the interdependency between parts is 
self-organized because parts are not only functionally integrated, but also 
reciprocally produced by each other. Kant compares organisms to artefacts, which 
is a comparison that goes back to Aristotle (Zammito, 2006). He emphasizes that 
we can understand the apparent design of organisms as analogous to the design 
of artefacts, although organisms don’t need an external designer. In an artefact 
such as a watch, parts exist due to the whole’s function, too. However, this does 
not exhibit self-organization, since the parts are integrated by means of an external 
designer. Thus, functional interdependency between parts is a common property of 
artefacts and organisms, whereas only in the latter production of parts is 
reciprocally implemented (Kant, 1790/2008). The uniqueness of biological 
interdependency in Kant’s thought can be understood through the functioning of 
organs. For example, functioning of the heart is necessary for the continuity of 
other organs and the body, and vice versa. But beyond that, the heart is materially 
produced due to the existence of other parts, as the replacement of muscle cells 
depends on protein synthesis. In a multicellular organism, cells are regenerated at 
different rates. For example, in humans, a red blood cell is replaced every 4 
months, a liver cell every 6 months to one year, and a fat storage cell every 10 
years – whereas a cell of the central nervous system is used for the lifetime.  
Due to the interdependency between parts, organisms are referred to as 
Kantian wholes (Longo, Montévil, & Kauffman, 2012), which can be considered as 
a theoretical basis of organizational approaches towards life. As will be discussed 
in more details below, reciprocal reproduction of parts is also basic as a minimal 
condition of life, which is associated with a protocell that can produce its 
membrane (Gánti, 2003; Luisi, 2006): A self-producing chemical activity that 
synthesizes its membrane material can isolate itself from the outer world and 
thereby stabilize its internal processes, as the membrane can selectively intake the 
material that is to be used in the self-producing reactions. As a precursor of 
organizational approach, Kant suggested the reciprocal nature of organization 
instead of essentialist elements due to explaining the distinguishing aspects of 
living systems. In this regard, reconciliation of the mechanical forces that were 
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analysed in a Newtonian paradigm and the self-reproducing, purposive 
characteristics of the organisms appear as an essential problem that Kant 
discusses.28 One interpretation of Kant suggests that Kant’s account should be 
understood as attempting to naturalize teleology. Yet, there are controversies on 
the philosopher’s views on this. Zammito (2006) points out that a core problem 
concerning the organism since Aristotle has been intrinsic purposiveness, and on 
this issue, Kant’s attitude was in favour of mechanistic explanation on a Newtonian 
basis, ascribing only a descriptive role to biology. In this sense, Kant’s explanation 
differs from Aristotle’s emphasis on self-motion because the latter presumes a 
causal power for animals that is not present in lower forms of being (see Chapter 4 
for details). Kant famously claimed that there would never be a Newton of the 
blade of grass, which is interpreted as a reflection of an epistemological deflation 
due to Kant’s scepticism towards a scientific explanation of life (Zammito, 2006). 
Internal purposiveness is inconsistent with mechanistic explanation in which there 
is only place for efficient causes. This dilemma brings us to the problem of 
teleology, and in particular, the possibility of mechanistic explanations for 
purposeful activities. Kant thought that teleology is a regulative, but not a 
constitutive principle, which implies that teleology has a heuristic role in the 
explanation of the mechanistic causes. On this basis, Kant’s strategy was to 
restrain organism’s organization to a notion of design that is in fact originated in our 
agency, which means that purposiveness is something we ascribe to organisms 
similar to the function of artefacts. Therefore, Zammito (2006) asserts that “if 
biology must conceptualize self-organization as actual in the world, Kant’s 
regulative/constitutive distinction is pointless in practice and the (naturalist) 
philosophy of biology has urgent work to undertake for which Kant turns out not to 
be very helpful” (p. 766). 
How relevant is his definition in terms of the organism’s regulatory self-
organization, then? Despite the problems that are pointed out by Zammito (2006), I 
believe that Kant’s description based on the reciprocal reproduction of the parts set 
a ground for recognizing the phenomenon. This early description obviously does 																																								 																					
28 As will be explained later in this work, self-organization relates to this discussion in terms of the 
organism’s form. 
	 84	
not completely overlap with the non-equilibrium condition of self-organization, as 
Kant’s definition could not foresee the contributions of nonlinear dynamics. Yet, it is 
a preliminary idea in the sense of considering organism’s existence due to its 
activity. Kant investigated the basis of organization at the level of the organism, 
which I propose, makes him a foreshadower of the contemporary notion of self-
organization at least in this respect. This is supported by the general scientific 
attitude of his time. Kant was involved in the theoretical discussions concerning 
development and evolution, and there was an intellectual interaction between his 
philosophy and the prominent figures of the German biology, Johann 
Friedrich Blumenbach in particular (Lenoir, 1980). Also, the ideas of Kant on the 
organism have partially influenced German traditions of romantic natural 
philosophy and organismic biology (Weber & Varela, 2002).  As he was closely 
following the biological research of his time, his definition of self-organization was 
probably inspired by the discovery of the regeneration capacity of hydra (Molina, 
2010, p. 26). 
On the other hand, the inconsistency between internal purposiveness and 
mechanistic explanation continues to be a conundrum of causation that is still 
debated in different ways. As is well known, Kant’s main philosophical views, which 
are built upon a convoluted way of thinking concerning our conceptualization of the 
world and the nature of causation, are highly influenced by Newton. Spontaneous 
dynamics of pattern formation, which is acknowledged in the contemporary theory, 
was not acceptable within this worldview, as it would imply a radical diversion from 
mechanical determinism, even beyond the compromise due to the reconciliation of 
purposiveness. As a matter of fact, Kant enunciated his thoughts on this by stating 
that the formation of life’s organization cannot be ascribed to the role of chance 
and spontaneity, which he cites as the claims of Epicurean atomism (Kant, 
1790/2008, pp. 219-220). This appears to be a drawback in terms of transitional 
self-organization, since modern studies show that spontaneous order indeed has a 
role in life’s organization. 
A point of similarity between Kant and the contemporary approach to self-
organization is that he did not accept preformationism, which considers the 
development of the organism as an unfolding process that is determined from the 
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beginning. As an alternative to preformationism, Kant supported Blumenbach’s 
theory of epigenesis that favours the sequence of developmental steps. 
Metaphysical reflection of this theory is the assertion on nature’s formative force 
against the idea that everything is determined from the first moment of creation. In 
biology, this notion of epigenesis is termed as formative drive (Bildungstrieb). Kant 
(1790/2008) remarked that in this principle, organization of nature emerges as a 
formative impulse beyond a simple mechanical force (p. 253). A main issue of 
biology in Kant’s era was how the forces of life enable – at least seemingly – 
purposeful development of living things. Even though this Kantian research project 
has almost ended in the nineteenth century, Moreno and Mossio (2015) suggest 
that a similar attitude has re-emerged in the early twentieth century. They claim 
that there is a parallelism between the Kantian definition of the organism as a 
“natural purpose” and the organicist approach of a group of biologists that formed 
“Theoretical Biology Club”, which was represented by Joseph Henry Woodger, 
Joseph Needham, Conrad Hal Waddington, and Dorothy Maud Wrinch (Moreno & 
Mossio, 2015, p. xxv). As a response to growing tendency of reductionism based 
on molecular biology, these biologists emphasized the implications of the holistic 
nature of the organization of the living systems. 
What was the dynamics that drove biology away from the organicist approach 
in the first place? Webster and Goodwin (1982) draw attention to a transition 
towards a primarily history-based approach towards science in the nineteenth 
century. Not only Kant, but also rational morphologists such as Georges Cuvier 
and Étienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire were attached to the ideals of Enlightenment to 
establish a mathematically based natural science inspired by Newtonian 
mechanics. A general belief of this time was that universal and ahistorical 
necessities of “being” underlie the diversity and temporality in the appearance of 
things. Therefore, the main approach of rational morphologists was based on 
explaining biological diversity in terms of “the laws of form” that point to the internal 
constraints, either as a reflection of functional harmony or structural conformity. In 
the nineteenth century, the centre of the natural science has shifted from “being” to 
“becoming” (Webster & Goodwin, 1982, p. 19), as a consequence of which 
historical development of the form has become the main question concerning the 
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organism. The philosophical roots of this shift were both in German Romanticism, 
which produced August Weismann’s preformationism, and in Natural Theology, 
which Webster and Goodwin (1982) claimed to have influenced Darwinism. In 
German Romanticism, the understanding of the organism as a self-organized 
totality has been replaced by a holism according to which form is determined by a 
spiritual organizing centre instead of a material reciprocity of the parts. On the 
other hand, the influence of Natural Theology is claimed on the basis that 
Darwinian tradition has replaced the intervention of a divine creator with that of 
natural selection. In that regard, albeit Darwinism did not directly contradict the 
structuralist conception of form, it ignored this aspect of research, as the dynamics 
of form is reduced to a functional explanation of traits that are externally 
determined due to natural selection (Webster & Goodwin, 1982, p. 23). 
Some of the concepts that I discussed here, mechanistic explanation, form, 
and structuralism, should be paid a special attention due to their role in the ensuing 
controversies over self-organization. I will go back to these problems in more detail 
in the last chapter. The essential claim of mechanistic explanation that is in 
question here is the consideration of matter as inert without external causes, which 
I believe to be reflected in Kant’s struggle to reconcile mechanical forces with the 
intensive purposiveness of the organisms. One could argue that this is an unsolved 
problem that persists in contemporary philosophy of biology in the attempts to 
develop concepts to replace or naturalize teleology. In contrast, I propose that self-
organization has now paved the way to find a solution that lies in the emergent 
condition of an endogenous transformation that determines the systemic context of 
the causal relations (see Sections 2.1 and 2.2). 
1.2 Autopoiesis 
As I have already discussed briefly in the first chapter, cybernetics established 
a theoretical basis that shaped the organizational approach. In this approach, it is 
emphasized that living systems cannot be understood by merely studying the 
physical properties of the components involved, and instead, specific attention 
should be directed towards internal relationships of living systems. This relational 
view contributed to the development of a non-reductionist view concerning life 
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which is also held by autopoiesis. However, as I show below, there is no 
consensus towards self-organization among the proponents of autopoiesis. In this 
section, my aim is to point out the distinctive aspects of self-organization and the 
criticism directed against autopoiesis from the perspective of self-organization. I 
aim to demonstrate how these criticisms are not merely reflective of a dispute 
between choices in terminology, but rather expose fundamental problems for the 
theory of autopoiesis. First, autopoiesis considers contingent factors merely as a 
negative aspect of organization that should be tolerated. This one-sided approach 
disregards the role of spontaneous order. Second, autopoiesis proposes an idealist 
interpretation concerning the operational relationship between the organism and its 
environment (Swenson, 1992). This is based on an emphasis that external stimuli 
mechanistically determine the action of the organism. However, this kind of 
deterministic relation between the perception and action denotes only a basic 
mechanism of cognition, which is inconclusive as to building the identity of the 
organism. The final concern is that autopoiesis is focused on the closure of the 
organism in an over-simplistic way, which leads the theory to overlook the 
existence of multiple levels of organization. Whilst it is true that autopoiesis does 
not necessarily exclude the possibility of multiple levels of organization, the theory 
denies that organization is primarily a matter of ecological emergence.29 Therefore, 
contrary to the main assertion of autopoiesis, it is not possible to define the 
minimum condition of life by merely focusing on the properties of the organism, or 
the proto-organism. 
Autopoiesis, which was originated from the Chilean biologists Humberto 
Maturana and Francisco Varela, refers to the self-producing character of living 
systems. The concept was originally put forward in biology, but then applied to 
cognitive science, sociology, and systems theory (Mingers, 2002). The application 
of this concept to these areas is known under the title of second order cybernetics, 
which presupposes that, in distinction to the first generation of cybernetics, the 
observation of systems is made not from the outside, but from within the system 
																																								 																					
29 As mentioned in the first chapter, ecological emergence is associated with the transitional 
dynamics of self-organization because increasing complexity on Earth can be considered as a 
transition to a correlated state. 
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(Van de Vijver, 2013). As I discuss below, this kind of shift brings other 
philosophical problems concerning objective criteria for identifying organization. 
Moreover, the relation between autopoiesis and self-organization is a controversial 
issue, since there are different interpretations concerning the relationship between 
these two theories. For example, Maturana believes that self-organization is not an 
applicable term in terms of their theory of autopoiesis (Maturana, 1987; Collier, 
2004), whereas Jantsch (1980), Zelený (1985), and many others consider that 
autopoietic systems are self-organized.  
Let us first look at the definition of the autopoietic system before discussing the 
main issues with this approach: 
An autopoietic system is defined as a network of processes of production 
(synthesis and destruction) of components such that these components: (i) 
continuously regenerate and realize the network that produces them, and (ii) 
constitute the system as a distinguishable unit in the domain in which they 
exist. (Varela, 1994, p. 26) 
Autopoiesis is a minimum condition of life that involves a repetitive process of 
self-production. The autopoietic system is an 
intradependent structure that is characterized 
by organizational closure. Closure refers to 
the internal operation of the system working 
as a network of feedback loops that maintain 
its structure against a certain degree of 
external perturbations. This is possible due to 
the creation of boundaries that isolate the 
system from its environment. Thus, an 
autopoietic system is operationally closed, 
relational, functionally invariant, and 
distinguished from its environment by its 
boundary. 
In contradistinction with allopoietic 
systems, “determined by processes which do 
not enter in their organization” (Varela et al., 
Figure 2.1 Self-production of the 
cellular boundary. External 
material is synthesized by the 
autopoietic system to produce 
the membrane as boundary 
(from Luisi, 2006, p. 172). 
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1974, p. 189), an autopoietic system is autonomous, meaning that it is the product 
of its own operations. A basic autopoietic system is the cell as a unicellular 
organism, which functions as a metabolic cycle producing its own membrane that 
constitutes its boundary (see Figure 2.1). Weber and Varela (2002) state that a 
multicellular organism is not an autopoietic system in itself, although it “inherits its 
autonomous nature and sense-making qualities through the configuration of its 
neural identity” (p. 115). The idea of the closure as a minimal condition of life is 
utilized in compartmentalization theory concerning the origin of life, which asserts 
that a protocell condition that isolates internal chemical activities from the 
environment is necessary for life to begin (Luisi, 2006; see Chapter 3). 
The theory of autopoiesis considers the living system as a type of machine that 
is able to produce itself. In this sense, it deals with the abstract relational properties 
of this machine that are independent of the properties of its real components 
(Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 77). Maturana and Varela (1980) state that their 
theory is a continuation of the cybernetic conceptualization of the homeostatic 
machine. However, cybernetic machines operate on external parameters, whereas 
autopoietic machines are self-referential. Here, self-referentiality implies cognitive 
operations that are not based on representation, but on the action of the organism. 
According to this approach, life depends on processual invariance due to the 
coupling between the organism and its environment (Maturana & Varela, 1992). 
Chemotactic movement of the bacteria cell is given as an example of this action-
based cognition. This movement depends on a certain set of rules, according to 
which the bacterium moves towards the sugar ingredient, avoids the obstacle in 
the environment, tumbles about, etc. This is due to the sensorimotor correlation in 
which environmental stimuli are coupled with the motor activities in the internal 
structure such as a change in the direction of flagella beating (Maturana & Varela, 
1992, pp. 148-149). The authors give this example to prove that behavioural 
changes that serve the internal invariance are the point of interaction between a 
living system and its environment, which is called operational closure. 
Autopoiesis suggests analysing life’s organization from the viewpoint of a 
relational and processual ontology, which can be considered as a development of 
ideas that can be traced back to Kant and cybernetics. Autopoietic organization is 
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defined as a unity of a complex system by a network of productions (Varela et al., 
1974, p. 188). This emphasizes the overwhelming regulatory capacity of relations 
over the components of a system. Since this notion is also basic to the organism’s 
self-organization, it seems, prima facie, plausible that autopoiesis and self-
organization have a common basis. Indeed, there are certain common themes 
such as the role of metabolism in the steady flow of materials through the organism 
and interconnectivity among the components. Moreover, theories of self-
organization and autopoiesis both emphasize that processual organization is an 
alternative to gene-centric explanations (Luisi, 2006, pp. 156-157). On the basis of 
these common themes, it has been claimed that autopoiesis, self-organization, and 
systems research are united in so far as they propose that an autonomous agency 
is essential to living processes (Weber & Varela, 2002, p. 115). 
However, upon closer inspection, it becomes evident that the interpretation of 
life’s organization proposed by autopoiesis is not utterly consistent with the main 
claims of self-organization that I discussed in the first chapter. The importance of 
transitional dynamics of self-organization is disregarded in autopoiesis, since the 
organization of the self is regarded as a given (Maturana & Varela, 1992). 
According to Maturana, as the self does not exist from the onset of interactions, 
“self-organization appears to require a sort of lifting oneself by the bootstraps 
without having even boots at the beginning” and therefore, self-organization 
“appears to be an oxymoron, or at least a misnomer” (as cited in Collier, 2004, p. 
151). In this regard, Maturana’s approach overlooks the role of self-organization in 
producing individuation as a system’s inherent capacity (Collier, 2004, p. 169). In 
far-from-equilibrium conditions, order emerges through fluctuations due to the 
randomness inherent within the system. As I emphasized in the first chapter, this 
dynamic is incorporated in the regulative system of the organism by recognizing 
the underlying contingency of the biological organization (see Chapter 4). 
However, autopoiesis describes biological organization as something that is in 
conflict with contingency. Reducing life’s functionality to the elimination of 
contingent factors presupposes that stochastic elements are necessarily negative, 
whereas this is not the case for actual biological processes. Stochasticity might be 
a positive element in life’s organization, e.g. stochastic elements in the expression 
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of genotypes lead to the phenotypic diversity of populations, which might contribute 
to the creation of novel adaptive solutions (Kærn, Elston, Blake, & Collins, 2005). 
In a single organism as well, noise-induced processes contribute to morphogenetic 
patterns. Besides, in several regulatory tasks such as the functioning of the 
immune system, contingency has a positive role in the exploration of new 
organizational possibilities (see Chapter 3). As I will explain in the following 
chapters, models of self-organization successfully recognize this contingent basis 
instead of the misleading presumption of precise mechanistic control by 
autopoiesis. 
To save autopoiesis from the abovementioned criticism, one could argue that 
predominant factors underlying the autonomy of an organism are regulative, and 
thus autopoiesis is consistent with regulative self-organization. However, this kind 
of reconciliation would not resolve the problem due to negative consideration of 
contingency in autopoiesis. As explained in the first chapter, individuation 
dynamics appear due to the nonlinearity of systems, and organisms are not 
exempt from spontaneous emergence of order, which involves the positive role of 
contingency.30 Moreover, the account of life’s organization proposed by autopoiesis 
is based on functional invariance, since the nature of relationality does not change 
through its adaptation to external conditions. This is a one-sided presumption that 
only considers the static aspect of organization by ignoring the generative 
processes within the organism (DiFrisco, 2014, pp. 509-510). The notion that 
internal relationships remain invariant would lead to disregarding the changes 
through the lifespan of the organism. As pointed out in a critical comment by 
Swenson (1992), from the viewpoint of organizational invariance, “the organization 
during the growth of an acorn into a full-size oak tree remains the same” (p. 209).  
The abovementioned problem is related to the abstract nature of autopoiesis. 
Autopoiesis presupposes the existence of abstract relational properties of the 
system prior to any knowledge of specific components that are assembled to form 
specific systems. This presupposition is supported by the further distinction 																																								 																					
30 In the following chapter, I will clarify this issue further by addressing how spontaneous order 
becomes efficient at different levels of organization, thereby contributing to a hierarchy of 
organization. 
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between the organization of a system from its structure. According to this 
distinction, organization refers to the relations that make a system a member of a 
certain class, whereas structure refers to particular components in unity, which 
realizes the organization (Maturana & Varela, 1992, p. 47). Autopoiesis is not 
primarily concerned with the structure of life, but it is concerned with the 
organization of life. The organization is relational and abstract, and it can become 
concrete in various structures. Fleischaker (1988) objects this claim by pointing out 
that “abstract systems cannot be candidates for living systems” (p. 42). Since 
abstract systems are constructed by humans, they are put forward as 
generalizable formulas of living systems, and therefore should not be confused 
with the physical basis of these systems. Maturana and Varela begin with the 
abstract autopoietic condition as a given, and derive the physical by comparing to 
the abstract. However, on the contrary, understanding living systems should be 
based on the observation of the physical (Fleischaker, 1988). In a similar vein, 
autopoiesis is criticized by the proponents of biological autonomy, which insists on 
a reconceptualization of closure (Moreno & Mossio, 2015). Autopoiesis 
emphasizes the minimal organizational logic of life at the expense of disregarding 
the chemical and physical properties, and in particular, thermodynamic basis of 
living systems (Ruiz-Mirazo, Peretó, & Moreno, 2004). The autonomy of biological 
systems depends on both organizational closure and thermodynamic openness of 
these systems (Moreno & Mossio, 2015, p. 5). Closure is determined by the 
constraints on the flow of energy through the living system (see next section for 
details of this approach). Swenson (1992) makes a similar point by stating that 
creative aspects of organisms and the emergence of order are ignored in 
autopoiesis. 
The main features of the theory of autopoiesis can be understood as 
developing from Maturana’s theory of cognition (DiFrisco, 2014, p. 506). Maturana 
and Varela (1992) claim that they are trying to find a middle point between 
representationalism and solipsism (p. 241), whereas Swenson (1992) criticizes 
autopoiesis for falling into the latter, which he says to be evident in the claim of 
“what we do not see does not exist” (Maturana & Varela, 1992, p. 242; as cited in 
Swenson, 1992, p. 209). According to Maturana and Varela (1992), when we think 
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or express what there is in the world, our awareness of the world is limited through 
the functional coupling between the organism and its environment. Subjectivist 
idealism resides in the claim of autopoiesis that organisms can invent their rules 
due to cognitive coupling with their surrounding, for which Swenson (1992) rightly 
remarks that this makes organisms “the inventor of reality” (p. 209). Although 
Maturana and Varela (1992) assert that their intention is to avoid 
representationalism, what they in fact avoid is the possibility of a realist 
interpretation of the world beyond the limits of our perception, which seems to 
depend on a conflation of epistemic and ontic bases of knowledge. 
The emphasis made by autopoiesis is that functional coupling between the 
inputs from the environment and the actions that are taken based on these inputs, 
which is exemplified by the sensorimotor correlation, is fundamental to cognition. I 
have no objection against this kind of anti-representationalist attitude, and it is not 
necessarily incompatible with self-organization. On the contrary, similar ideas have 
been expanded to cognition based on the self-organized constitution of action-
perception cycles (Swenson & Turvey, 1991; Juarrero, 2004; Kelso, 2016). 
However, merging the ontological and empirical bases of knowledge within the 
operational closure has a more profound implication than merely claiming for the 
cyclic nature of cognition. The distinction between the object and the subject would 
be blurred because the perceiver would be defined by the perceived, and vice 
versa. The subject perceives things and makes decisions based on what is 
perceived; yet the identity of the subject cannot be reduced to the world perceived 
by the subject. Beyond a mechanistic coupling with the surrounding conditions, the 
subject can imagine counterfactual situations, anticipate, or create an identity by 
reflecting the momentous self-perception through an extension of time. 
As Zolo (1990) points out, if the subject’s identification of the object within its 
observation is considered as impossible, then it also becomes “meaningless to 
postulate the existence of a ‘logical isomorphism’ between the substratum of the 
observation and the language of description” (p. 69). The body is functionally 
coupled with the world, but cognitive abilities also enable the organism to perceive 
its self as opposed to environment. So, contrary to the main claim of autopoiesis, 
cognition – maybe not in the form of sensorimotor skills, but as the abilities of self-
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awareness, planned behaviour, and abstraction – contributes to the decoupling of 
the self, while other ways of interactions such as metabolic activities couples the 
organism and its environment. Maturana and Varela ignore the fact that the 
abstraction that is necessary to make statements concerning life requires the 
organism to possess the cognitive capacity to detach itself from the vicious cycle 
between the perceiver and the perceived. This aspect of cognitive decoupling from 
the world, which is manifest in animals with a self-awareness capacity, also 
includes an array of cognitive abilities that are well beyond the sensorimotor 
coupling of simpler organisms such as bacteria. On the other hand, even if a basic 
input-output model of action-perception cycles could be considered as a basis of 
cognition, this would not be sufficient to reduce self-maintaining systems to 
cognitive functions. Other examples aside, the existence of non-living forms of self-
organization, which are obviously not cognitive, proves that systems might gain the 
capability to tolerate perturbations in various ways. 
Last but not least, autopoiesis understates the importance of ecological 
dimension for life. By reducing life’s minimal condition to the causal closure of the 
organism, it ignores that the organism’s organization is dependent on an 
environmental network at the most fundamental level. As pointed out by Meincke 
(2018), there is a one-sided consideration of the environment in autopoiesis which 
focuses solely on the negative aspect of perturbations (p. 4). In fact, autopoiesis 
does not take environmental aspect into consideration beyond an extension of the 
organism. Some aspects of autopoiesis are in line with a general account of self-
organization. For instance, self-maintaining cycles undertake the constant inflow of 
energy, and other cyclic processes such as the circadian cycle enable organisms 
to adapt their environment. Nevertheless, life is primarily an ecological organization 
because metabolism is a chemical process that requires available conditions that 
sustain its dynamism. Therefore, the organism’s self-maintenance would be 
impossible without an ecological cycle through which energy sources are 
replenished, which is why the minimal conditions of life that are identified by 
autopoiesis are not fulfilled at the level of organism, but at the level of ecological 
cycles. 
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The requirement of the ecological dimension for understanding the organism 
becomes apparent from the thermodynamic conception of the emergence of life, 
which is mostly ignored by autopoiesis. Considering the underlying non-equilibrium 
condition that requires a constant energy flow, availability of energy is crucial for 
organisms. If it were not for ecological basis of disequilibrium, organisms would not 
have access to this flow of energy. Furthermore, the main elements of living 
systems – hydrogen, oxygen, and carbon – are limited on Earth, and an ecological 
circulation of these elements is necessary for the organisms to readily have access 
to them. The necessity of these fundamental conditions is emphasized in research 
on the life’s origin, which deals with the minimal condition of life from historical 
perspective. According to this approach to minimal condition of life, since the 
sustainability of the interactions between the organism and its surrounding is 
essential, the fluctuations of the organism’s life cycle should be synchronised with 
the fluctuations in the ecological conditions, e.g. there should be a cycle between 
reducing and reduced elements for the sustainability of life’s chemical interactions 
(de Duve, 1995). For example, life on Earth depends on the autotrophic life form, 
whose energy intake is due to the attraction of electrons by using solar energy. As 
is known, photosynthesis turns solar energy into chemical energy; hence it can be 
used by other species as well. For the ecological continuity of photosynthesis, 
oxygen and carbon cycles are crucial. In today’s ecosystems, oxygen is the final 
electron acceptor for aerobic organisms and therefore it must be available in nature 
for these organisms to survive. Concerning the early conditions of Earth in which 
life has emerged, it has been hypothesised that a primitive ecological cycle could 
have existed between sulphur and iron, in which iron was the reducing element (de 
Duve, 1995). As is seen in this example, circulation of elements and energy can be 
addressed as a relational property that applies in different actual conditions, which 
is in a way parallel to the distinction between structure and organization that was 
made by autopoiesis. Yet, in this context it is a relational property due to ecological 
dimension which is above the level of the organism. 
The availability of ecological cycles is an implicit background presupposition for 
any conception of the minimal condition of life at the organism level. The latter 
would not be possible in the absence of the former. Hence, since Alexander 
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Oparin, the question of life has been addressed as a transformation of biosphere 
that enabled the emergence of complex life cycles. In fact, it is stated that the 
theoretical gap concerning the ecological condition was noticed by the pioneers of 
autopoiesis, as Varela himself had an attempt to reformulate the organization in 
conjunction with the ecological niche (see: Varela & Goguen, 1978), but it seems 
that the revision of the theory in this respect was never completed (Andrew, 1979). 
There is no abstract formulation of the organism, and therefore no type of 
autonomous unit including the one that is suggested in the autopoietic account can 
be supported without acknowledging ecological context. In contrast with the idea 
that a theory can describe the minimal condition of life by merely focusing on the 
organism, levels of organization from biochemical activities to ecosystems are 
crucial. Life on Earth is a history-dependent process, and any attempt to formulate 
abstract principles, including the efforts to develop artificial life forms, are derived 
from the observation of actual life forms, since any consideration of the minimal 
condition of life is determined within the context of the biosphere. Autopoiesis 
defines the organization specific to living systems in terms of abstract principles 
that ignore both the physical dynamics of life and historical background that 
enabled the minimal condition of life. As I discussed in the first chapter, chemical 
basis of life is a question that requires dealing with the transitional dynamics of 
self-organization. In this sense, autopoiesis is neither within the scope of, nor an 
alternative to the ideas of self-organization. 
1.3 The theory of biological autonomy 
In this section, I address the theory of biological autonomy, which is also called 
the autonomous perspective, pioneered by Alvaro Moreno and Matteo Mossio 
mostly within the scope of the research tradition of organizational approach that 
includes, cybernetics, autopoiesis, Howard Pattee’s views on closure, and Stuart 
Kauffman’s notion of work-constraint cycles (Moreno & Mossio, 2015, pp. 1-11). 
My specific questions are how the autonomous perspective explains the 
organism’s individuality, at which points it is critical or supportive of the principles of 
self-organization, and how it can contribute to broader concerns raised by this 
thesis such as the processual nature of organisms. The autonomous perspective 
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deals with the underlying dynamics of the organism’s individuality in the face of 
constant energy flow, contingency, and dissipation. In other words, it questions 
how the organism maintains its organizational stability despite being a dissipative 
system. This approach is partially based on the revision of the notion of closure, 
which was first put forward in autopoiesis (Varela, 1979). As the reader will recall, 
autopoiesis is criticized from the perspective of organizational account for not 
considering the thermodynamic basis of life (Ruiz-Mirazo et al., 2004).31  The 
revision of organizational approach by the autonomous perspective involves the 
claim that the organism’s organization is determined by the closure of constraints 
acting on the energy flow, thereby outbalancing the increase of disorder. Despite 
this positive contribution, I argue that the autonomous perspective is inadequate for 
acknowledging the principles that are put forward in the theory of self-organization. 
In particular, there is a lack of emphasis on emergent order in the former account 
due to its consideration that self-organization is restricted to non-living phenomena. 
The notion of constraint and its application to living systems and evolution must 
first be explained as these principles underpin the autonomous perspective. 
Moreno and Mossio (2015) are influenced by Pattee’s views on this issue. They 
state that they have an intellectual debt to Pattee, in particular to his understanding 
of the notions of constraint and closure (Moreno & Mossio, 2015, pp. 24, 134). In 
physics, the constraint denotes any property of the environment of a system which 
reduces the degrees of freedom; generally expressed as an equation that 
formulates the relation between different variables. Here, the environmental 
properties refer to the geometrical conditions in the surroundings, e.g. an inclined 
plane acts as a constraint on the movement of an object that slides onto it. As 
highlighted by Pattee (2012), although the notion is applied to the physical basis of 
life, the implications for the origins of life and evolution is more complicated than 
the textbook definition of the constraint. First, constraints are different from a law of 
nature, since “a natural law is inexorable and incorporeal, whereas a constraint can 
be accidental or arbitrary and must have some distinct physical embodiment in the 
																																								 																					
31 Moreno and Mossio (2015) state that another source that influenced their theory is Kauffman’s 
work cycle in which exergonic and endergonic reactions are coupled in order to harness the release 
of energy as heat (see Chapter 1). 
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form of a structure” (Pattee, 2012, p. 82). Second, a physicist’s conception of 
constraints is always associated with a hierarchy of levels, since constraints apply 
to a collection of particles (Pattee, 2012, p. 98). Based on this, Pattee (2012) points 
out that “a dynamical collection is described as a constraint when there exist 
equations or rules in a simpler form that direct or control the motions of selected 
particles” (p. 99), which brings certain implications as applied to living systems (see 
below). Thirdly, quite similar to Kauffman (2000), Pattee thinks of constraint as a 
way of questioning the nature of causation and the epistemological basis of 
understanding causation. As remarked by Schrödinger on the question of life, two 
different theoretical approaches to causality involves the deterministic description 
of the microscopic events and the statistical description of the macroscopic events 
(Pattee, 2012, p. 201). Self-organization due to far-from-equilibrium conditions 
involves the idea that chance events at the micro level are amplified at the macro 
level, and stabilized within a new form of organization. Pattee points out that even 
though Prigogine’s theory on dissipative systems introduces history to the physical 
basis of organization, in this theory, “the selection of alternative modes is left to 
chance” (Pattee, 2012, p. 202). When it comes to biological organization, he thinks 
that neither deterministic description of micro-scale events depending on initial 
conditions, nor statistical physics can be explanatory. Different from the physical 
dynamics of self-organization that are based on statistical laws and chance events, 
self-organization of the living systems is based on symbolic information. According 
to Pattee, a symbol is “something that stands for something else by reason of a 
relation, but it is implicit in this concept that the relationship of symbol to referent is 
somewhat exceptional” (Pattee, 2012, p. 205). 
Pattee (2012) claims that symbolic information is the underlying factor of the 
organism’s organization through genetic regulation and enzymatic activities. 
Contrary to dissipative systems, there is a selective control of the rate of matter 
and energy flow within the living systems, which is exerted through the instructions 
of the symbols. For example, protein synthesis is implemented in this way by 
controlling the rates of genetic expression and enzymatic activities (Pattee, 2012, 
p. 206). Physical dynamics of organisms are harnessed by their evolutionary 
history, which is realized by the closure that determines the organization of living 
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systems. Closure corresponds to the emergence of functionality through the levels 
of organization: 
Hierarchical control arise from a degree of internal constraint that forces the 
elements into a collective, simplified behavior that is independent of selected 
details of the dynamical behavior of its elements. It is the combination of the 
independence of the constraints on the microscopic dynamics along with the 
simplification of the collective dynamics which creates what we recognize as 
integrated behavior or function. (Pattee, 2012, pp. 101-102) 
Pattee’s (2012) account of closure in the face of non-living self-organization 
can be interpreted as follows. In far-from-equilibrium systems such as Bénard cells, 
appearance of correlated relations out of the random movement of molecules 
creates certain patterns. These patterns produce macro-scale structures belonging 
to certain kinds, despite the uniqueness of each individual process. In organisms, a 
similar process across the levels of organization occurs. Yet, contrary to dissipative 
systems, what characterizes the organism as a specific type of organization is not 
a direct amplification of certain micro-scale events that are associated with chance, 
but the regulatory cohesion in which symbols – as amino acid sequences, 
signalling mechanisms, intercellular interactions, etc. – enable the continuity of 
form against perturbations by using internal information systems. Pattee (2012) 
claims that constraints similar to those introduced by artificial devices of 
measurement are the basis of biological organization from enzymatic activities to 
natural selection (p. 207).32  
The distinction between matter and symbol is a core element in Pattee’s 
approach. Although all symbols have material embodiment, symbols cannot be 
reduced to law-based descriptions of matter, as they are the products of natural 
selection. Symbols are used by organisms to increase control and survival abilities 
																																								 																					
32 In the context of a broader criticism also calling into question the deterministic worldview, Pattee 
(2012) discusses the role of measurement and the relevance of initial conditions in a Laplacean 
way of thinking. He is critical toward the deterministic view based on initial conditions. In particular, 
he questions the relevance of the complementary models of chance and determinism. The factors 
that are associated with either chance or determinism are built on non-observable constructs, and a 
non-observable construct “depends on the observables chosen for the model” (Pattee, 2012, p. 
255). Both chance and deterministic factors are necessary as complementary models of a binary 
way of thinking, even though these are formally incompatible (Pattee, 2012, p. 265). In the fourth 
chapter, I will go back to this problem in relation with relational ontology. 	
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in a specific environment (Pattee, 2012, p. 214). Any measuring activity depends 
on reducing the material degrees of freedom of a system to a few semantic 
references. This is equivalent to the essential role of symbolic information in 
constraining and controlling living systems. In a measuring activity such as the one 
that is performed in physics, the symbol-matter distinction is quite clear, yet this is 
not the case with organisms. Pattee (2012) states that an external analysis of 
symbolic information and internal utilization of symbols are different. From an 
external viewpoint, to understand the function of symbols, we need to fully 
investigate the complexity of mechanisms involved; not only the symbolic role of a 
gene sequence in the coding of a protein, but also the very material process of 
protein folding. The computation of the whole complex mechanism across the 
hierarchy of organization is necessary. However, for the folding to occur within the 
cell, all that is required is the reading of the base sequence. Thus, within the 
interlevel causation in which the process occurs, the practical role of symbols is the 
simplification that enables the required function: “As in the case of measurement, 
in order to have any useful function, genes must be able to symbolize something 
without symbolizing everything” (Pattee, 2012, p. 215). 
Of course, Pattee’s (2012) theoretical approach to constraints, symbols, and 
measurement is a detailed one that cannot be fully explained by my short summary 
above. I have provided an outline of his ideas to clarify how it influenced the 
autonomous perspective. Before continuing this analysis of the autonomous 
perspective in relation to self-organization, I will first expose a drawback in the 
account by Moreno and Mossio (2015). Pattee’s critique exposes problems 
concerning symbols, deterministic modelling based on initial conditions, and 
measurement. Pattee’s views – as well as Robert Rosen’s (see Chapter 4) – are 
developed to address the issues concerning not only biology, but also more 
general problems within philosophy of science. As I discuss below, in Moreno and 
Mossio’s (2015) account, there is a notable absence of a debate concerning these 
epistemological issues, particularly measurement and symbols, even though they 
adopt other parts of Pattee’s theory that are derived from a questioning on this 
general basis, e.g. boundary conditions, closure, constraint, etc. Sure enough, it 
should be admitted that acknowledging all aspects of theoretical questioning is not 
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necessary for developing from Pattee’s account. At the very least, it follows that the 
notion of constraint in Moreno and Mossio’s account is descriptive, since the 
authors move away from some of Pattee’s epistemological concerns without 
offering an alternative. Ignoring these core problems might be one of the 
underlying reasons of the attitude that is adopted by the autonomous perspective 
towards the notion of self-organization. As discussed below, Moreno and Mossio 
(2015) distance themselves from biological self-organization, and consider the 
phenomenon as limited to non-living area. In this sense, their attitude is deviated 
from Pattee’s view that a theory of biological self-organization requires functionally 
relating spontaneous generation of order and information-dependent systems, 
which are considered as two different classes of self-organizing systems (Pattee, 
2012, p. 197). 
According to the autonomous perspective, a constraint is referred to as an 
entity that limits other processes without being unaffected by them (Moreno & 
Mossio, 2015, p. 11). Hence, stabilities within the organism are determined 
relatively through processes at different paces, e.g. an enzyme catalyses chemical 
reactions, while it remains relatively unchanged through these reactions (pp. 11-
15). The organism’s organization is described as a network of constraining 
processes, as “the organization of the constraints can be said to achieve self-
determination as self-constraint, since the conditions of existence of the 
constitutive constraints are, because of closure, mutually determined within the 
organization itself” (Moreno & Mossio, 2015, p. 5). 
In this context, the autonomous perspective points out that the flow of energy 
within the living system is restricted in a way toward maintaining its form. Moreno 
and Mossio (2015) associates the notion of constraint with the role of timescales in 
the creation of organizational hierarchy, 33  which provides insights for 
understanding the organism’s organization appealing to certain theoretical issues 
mentioned above. According to this view, the constraint, as an entity, has a static 
nature in the face of dynamic processes. Moreno and Mossio emphasize that the 
																																								 																					
33 The role of timescales in the constitution of levels of organization is not a new theme. For a 
review on timescale hierarchies, see DiFrisco (2017b). 
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organism’s autonomy involves additional conditions in comparison with the 
spontaneous dynamics of self-organization, which is a point that is made by other 
people addressing the issue (Simondon, 1992; Ulanowicz, 1997; Pattee 2012). 
Since the underlying problem is explaining the relation between biological 
autonomy and spontaneous self-organization, I shall further elaborate thoughts of 
Moreno and Mossio (2015) on this issue. A prominent idea in this context relates to 
the organism’s closure in contradistinction with self-organized systems such as 
Bénard cells that occur in physics and chemistry (Moreno & Mossio, 2015, p. 16). 
They contrast non-living self-organization and closure in the following way: 
This makes a clear-cut categorical distinction between minimal self-
organisation and biological closure: while in the first case a single constraint is 
able to determine itself, in the second case self-determination can only be 
collective, i.e. by contributing to the maintenance of one or several other 
constraints, each constraint contributes indirectly to its own maintenance, 
because of mutual dependence. (Moreno & Mossio, 2015, p. 17) 
In this account, non-living self-organization is considered a lower type of self-
determination, whereas closure is ascribed to a “qualitative change from minimal 
(self-organisation) to collective (closure) self-determination [that] goes hand in 
hand ... with a quantitative increase of the underlying complexity” (Moreno & 
Mossio, 2015, p. 18). Other features that distinguish closure in living systems 
include: the takeover of boundary conditions (as the physical boundary of an 
organism is demarcated by a membrane), the coupling of the endergonic and 
exergonic reactions, the ability to store energy, and a potential for increasing 
complexity – which refers to the evolvability of organisms. 
As mentioned in the distinction in the first chapter between regulative and 
transitional dynamics of self-organization, the existence of the differences pointed 
out by Moreno and Mossio (2015) is undeniable, and point to a distinct aspect of 
life that requires a different type of explanation. The kind of complexity that 
appears in autonomous organisms is only possible due to evolution, as we would 
not expect the emergence of self-maintaining cells directly out of a solution 
containing the basic elements of life. Thus, concerning the distinction between non-
living self-organization and biological autonomy, I agree that biologically 
autonomous systems require a different explaining of their emergence which is 
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characterized with a high capacity of self-maintenance. It goes without saying that 
we need conceptual distinctions and a different type of analysis for biological 
autonomy to differentiate the circular causality of living systems (see Section 2.3) 
from the basic physical dynamics of organization. However, it is also important to 
recognize that causal cycles are the common basis of organization of both living 
and non-living systems. What distinguishes organisms is that their complexity grant 
unprecedented robustness to biological cycles. Spontaneous emergence of order 
that produces causal cycles is key to understand the relation between living and 
non-living types of self-organization. Natural selection alone cannot explain all 
aspects of biological evolution, and therefore the role of spontaneous order is 
essential (Bonner, 1996; Weber & Depew, 1996). As I explain below, the strong 
distinction between non-living self-organization and biological autonomy that is 
offered by the autonomous perspective is an obstacle to acknowledge the common 
basis of emergent organization. 
The emphasis I made concerning the association with general forms of 
causation requires reconsidering the constraint as an explanatory element of 
ontogeny. Self-organization is primarily a bottom-up appearance of order that 
brings transformation of the system in point depending on internally contingent 
elements. This is the common basis of self-organization that applies to both 
biological and non-biological processes, which seems to be ignored in the 
approach of Moreno and Mossio (2015). By denying the common basis of living 
and non-living self-organization, Moreno and Mossio reject the possibility of a 
universal principle of bottom-up dynamics. Closure creates a self-driven bedding 
for energy flow, but this does not mean that once multicellular organization has 
evolved, autonomy has replaced the bottom-up dynamics by ruling out emergent 
dynamics of order. On the contrary, dynamics due to the physical properties of 
matter are reshaped in biological organization by genetic regulation that increases 
the robustness of biological systems. This also implies that the emergent order is 
systematically exploited by the organismic organization through the processual 
dynamics, transitional self-organization is constrained and made a part of the 
regulative self-organization. Therefore, even though the role of closure is 
undeniable in self-determination, this does not require giving up the concept of self-
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organization in biology in any case. As was mentioned earlier, the evolutionary 
possibility of autonomous systems cannot be sufficiently understood in isolation 
from transitional self-organization. Autonomous systems are still subject to 
spontaneous order that occurs at different levels of interactions. As a basic 
difference, non-living systems rely on an external energy source in a passive way, 
whereas biologically autonomous individuals are characterised by having the ability 
to extract their energy in a much more consistent way. A flame is self-organized, 
but its continuity depends on the system’s source of energy, whereas an 
organism’s self-organization allows it to become an active agent of its environment, 
e.g. the organism can seek new sources of energy. 
How should we understand Moreno and Mossio’s (2015) emphasis on 
constraints, then? The answer to this question can be given by considering the 
examples of constraint described by the authors. For instance, they discuss the 
role of the membrane in enabling cellular activities and the role of cardiovascular 
system in the flow of oxygen (Moreno & Mossio, 2015, p. 11). These are the 
examples that allude to the underlying geometrical nature of constraints, e.g. the 
membrane is a physical boundary of cellular activities. Formation of constraints 
depends on relatively unchanging conditions in the face of more rapid processes. 
This consideration of constraint does not sufficiently explain organizational novelty 
and emergence due to ontogenetic factors; rather, it reduces the emergence of 
constraints to an issue of functional explanation, and thus selection. On the other 
hand, according to an approach of ontogenetic self-organization, the form of the 
organism is emergent, that is, form is acquired through development and growth. 
Hence, part-whole relationships should be investigated in this respect. The 
autonomous perspective does not take this aspect of emergence into account, but 
only concedes the evolutionary emergence of constraints. It is true that enzymes, 
cardiovascular systems, and membranes are entities that appear through 
evolution. Yet, pointing to their role as constraints per se is not sufficient to go 
beyond the Darwinian approach that explains each trait due to its specific function. 
Organisms are self-determining systems, but their appearance as systems of 
determining themselves is a question of morphogenesis, that is, how the whole, as 
a dynamic constraint, with several processes of spontaneous ordering dynamics at 
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lower levels of organization, organizes itself. In this sense, the reduction of the 
degrees of freedom, which is essential for the idea of constraint, not only appears 
as a static physical condition, but also as a transitional process (e.g. in noise-
induced processes). The autonomous perspective points out that constraints are 
contingent causes in comparison with the laws of physics, as they arise due to the 
specific conditions of a system (Montévil and Mossio, 2015). However, as it 
explains constraints only as products of evolution without considering their 
emergence specifically in the context of ontogenetic self-organization, the 
ontogenetic emergence of biological constraints from, and continual dependence 
on, transitional self-organization is disguised. The notion of closure, which refers to 
the mutual dependence of stabilization factors, points only to aspects of physical 
boundary and relative stability of processes as the underlying factors of the 
organism’s individuality. On the other hand, spontaneous dynamics of order is 
fundamental to life’s order, which is why a comparison between self-organization 
and “closure” should take into account that the former is in fact included in the 
latter. As will be clarified in the following chapter, processual basis of constraints 
involves not only dynamics of self-assembly that appears with the release of free 
energy, such as the self-assembly of a phospholipid bilayer, but also a type of 
“order for free” phenomenon that is hidden in the self-organizing tendency of 
kinetics. Thermodynamic flow is already sealed by the spontaneous dynamics of 
order across the lower levels of organization even without the types of constraints 
that Moreno and Mossio emphasize. This lower-level spontaneous source of order 
is crucial because if the role of physical factors is not acknowledged, then we could 
be led to the misconception that biological regulation is simply a matter of 
mechanistic micro-control and precise structuring. Although the autonomous 
perspective does not explicitly advocate this mechanistic conception, their account 
does not resolve the explanatory gap when mechanistic explanation is ruled out, 
which makes it difficult to differentiate their approach from the machine conception 
of autopoiesis. 
In the previous section, I criticized autopoiesis for ignoring the importance of 
ecological dimension, and beyond that, for developing its main ideas on the basis 
of an abstract scheme derived from a self-sustaining cell. The autonomous 
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perspective makes significant advances compared to autopoiesis because it 
recognizes the need to explain both the ecological interdependency relationships 
and the basic conditions of individuation (Ruiz-Mirazo et al., 2004). However, when 
it comes to establishing a common basis of self-organization, the autonomous 
perspective limits itself to merely conceding the thermodynamic grounding in 
relation with the notion of constraint, without accepting the broader importance of 
thermodynamics and spontaneous ordering that have been advocated by the 
theories of self-organization (e.g. Salthe, 1985; Swenson, 1989; Kauffman, 1993). 
2. Why Self-organization? 
In Sections 1.2 and 1.3, I briefly addressed the theoretical approaches in so far 
as they could be alternatives to self-organization, or as they contribute to the 
theory of self-organization. Now, to complete this critical review, I will explain why 
self-organization is preferable to other theories within organizational approach. The 
following sections will also clarify in which ways self-organization in the ontogeny of 
the organism relates to the universal aspect of self-organization. 
2.1 Self-organization between history-based and law-like explanations 
In the first chapter, I addressed how the universal aspect of life is related to the 
transitional dynamics of self-organization on a thermodynamic basis. I have also 
mentioned the claim that considers spontaneous ordering as a fourth law of 
thermodynamics (Swenson, 2009). These two aspects, a history-based 
explanation in the former, and a law-like explanation in the latter, involve a crux of 
the issue of making sense of self-organization. On this issue, I argue that the 
universality of self-organization is not originated in a law of nature, but in its 
historicity, i.e. self-organization does not involve a certain nomological necessity by 
definition, but it can be universally associated with a gradual process of emergence 
and then persistence of adaptive systems in nature. Therefore, it would be better to 
accept the universal aspect of self-organization as a tendency for the creation of 
certain forms of causation such as interdependent networks and circular systems. 
This also involves an evolutionary dimension of increasing complexity (see Section 
1.1), since these kinds of causal forms are expected to be viable in the long-term 
due to forming robust and flexible structures. 
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As I tried to show above, both autopoiesis and the autonomous perspective 
focus on what is unique in life’s organization that underlies the autonomy of living 
systems. In contrast with the abovementioned approaches, self-organization is not 
a theory that begins from an abstract description of living systems, but from the 
potential of matter to create life. Self-organization differs also from the neo-
Darwinian approach that is primarily focused on natural selection. In this sense, the 
attitude of seeking design properties of life independently from its material basis 
needs to be rectified by beginning from the history of life as the potential to form 
reciprocal linkages. The interpretation of the history of life is not only a matter of 
explaining adaptive traits based on random mutations, but also of explaining the 
emergence of viable forms based on the dynamics of organizational robustness. 
Life must be understood in terms of the emerging networks that are established by 
the contingent appearance of reciprocal causal relations. This potential by the 
dynamics of contingent reciprocity is a necessary condition, even if not a sufficient 
condition for the emergence of life.  
With this regard, Kant’s regulative account of self-organization focusing on the 
organism denotes the product of the underlying phenomenon, but not the 
phenomenon itself. Only transitional self-organization exposes the underlying 
spontaneous order, leading to the expansion of a global possibility space in which 
life had the opportunity to flourish. Thus, a unified theory of self-organization 
explains both the common aspects of organization and those that make life 
different from other kinds of organization. Moreover, it demonstrates the need to 
reconsider our understanding of causation and move away from the view that 
matter is fundamentally inert (Arshinov & Fuchs, 2003; Heylighen, 2010). 
Emergence of life is not an exception, but on the contrary, it is the approach of 
classical physics that led previous philosophers to think that it was, requiring 
appeals to an external factor or to a lucky coincidence. Life, as a culmination of 
self-sustaining order, is a possibility within the multiplicity of contingently formed 
reciprocities. Therefore, although self-organization is a universal principle, 
biological systems are at the heart of the problem. 
This brings us to another problem, the likelihood of life as a consequence of 
the realization of matter’s potential for organization. Is the emergence of life a 
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matter that is to be primarily associated with a unique event that created a new 
possibility space of organization? Or, is it a consequence of the emergence 
potential in physico-chemical interactions that is repeatedly manifested, only 
unique in the sense that specific ways of evolvability and agency arise as a result 
of the accumulated effects of a global transformation that catalyses itself? Theories 
on life’s organization are not usually dependent on exact preference between these 
two poles, but varies to different degrees across a spectrum: A theory 
approximates to the former inasmuch as it promotes the idea of life’s relational 
novelty as a possible but improbable phenomenon, whereas it approximates to the 
latter inasmuch as it promotes the intertwined dynamics of emergence among 
living and non-living interactions. In this regard, approaches such as Jacques 
Monod’s (1972) theory, which asserts the improbability of life, is quite close to the 
former pole of the spectrum, whereas Herbert Spencer’s understanding of 
evolution and Vladimir I. Vernadsky’s theoretical approach that considers the 
formation of biosphere as a natural (in the sense that it is likely) result of a geo-
chemical transformation approximates the latter. This is because both Spencer and 
Vernadsky explain the individuation dynamics of organisms by appealing to a 
universal principle of self-organization. My position is that life’s gradual 
development is quite probable considering that self-sustaining networks are likely 
to be maintained as an evolving global system. Not only life and its environment 
are coupled materially, but also living systems and global environment are 
organizationally coupled in the sense that spontaneous ordering characterizes 
reciprocal linkages between systems and their surroundings. 
Vernadsky considered life as a global, interconnected phenomenon, which 
naturally emerged from chemical activities on Earth (Vernadsky & Margulis, 1998). 
According to this approach, not only are living systems interconnected, but also 
living and non-living matter are inseparable, forming a single self-sustaining global 
system. The biosphere has been formed through a geological transformation, as 
the activities of microorganisms and insects have led to the making of moist soil in 
which minerals circulate, allowing the growing of plants. In a similar vein, James 
Lovelock (1979/2000) pioneered an approach known as the Gaia hypothesis which 
argues that the biosphere is a self-regulating system as a whole. According to 
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Lovelock, physical conditions such as the temperature of the atmosphere and 
salinity of oceans are globally determined through life’s activities. However, 
considering biosphere as a single evolving system, which I claimed to be a case of 
transitional self-organization, poses a problem in terms of the explanatory limits of 
the Darwinian theory. Natural selection operates only if there are multiple 
reproducing individuals in a population. Earth does not belong to a population of its 
kind, and biosphere as a whole population has no competitor. Therefore, natural 
selection does not apply to the evolution of biosphere as a whole (Dawkins, 1982). 
On the other hand, from the perspective of self-organization, evolution on Earth 
needs to be revised to the evolution of Earth (Swenson, 2010, p. 174; see Chapter 
1), which implies an incongruity between Darwinian evolution and self-organization. 
The solution of this problem requires understanding self-organization as a historical 
phenomenon, which is an issue that I return below. But first, let me introduce 
another interpretation of the universal characteristic of self-organization which is 
considering self-organization as a law. 
Formation of patterns appears in processes that are so different from each 
other, including biological phenomena such as the evolution of populations and the 
morphogenetic development of the embryo, as well as physical phenomena such 
as turbulence in fluid movement and fractals in geological structures. If all these 
cases are manifestations of self-organization, which I believe to be the case, this 
offers support to an understanding that self-organization is a universal principle. 
Both in chemical interactions such as autocatalytic systems, and non-chemical 
interactions due to kinetic factors such as convection cells and hurricanes, self-
organization denotes the characteristic of a system in focus to act upon itself, 
pulling sources in the surroundings into the limits of its extension (Swenson, 2010, 
p. 170). We saw in the first chapter that on this basis, Swenson formulated a fourth 
law of thermodynamics, which presumes that a complex system will “choose” 
among different paths the one that maximises its entropy production. Is it really 
possible to formulate self-organization in this way? Let us ignore the potential 
disputes this raises specifically in relation to physics for one moment. Even if 
maximization of the entropy production is the case, it is hard to conclude that this 
principle is a law-like explanation of self-organization. Entropy maximization as a 
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universal principle refers to a quantifiable aspect of organization, whereas I believe 
that universality of self-organization is basically a qualitative issue, which is based 
on a tendency for certain causal patterns always contextualized in a unique 
systemic condition. Thus, the qualitative uniqueness is incompatible with law-like 
definitions of causal relations. For example, in living systems, self-organization has 
to do with organizational robustness and formal stability of boundary conditions, for 
which entropy maximization does not offer any direct solution. Furthermore, 
entropy maximization depends on the specific thermodynamic condition that a 
decrease in local entropy is always compensated by a universal increase entropy 
(Swenson, 2010, p. 172). However, if the boundary conditions of a system are not 
sustainable, utilizing the potential in the surroundings of the system faster only 
leads it to dissipate earlier. Therefore, universality of self-organization cannot be 
merely dependent on the self-reinforcing nature of non-equilibrium systems. A 
turbulent movement, which is one of the cases of non-equilibrium state, is 
temporally restricted to a certain processual condition, so its routine occurrence is 
not capable of building organizational hierarchy by itself. Most of the self-
reinforcing processes create temporary boundary conditions, and in fact, it is the 
relative stability of boundary conditions in Bénard cells that makes them 
observable, and hence, an exemplar of non-living self-organization. Contrary to 
Kauffman’s (2000) early claim, spontaneously arising autocatalytic systems are 
hardly sustainable, which is why models find that only a continuous existence of an 
external food resource can restore their activity (see Chapter 1). Similarly, in a co-
evolving system, there might emerge interdependency networks between 
cooperating species that give an evolutionary advantage to relevant members, 
thereby leading to an increase in rate that these networks take in external energy. 
But again, sustainability is a problem. A rapid growing of these networks would 
bring an evenly rapid depletion of the resources, and this would eventually lead to 
an ecological catastrophe for the system.34  
																																								 																					
34 All these objections towards the maximization of entropy production as a sufficient condition of 
self-organization is parallel with the fact that in most self-organizing processes, a positive feedback 
in the short term is coupled with a negative feedback in the long term. 
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I have previously explained how transitional self-organization is a tendency for 
structuration,35 which makes possible the creation of higher levels of organization 
(see Chapter 3), such as: the integrity of cellular processes in a multicellular 
organism, collective behaviour in animal groups, or the complex interplay between 
ecological and evolutionary dynamics. Reciprocity of causal relations and the 
emergence of self-sustaining loops have a basic role in this. However, in relation to 
the long-term evolution of these systems, dynamics of spontaneous ordering is a 
necessary, but not a sufficient condition. These dynamics might contribute to the 
formation of patterns at a lower level available for functions at a higher level, or to 
qualitative leaps in the population dynamics, but they cannot be expressed as a 
law that alone provides the formula of the living systems. Instead, since living 
systems require dynamics of evolvability, the evolution of organisms as 
autonomous systems with stabilized boundaries refers to a quite inclusive issue of 
life as a whole system, and transitional dynamics are included in this historical 
phenomenon at different levels. 
If self-organization is not a law of nature, how should we understand its global 
occurrence, then? This question requires going back to the historicity of self-
organization that is mentioned afore. The basis of understanding self-organization 
as a universal principle should go beyond the false dilemma that the only 
alternative to the idea of inevitable progress is an arbitrary concatenation of several 
causes. In other words, self-organization does not have to be elevated to the status 
of a law of physics to support the argument for directional evolution. A solution to 
the dilemma between randomly aggregated evolutionary factors and a law-like 
explanation of self-organization involves considering self-organization as a 
phenomenon of evolving complexity that also includes biological evolution. This 
kind of understanding is reflected in Spencer’s theory of evolution, which is closer 
to a view of universal self-organization that presumes a general increase of 
complexity due to internal relations of a system. Spencer’s theory has fallen into 
disfavour over time, partly due to an overemphasis on the role of randomness in 
evolutionary theory. Paradoxically, it was Spencer who coined the notion of “the 
																																								 																					
35 For this notion, see Fuchs (2003). 
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survival of the fittest” (Spencer, 1898/2016) upon reading Darwin’s Origin, which 
contributed to an overestimation of the role of natural selection as the single 
mechanism of evolution. This in turn has led to a notion that evolution is only a 
problem of multiplicity, since according to the principle of the survival of the fittest, 
driving power of evolution is now conceived a war of all against all. The 
abovementioned theoretical denial of the evolution of biosphere as a whole 
(Dawkins, 1982), hence any conception of directionality in evolution, is a 
consequence of this type of reduction to natural selection. On the other hand, this 
way of thinking neglects the role of cooperation, and in a broader context, the 
interconnectivity of the biological phenomena. This is evident from loose 
interconnections at all levels to symbiotic forms, niche construction, and several 
globally emergent situations in the ecological conditions that brought irreversible 
changes, e.g. the Great Oxygenation Event, which led most anaerobic organisms 
to extinction due to the increasing concentration of free oxygen in the atmosphere. 
In general, self-organization and natural selection are intertwined phenomena. The 
former involves the role of selected effects, which is described as selection among 
micro-configurations at the macro level (Haken, 2000; Swenson, 2010), and vice 
versa, the latter can be influenced by self-organization in different ways (see 
Chapter 1). Considering the evolution of life in the context of universal self-
organization presents a strong case in favour of the directionality of evolution 
because sustainable networks can be selected against short-term adaptations, 
which enables a long-term tendency through evolution. All self-organized systems, 
just like evolving populations, involve both the elements of conflict and positive 
reciprocity among its elements. Alternative states of complex conflict-cooperation 
relationships form an infinite possibility area that is discovered through organized 
transformations. Even though it would be too ambitious to claim that self-organized 
end-state is inevitable, it is possible to think of a complex, flexible, and self-
maintaining hyper-network as a likely outcome of an evolution, beginning with 
simplistic conditions, in which this end-state is a final cause. This suggests that 
global context of self-organization should be ascribed to directionality and 
irreversibility as a consequence of systemic changes, instead of a law-like 
conceptualization. The necessity due to self-organization is to be found in certain 
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forms of self-maintaining systems imposing themselves through evolution, and 
therefore transitional self-organization is a historical tendency. 
Finally, I will briefly consider how self-organization vis-à-vis natural selection 
relates to regulative self-organization of the individual (see Chapter 4 for details). 
Concerning the question of what makes an organism, natural selection focuses on 
the negative aspect of the explanation by focusing on the processes whether the 
organism is eliminated or not, whereas it does not deal with the generative 
processes of the form (Goodwin, 2001). This is in line with an externalist 
explanation of the function of each trait. However, self-regulation of the organism 
cannot be explained from an adaptationist viewpoint (Griffiths & Gray, 1994). On 
the contrary, regulative self-organization is a question of internal relationality, 
according to which organizational constraints determine the structure of organisms. 
More importantly, the organism is not a mediocre accumulation of adaptive traits, 
but it is the materialization of a process of lifespan development from birth till 
death. 
In this section, I tried to demonstrate that self-organization has a universal 
aspect characterized by a tendency for the emergence of reciprocal relations. Self-
organization does not need to depend on a law-like explanation in order to claim 
universality because its universality is originated in its historicity. Moreover, the 
constructive aspect due to emergent reciprocities support the idea of directionality 
in evolution, as the inclusive networks of biological organization is expected not 
only to be viable, but also to flourish in the long-term. 
2.2 Circular causality 
Below, I discuss the question of how the universal principle of self-organization 
is associated with the ontogeny, as it is essential to resolve this problem before 
examining the self-organization of the organism in the following chapters. This 
builds from an argument proposed in this chapter in support of the inclusiveness of 
the theory of self-organization compared to other approaches of life’s organization. 
This section offers further support to this argument by demonstrating the 
connection between the general aspects of causation and the specific 
understanding of the organism. The answer lies in the tension between circular 
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causation, and any kind of perturbation that has the potential to disrupt, distort, or 
improve causal cycles. As the chaotic nature of things does not allow reaching 
stability by simple means, some additional mechanisms would be needed to 
tolerate the perturbations that interfere with causal cycles. This is why only living 
systems that have this capability can sustain cyclic processes in the face of 
irregularities. The circular nature of living processes is also conceded in alternative 
approaches, but it is only from the perspective of self-organization that it is 
acknowledged as a universal basis of emergence (Swenson & Turvey, 1991; 
Heylighen, 2010). From this perspective, causal cycles are expected to arise by 
themselves, and variation and selection among circular processes – which points 
to a general principle beyond natural selection – is the key to emergent order. 
As pointed out before, the interdependency between parts within the organism is 
a strict form of reciprocity in which parts exist due to their dynamic relationships 
with other parts and the whole. On the other hand, an essential implication of 
transitional self-organization is a transformation from random associations of 
reciprocal relations to interdependent networks. The problem is, as a banal fact 
that has already been mentioned here as well as in other works, organisms cannot 
be formed spontaneously. Thus, there is an explanatory gap between a relation of 
contingent reciprocity and a highly self-constrained network of organization within 
the organism. A good strategy to overcome this deficiency is to consider this issue 
from the perspective of abiogenesis in order to retrodict possible pathways that 
began with the spontaneous emergence of autocatalytic networks. Another useful 
way to acknowledge the causal nature of life is to draw attention to the fact that 
contingent reciprocities have not been replaced, but they are still there within the 
organism, as moulded by selective pressure. These reciprocal relations are 
thereby embraced in a highly robust and complex regulative system of 
organization. The role of symbiotic encounters in the formation of complex living 
forms is striking in this sense. The engulfing of the first mitochondria by another 
bacteria cell is a contingent event. Yet, through the life cycles of the relevant 
bacteria species, contingently established reciprocity becomes the basis of a new 
structure. The interesting aspect of this example is that an event is transformed 
into a cyclic process through the machinery of reproduction. In other words, the 
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event becomes structure. This is also evident in the activity of the bacteriophage. 
Considering that there has to be contingent beginnings of the life cycles of these 
parasitic viruses that initiated the copying of their chromosomes by using the 
bacterium host in a chance event, the question is at which point this type of event 
becomes a repetition as a manifestation of the reciprocity between the relevant 
genes coding the behaviour and behaviour reproducing the genes. Another similar 
example is the evolution of greenbeard genes that enable two individuals to 
reciprocate their altruistic behaviour between each other (Gardner & West, 2010). 
These examples would be enough to indicate the power of life cycles. Still, as 
these examples are all the consequences of evolutionary contingency (Beatty, 
2006), they are dependent on the reproductive mechanism of life as a given. Thus, 
they cannot prove a natural relation between contingency and reciprocity because 
they are derivatives of life cycles instead of developments from scratch. 
A more crucial question at this point is to ask, beyond life cycles, why life 
depends on cyclic processes. This is of such importance because cyclic processes 
are ubiquitous and fundamental in metabolic regulation and other aspects of living 
systems. A feedback loop is a common causal cycle that appears both in living and 
non-living systems. As to the latter, the Carnot cycle, which is the basic 
thermodynamic mechanism utilized by the first steam engines, consists of the 
circulation of heat between a hot and a cold reservoir. Through the cycle, heat is 
transformed into mechanical energy that enables the piston to move between the 
reservoirs. Causal cycles are so ubiquitous in biological systems that they 
constitute the basic condition of organization. Oxygen cycle is an example of 
circular processes at the ecological level. It is mostly determined by 
photosynthesis, which produces oxygen as a waste product, and respiration, in 
which oxygen is consumed. Photosynthesis and respiration are each cyclic 
processes in their own, too. In photosynthesis, carbon dioxide and water are 
combined into bigger molecules through the Calvin cycle, and in respiration, 
organic molecules such as carbohydrates are broken down to release energy 
through the Krebs cycle. In these processes, electrons are carried by the 
molecules such as ATP and NAD+, which are also used to regenerate the 
biomolecules that are required to continue with the next cycle. As the cyclic 
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regeneration also serves the extraction of energy from the materials involved, it 
enables the organism to stay far-from-equilibrium (Eigen & Schuster, 1977). 
Cognitive processes are considered as circular as well because there is a 
reciprocal coupling between perception and action that leads the organism to 
behave according to the environmental stimuli (Swenson & Turvey, 1991; Vernon, 
Lowe, Thill, & Ziemke, 2015). Furthermore, some other cognitive skills grounding 
human autonomy imply a detachment from sensory-motor coupling, but also the 
creation of a higher-level circularity as identity (Negru, 2016). These examples 
demonstrate that causal cycles are more pervasive than one realizes at first 
glance. This indicates how causal cycles can be understood as an essential 
feature of life, which should lead us to think about the emergence of this particular 
causal form that is necessary for the potential for life. 
A simple causal cycle is a basic self-maintaining process. The logical relation 
between self-maintenance and circularity explains why this type of process is 
prevalent in nature. Once formed due to random interactions, a causal cycle is 
sustained better than any linear process. The linear process, by definition, lacks 
the condition of regenerating its 
current form. A causal loop could be 
considered as the simplest form that 
is capable of maintaining itself in a 
theoretical sense. In a hypothetical 
causal closure, the cycle would not 
require an external cause, as the 
repetition of the causal system would 
create its own order as an endless 
cycle. In this causal loop, repetition 
of the system is a routine, and while 
the loop fulfils its motion, there is no 
possibility for a transformation that 
could make a cycle different from 
previous ones, either. 
Figure 2.2 The hierarchy of hypercycles (from 
Eigen & Schuster, 1977, p. 546). 
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However, only in this kind of hypothetical system where there is neither loss of 
energy nor perturbations circular causality lacks the dynamics of self-organization. 
In real interactions, systems never appear as wholly isolated repetitions that are 
kept perfectly unchanged. Since even the solid matter slowly dissipates its kinetic 
energy, an energy input is needed to tolerate this energy loss. Moreover, perfect 
repetitions would not be the case in reality due to the principle of sensitive 
dependence to the initial conditions. This principle states that slight irregularities at 
any seemingly regular movement are amplified in time. Although chaotic behaviour 
is directly evident only in certain processes, physical systems are all subject to 
nonlinear dynamics. Thus, perturbations might seem ignorable in the short-term, 
but they would eventually end up with dramatic alterations in all physical systems 
(Bishop, 2016). This is why a real system cannot revert back to initial conditions. 
Therefore, in a system that is able to preserve its processual form, some other 
mechanisms are required in order to make the system robust against 
perturbations. 
Inescapable perturbations entail a logical association between complexity and 
circular causality in self-organized systems. A simple causal cycle is weak in its 
self-preservation because it has no solution for the conditions that could disrupt its 
repetition. To be able to repeat itself, a system has to include some additional 
mechanisms beyond a simple causal cycle. This is why self-organization requires a 
certain level of complexity that involves tolerating micro-scale variability due to the 
macro-scale structure, and causal cycles in biological systems must possess a 
certain complexity that includes mechanisms to “repair” the decay into chaos. In 
this sense, self-organized processes include imperfect forms of circular causality, 
in which relations are arranged in a complex network instead of a single loop. 
Causal loops are widespread in nature, in self-organizing phenomena in particular. 
Yet, they are obviously not manifestations of a perfect form in the mentioned 
hypothetical condition, but a form that is realized as a mixture of irregularity and 
self-correcting repetitiveness. Hence, the imperfect circular causality can be put 
forward as one of the main elements of self-organization. 
Eigen and Schuster (1977) developed an influential theory of life’s self-
organization based on circular causality. They argue that only a cyclic model can 
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explain the pre-Darwinian evolution of first biomolecules and the appearance of the 
first genetic code as a frozen accident. Their relevant model is named hypercycle. 
In the hypercycle, there is a stepwise process of chemical reactions in which every 
product is the reactant of the next step, and thereby the whole system becomes its 
own catalyst (Eigen & Schuster, 1977, pp. 542-543). Although a causal cycle is a 
diachronic chain, inasmuch as the system becomes complex, causal cycles might 
appear in the form of synchronized networks that include a spatial expansion of 
circularity. Based on this, Eigen and Schuster state that a hierarchy of cyclic 
processes can be formed in which self-catalysing cycles become the components 
of a higher order hypercycle (see Figure 2.2). They also argue that these 
autocatalytic cycles have their own variation and selection dynamics, which 
indicates that self-organized systems might be characterized by these principles 
beyond the scope of natural selection. On the one side, these systems are 
competitive units as any coupling between cycles leads to the exclusion of other 
possibilities. On the other side, competitive units can be turned into cooperating 
ones in the emergence of a higher order system that includes these units in a 
stabilized form (Eigen & Schuster, 1977, p. 546). As these systems are not 
traditional Darwinian individuals, their scheme of organization is in line with a 
viewpoint that self-sustaining reciprocal linkages and selected effects operate 
within a wider ground than natural selection. 
Now that I have discussed how reciprocal relations in Darwinian evolution and in 
pre-Darwinian conditions lead to the creation of self-maintaining structures, the 
question remains regarding the universal basis of the emergence of cyclic 
processes. The answer lies in the ubiquity of attractor states in nature (see Chapter 
1). As exemplified by Bénard cells, the emergence of an attractor from random 
interactions within a system proves how causal cycles are stabilized as a 
consequence of reciprocal linkages. There are different types of attractors that 
relate to life’s organization in different ways. For example, a strange attractor 
appears as an unpredictable, non-periodic, and semi-organized behaviour of a 
system that is mostly known by the swinging patterns of a hinged pendulum. It has 
been hypothesized that malignant tumour growth is an instantiation of a strange 
attractor, and a growing area of study has been focusing on the nonlinear basis of 
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similar cellular processes (Nikolov, Wolkenhauer, & Vera, 2014). According to a 
similar claim, cancer is related to the emergence of specific attractors in genetic 
regulatory networks that divert the system from its normal parameters (Huang, 
Ernberg, & Kauffman, 2009). Another type of attractor that is essential for life’s self-
organization is the stable limit cycle, in which system moves into a periodic 
behaviour by tolerating any perturbations. Oscillators in living systems are either 
due to the limit cycle or induced by noise (Mitarai, Alon, & Jensen, 2013). For 
instance, the limit cycle is the basis of circadian clock oscillations (Lenz & 
Søgaard-Andersen, 2011), which I discuss in the fourth chapter in relation to the 
temporality of biological organization. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I discussed alternative approaches towards life’s organization 
as well as early contributions to the ideas of self-organization. In many cases, 
autopoiesis is not in compliance with self-organization. Above all, the notion of 
closure, although being useful to highlight the basis of autonomy, is far from 
sufficiently describing life’s fundamental condition which is ecological organization. 
In comparison with autopoiesis, the autonomous perspective is a step forward, as it 
identifies the thermodynamic basis of life. However, the autonomous perspective 
disregards the spontaneous dynamics of order in life, which leads it to presuppose 
a sharp distinction between self-organization and the regulation of autonomous 
living systems. 
I also discussed how the universal basis of life’s organization resides in cyclic 
processes and the emergent stability of the systems. Certain physical processes 
that are analysed with the models of self-organization such as robustness, 
criticality, and feedback loops arise in all kinds of natural systems including 
biological ones. Yet, pointing out the universal feature of self-organization does not 
imply that life’s organization is reducible. New hierarchical dimensions arise with 
the increasing complexity that cannot be explained by any generalization of these 
underlying dynamics. In this sense, biological processes appear across an 
emergent dimension that is formed historically, and therefore it is not possible to 
reduce life’s organization to a universal principle of self-organization. On the 
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contrary, the universality of self-organization does not refer to a type of law-like 
necessity, but only identifies general trends, e.g. certain forms of reciprocal 
linkages tend to be sustained in self-maintaining structures. The latter is an 
explanation of selected effects, and therefore demonstrates that self-organization 
and selection are intertwined phenomena. Transformation from randomly 
established reciprocal relations to interdependency, which I termed transitional 
self-organization, is a pervasive phenomenon. The ubiquitous existence of these 
dynamics suggests that this type of patterns might have also been involved in the 
emergence of life, as we can expect the role of attractors in the transformation of 
Earth’s physico-chemical conditions. This would mean that, contrary to Monod’s 
(1972) claim, the emergence of life is not a miraculous event, but a likely 
possibility, as a consequence of the creation of order by self-organization. 
This chapter has offered an account of the fundamental dynamics of a self-
organizing system, “which is typically non-linear, because of circular or feedback 
relations between the components” (Heylighen, 2001). A system requires a certain 
variety of stability states to cope with environmental changes, and this is why self-
organization is so fundamental for living systems. As will be explained in the 
following chapters, through self-organized processes, systems can discover novel 
ways of organization, which leads to the expansion of interdependent relations and 
construction of higher levels of organization. Therefore, life’s evolution cannot be 
thought as distinct from self-organization. 
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Chapter Three 
Levels of Organization in the Organism 
 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I explain the role of emergent dynamics of order in the 
formation of hierarchical levels of biological organization, before focusing on the 
problem of diachronic emergence in the next chapter. As noted in the previous 
chapters, bottom-up dynamics of self-organization are utilized in many ways, yet 
they are not sufficient to explain life’s organization. This brings us to the main 
issues of this chapter, that is, levels of organization and downward causality. One 
way of approaching life’s emergent organization is to trace the issue of hierarchy 
back to the origin of life, which involves the big question of how life began through 
chemical self-organization (Luisi, 2006; Eigen & Schuster, 2012), or to tackle 
questions such as the interaction between natural selection and self-organization 
(Swenson, 1989; Hogeweg, 2005). Although important, this chapter will not focus 
on the evolutionary aspect.36 Many of the issues with biological self-organization 
emerge at the organism level, so I focus on the organizational levels within a 
modern multicellular organism. Specifically, this is the question of how emergent 
order is exploited across multiple levels of organization.37 
																																								 																					
36 This is also because this aspect involves a broad scientific topic in which answers relating to self-
organization mostly depend on empirical studies. For instance, a new experiment on RNA world 
hypothesis might shed light to the relevant arguments concerning the evolutionary aspect of self-
organization. This hypothesis on the origin of life asserts that RNA emerged before DNA in primitive 
cells. According to this idea, both the storage of hereditary information and catalysis of chemical 
reactions were carried out by RNA prior to the existence of DNA. In this sense, any revealing 
concerning this issue would also help to understand the evolutionary background of molecular self-
organization. 
37 When it comes to the evolutionary basis of self-organization, it will suffice to note some of the 
hypothetical stances concerning how physical forces have been evolutionarily constrained through 
biological regulation (Newman, Forgacs, & Müller, 2003). From the historical perspective, the 
evolution of the multicellular life form is based on an ascending complexity. This does not mean that 
the direction of evolution always favours the complex over the simple. As Vrba and Gould (1986) 
have explained, even though hierarchy is historically built by the integration of simpler forms into 
more complex entities, this does not imply that selection always favours the complex against the 
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A core idea of this chapter is that a non-reductionist approach and a multi-
scale analysis are necessary to understand the emergent dynamics of life. It would 
be a mistake to assume that a molecular-level analysis is sufficient to understand 
biological organization. This would perpetuate the tendency to reduce processes to 
molecular biology and generally undermine the value of macro-scale approach. 
Similarly, to explain biological organization by solely focusing on the bottom-up 
construction of order results a defective explanation that ignores the top-down 
context of biological functionality. Therefore, a more complete account of the 
organism’s self-organization will be able to explain how emergent properties of the 
organism rely on several causal capacities. Biological form is acquired and 
dynamically maintained throughout the life cycle of the organism. This is the basic 
claim of epigenesis (see Chapter 2 and Chapter 4), which is defended against 
preformationism (Moss, 2003). 
Below, I introduce an analysis concerning the integration of parts at multiple 
levels. This involves an examination of the dynamics of self-ordering, self-
assembly, and pattern formation, since these are the main mechanisms which 
enable the formal stability of the organism. These dynamics denote systemic 
regularities utilized within the bottom-up construction of order. For instance, self-
assembly of the bilayer at the molecular level becomes functional by forming the 
membrane at the cellular level. Spontaneous dynamics of order, biophysical 
capacities of cells and tissues, and combinatory potential due to the alternative 
functionality of a component in higher-level networks are among the bottom-up 
dynamics of organization. On the other hand, centralized functions such as the 
immune system could be considered as downward causes. Centralized 
mechanisms are processual networks of functions that make use of the rest of the 
organism as a potential source for reorganizing the system. In this context, the 
organism is a process of constant interplay between bottom-up and top-down 
dynamics. This provides the foundation for the next chapter which develops a 
potentiality approach in relation to the processual nature of the organism. 
																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 																										
simple. Nor does it imply that we should be seeking a deterministic law that requires an increase of 
global complexity in all circumstances. Instead, the appearance of lower-level dynamics is the 
prerequisite for the complex multicellular organism. 
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The relevance of emergent dynamics in the formation of organizational levels 
is evident within an expanding scientific literature that appeals to the concept of 
self-organization. The importance of self-organization is apparent from the 
increasing popularity of the notion, notwithstanding some inconsistencies that I 
detect with the definition (see Section 1.3). Self-organization has been traditionally 
referred to in the studies of embryo development (Deglincerti et al., 2016; Weiss, 
1968; Wennekamp, Mesecke, Nédélec, & Hiiragi, 2013), whereas recently the 
concept is ever-increasingly deployed in different areas from cellular interactions to 
regulatory networks, to name a few: molecular self-assembly – or self-organization 
(Luisi, 2006; Vendruscolo, Zurdo, MacPhee, & Dobson, 2003), self-organization of 
organelles at the cellular level (Maly & Borisy, 2001; Misteli, 2001, 2009; Karsenti, 
2008; Junkin, Leung, Whitman, Gregorio, & Wong, 2011), tissue self-organization 
(Kadoshima et al., 2013; Muguruma, Nishiyama, Kawakami, Hashimoto, & Sasai, 
2015; Newman & Comper, 1990; Sasai, 2013), and self-organizing networks that 
operate in centralized functions (Pasquale, Massobrio, Bologna, Chiappalone, & 
Martinoia, 2008), such as the genetic circuits, the immune system (Atlan & Cohen, 
2006), and the nervous system – including the brain’s self-organization (Atasoy, 
Donnelly, & Pearson, 2016; de Gennes, 2007; Singh, Haobijam, Malik, Ishrat, & 
Singh, 2018). In the following sections, I address the understandings of self-
organization across these levels also by discussing some of these studies. 
First, I explain how bottom-up factors such as self-ordering dynamics at the 
cellular level help to create a basis for organization (Sections 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3). 
This requires discussing the nature of organizational hierarchy, which is context-
dependent and open to interlevel causation. In this regard, I address the emergent 
dynamics at the molecular, cellular, and tissue level, which constitute the lower 
levels of organization within the organism. Some of the concepts proposed in this 
area also define certain research problems, e.g. dynamic instability as an 
intracellular mechanism, pattern formation in tissues, and morphogenesis in the 
development of the embryo. These phenomena all exemplify the emergence of 
ordered patterns through interactions at different levels, and therefore fall under the 
scope of self-organization. Non-equilibrium dynamics determine the de novo 
appearance of form within the cellular environment, and similar spontaneous 
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factors are also relevant in tissue structures. Beyond these levels, metabolic 
activity keeps the organism far-from-equilibrium, as explained in previous chapters. 
These sections lay the foundations for understanding the association between 
metabolic dynamicity and lower-level spontaneity, hence it will be possible to see 
how the multicellular organism, as an evolved structure, exploits non-equilibrium 
dynamics at lower levels. Lower-level dynamics also indicate that self-ordering is 
inclusive of stochastic elements by its very nature. In fact, stochasticity might play 
a positive role in the emergent order, and therefore the elimination of contingency 
by an omnipresent regulation does not accurately portray the organism’s 
organization. This supports my criticism of the mechanistic approach of autopoiesis 
in the preceding chapter. 
The main questions examined in the rest of this chapter (Sections 2.1 and 2.2) 
are: how is the organism individuated and how does the system exert top-down 
control over its components inasmuch as the parts vis-à-vis the centralized 
networks are highly modifiable, replaceable, and dispensable? In this context, I 
emphasize the claim that centralized systems that are partially detached from 
intradependent processes of the organism act in complementarity with the causal 
capacity of spontaneous dynamics (Moreno & Mossio, 2015). Furthermore, the 
organism is not simply a composition of its parts, and sub-systemic elements are 
not perfectly integrated. Instead, the organism is a whole in which parts 
communicate with each other (Atlan & Cohen, 2006). Each of these points has 
been made in other studies due to considering the organism’s activity as an open 
process. The novelty of my account is that it interprets these points from the 
broader perspective of the interplay between spontaneous dynamics and 
downward regulation. In this regard, the openness of the organismic processes 
also refers to them being unprecedented, and characterized by alternative 
realizations and even internal conflicts in certain circumstances. 
1. Steps of Biological Complexity 
In the following sections, I address general characteristics of hierarchical 
organization in the face of contingency, by emphasizing that organization is an 
issue beyond the composition of nested levels; I then explain how interlevel and 
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intralevel dynamics of hierarchy are realized from the molecular to the tissue level. 
Lower-level dynamics of the organism are fundamental for the bottom-up 
construction of organization. This multiple-level analysis also demonstrates how 
new properties emerge beyond the micro-level determination of biological 
organization. 
1.1 Hierarchy of the organization and contingency 
It is the hierarchy of the organization that enables us to refer to higher vs. lower 
levels. However, the hierarchy has different implications depending on whether the 
context is material composition, organization, or cause-effect relations. In this 
section, first, I show why organizational hierarchy, which mostly determines the 
context of causal relations, is not simply a matter of material composition, and why 
we should focus on the dynamics of stability vis-à-vis contingent factors. Second, I 
remark that cause-effect relations within this hierarchy require a discussion of 
intralevel vs. interlevel causation. Finally, I explain why self-organization of the 
organism is not contradictory to the organizational hierarchy, despite some of the 
definitions of the former which consider it as a single level phenomenon. 
According to a formulation that is based on material composition, a lower level 
denotes a part that is included in a more inclusive mechanism at a higher level 
(Craver & Bechtel, 2007). Within this mechanistic view, biological systems are 
hierarchical due to being nearly decomposable systems (see Chapter 4). 
According to this idea, living systems include intertwined mechanisms possessing 
stronger internal relations compared to those external to the mechanism (Simon, 
1962). On the other hand, Craver (2007) states that this kind of mechanistic 
decomposition is relative to the function that is attributed to the mechanism, which 
implies the idea that organization depends on goal-directed processes that cannot 
be understood through static compositions. Although describing living systems as 
nearly decomposable can be useful for explaining their hierarchical nature, I will 
instead focus on the generic properties (see below and Section 2) of living 
systems, as understanding organizational hierarchy is an issue that extends 
beyond the mere description of compositional hierarchy. 
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Concerning the levels of organization within the organism, the received 
identification in contemporary scientific literature considers a hierarchy of molecular 
level, cellular level, tissue level and so on. For part-whole relations, this formulation 
merely denotes the compositional hierarchy of an entity. However, an approach 
beyond the part-whole relations of a single entity is necessary to account for the 
existence of organizational levels, because levels are only applicable when there is 
a class of individuals (DiFrisco, 2017a), e.g. we can speak of the molecular level 
only if there are multiple molecules, and based on that, there is the notion of 
molecule as a kind. A part-whole relationship that is exemplified by an individual 
molecule’s involvement in an individual system is not sufficient to yield an 
explanation of the hierarchy of levels. Levels are described due to principles of 
organization with relation to entities belonging to certain classes. Parts constitute 
the whole in a specific entity, but both the part and the whole represent certain 
classes, which is a fact that enables an extension of the part-whole relation to a 
relationship between entities representing different levels. Therefore, beyond an 
individual part-whole relation, the hierarchy of levels depends on a generic 
understanding of living systems that concerns classes of individuals. For example, 
a specific cell being a part of a specific tissue, if considered only in the context of 
an individual animal’s body, is basically a matter of material composition, whereas 
cells belonging to tissues in general is a matter of cells belonging to a lower level 
and tissues belonging to a higher level. 
Understanding the hierarchical levels in the context of the individuals’ 
association with classes is essential to identify specific organizational properties 
that are common to organisms. For instance, it would be quite difficult to say 
whether some properties are either contingent and unique, or generic and 
organizational, only by looking into the properties of a single tissue. Instead, an 
investigation of tissues as a class makes it possible to understand these relational 
properties as intralevel dynamics that are specific to a certain level of organization.  
At this point, the following question should be asked: is it only the levels of 
scale, e.g. the molecular interactions at the micro-scale, that justify the attribution 
to different levels, or is it possible to make reference to specific organizational 
properties for these different scales? That is, what properties, if any, make a tissue 
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something classifiable as a level of organization? As mentioned above, 
organizational levels are dependent on typical partitions of a whole, which indicates 
that the main issue extends beyond an understanding due to decomposing a whole 
as a unique individual (DiFrisco, 2017a). However, the properties that make a 
tissue a member of a class cannot be investigated through ideal token-type 
relationships. This is because the aspect of uniqueness cannot be discarded when 
investigating organizational types. Since a real tissue, for example, has always 
some degree of uniqueness, epithelial tissues of two different organisms are never 
identical, even though these individuals are homozygous. This is due to several 
factors of internal contingency, such as stochasticity in epigenetic mechanisms, 
signalling cascades, and gene expression, or environmental noise, which refers to 
the external aspect of the contingency (Bateson et al., 2001). As a consequence of 
contingency, there is no exact similarity between the members of organizational 
types. 
One could argue from this that associating tissues or cells with certain levels of 
organization is a matter of convention, and that there is no ontological ground to 
assume certain organizational properties for different levels because there is no 
typical hierarchy that is applicable to all living systems. This objection would be 
against the typical partition of organizational properties. Since biological systems 
are characterised by diversity and contingency, it is not possible to establish neat 
classifications. A tissue is an ensemble of similar cells, but it seems difficult to 
come up with more specific characterizations that are generalizable to all tissues 
due to the diversity of biological entities. For instance, claiming that a membrane 
constitutes the closure of any cell including a nucleus, even though typical to 
eukaryotic cells, is not generalizable, as in the case of muscle cells there are 
several nuclei within a membrane. In this sense, there is a constant antagonistic 
relation between the contingently diversifying and the typically appearing features 
of the organization. 
The contingent and unique nature of interactions within the part-whole relations 
poses a problem in terms of organizational types. The problem is twofold: first, it is 
about understanding the ontological basis of organizational types; second, it is 
about explaining why the factors of contingency do not lead to complete chaos by 
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rendering any organizational classification impossible. This is important for 
understanding the actual reciprocal relations that keep tissues intact and provide 
the stability of developmental trajectories. Certain organizational patterns appear 
both spatially and temporally, even though each individual organism exhibits a 
unique trajectory of development. At the individual level, it might be the case that 
two members of a certain species are characterized by the factors of internal and 
external stochasticity, yet both still have the same types of cells, tissues, and 
organs, and thus both of them sustain their life as the members of the same 
species. 
A gene-centred explanation would make the claim that these two individuals 
are members of the same species because both include genomes that are peculiar 
to that species. This claim is partially true in so far as it explains the similarity at the 
level of the individual, but it does not offer a full causal explanation for why there 
are similar organizational properties at lower levels. In other words, genetic 
similarity does not give an ultimate answer to the fact that the organizational nature 
at the molecular, cellular, and tissue levels is mostly immune to developmental 
contingency, as a consequence of which a certain amount of diversity among 
individuals co-exists with organizational stability. Neither does it account for why 
these organizational properties are widely shared across the phylum; that is, 
certain structural properties stay the same despite the variations due to 
evolutionary contingency. Therefore, an account of hierarchy which explains the 
emergence of certain organizational constraints through multiple levels is needed. 
As will be shown below, nested layers of organization are characterized by certain 
generic properties that are highly intertwined with the physical basis of biological 
systems. Contingent factors must be tolerated in certain ways due to physical 
necessities such as the requirement of keeping entropy low, or biological 
necessities such as supressing microorganisms and cancerous cells. Thus, an 
explanation of the organism must include the underlying reasons for the 
emergence of typical organizational patterns. 
The hierarchy of organization also has implications in terms of cause-effect 
relations between the levels. As the self-organization of the organism is not a one-
dimensional integration, a presumption concerning the lateral versus vertical nature 
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of causal interactions is essential. Within intralevel interactions, spontaneous order, 
such as in the dynamics that keep a tissue intact and immiscible, is highly efficient. 
Concerning the molecules, cells, and tissues, some of the organizational properties 
are typical in the sense that certain types of spontaneous order, regulatory 
networks, or geometrical shapes appear with them. For example, a cell is typically 
(but not always) a unit characterized by membrane closure, and a tissue is typically 
an immiscible, semi-fluid structure with a certain geometrical shape such as a layer 
or a fibrous structure. In this sense, a level of organization is associated with 
specific dynamics of order usually led by the characteristic appearance of intralevel 
causation at that scale. Intralevel causation is based on structurally (though usually 
not productively) interdependent parts that belong to a lower level, as in the cells 
forming a tissue. Since the emergent dynamics are fundamentally realized as 
localized order, emergent properties are due to intralevel synergy exerting 
influence at a higher level. 
An interlevel interaction appears when a mechanism at one level intervenes at 
a different level, or when higher-level structures determine a context for micro-
scale interactions. An example of the former is cellular apoptosis, in which the body 
sends the cell a signal to trigger the self-destruction of the cell. On the other hand, 
the organizational context due to a higher level is usually based on the presence of 
the surrounding conditions facilitating a lower-level interaction. For example, 
protein folding is a process of thermodynamic stability, which is determined by 
intralevel interactions due to size (if the complexification from primary to tertiary 
structures is disregarded), but it is the cellular environment that enables protein 
folding. Similarly, a cellular membrane is crucial for maintaining the chemical 
processes within the cell, but more inclusive factors such as the interactions 
through the intercellular matrix also exert a large influence on the cellular function 
(Moss, 2003). Tissue cells are unified through the morphogenetic dynamics of 
attachment, yet tissues are functional thanks to the ongoing metabolic activity of 
the organism. In the end, this multi-level organization is hierarchical because the 
whole organism with its array of bodily functions is integrated by forming a top-
down control over its parts. Nevertheless, this is not a strict causal hierarchy of top-
down control because the interactions at a lower level might also influence a higher 
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level. The elements of stochasticity at a lower level can percolate, or, due to some 
mechanisms that were mentioned in the previous chapters, get amplified into 
higher levels, which mitigates the downward hierarchy. For instance, this is evident 
with a point mutation’s rare influence on a phenotypic property. In general, a point 
mutation does not lead to a phenotypic change due to the robust nature of 
organization, whereas in certain loci, a mutation might be expressed as a shift 
between the phenotypic traits, as in the example of a mutation that changes the 
eye colour of a fruit fly. It is argued that some point mutations of this kind could be 
even realized as an amplification of indeterminacy at the molecular level which is 
manifest at the population level when the point mutation is fixed through random 
fluctuations (Brandon & Carson, 1996). 
Let us consider the other relevant factor for this discussion, centralized 
systems. The multicellular organism is a self-organized whole that includes 
centralized mechanisms exerting top-down control over the body. The role of the 
organizational hierarchy is usually not a disputed claim, whereas ascription to self-
organization is. Since self-organization is usually associated with decentralized 
systems (Seeley, 2002; Camazine et al., 2003), mentioning hierarchical 
organization and self-organization together seems contradictory at first glance. Yet, 
I argue that in spite of this seeming contradiction, self-organization and 
organizational hierarchy are co-existent. Not only organisms, but all self-organized 
systems are organizationally hierarchical. This is due to an asymmetry in the 
interactions that determine the self-organized nature of a system. As shown in the 
previous chapters, self-organization denotes the fact that the relevant system is 
individuated as a whole by its organization. In this individuation process, the 
interactions that play a role in the cohesion of the system are distributed all over 
the system. This might lead some to think that self-organization is one-
dimensional. Moreover, as self-organization is usually associated with the bottom-
up emergence of properties, or distributed control through lateral relations within 
the same level (Shen, Will, Galstyan, & Chuong, 2004), this might support the 
misconception that self-organization contradicts organizational hierarchy. 
However, the misconception here results from overlooking the dialectical 
aspect of the issue: Self-organization is a process that either changes the 
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characteristics of a system, or adds new characteristics. Homogeneous turns into 
heterogeneous, and non-hierarchical turns into hierarchical due to transitional self-
organization. Moreover, the distinction between transitional and regulative 
dynamics that was discussed in the first chapter deals with any possible 
vagueness in this dialectic, hence the emergence versus the continuity of the 
hierarchy can be distinguished from each other.  In transitional self-organization, it 
is the local contingency that is caught up by the emerging pattern within the 
system, whereas in regulative self-organization, lower-level spontaneity is 
consistently integrated within the system. In both of these types, a notion of 
distributed or one-dimensional nature corresponds to an initial or a basic condition, 
since this one-dimensionality corresponds to causal symmetry and homogeneity. In 
actual fact, self-organization denotes the loss of one-dimensionality: Certain cases 
of transitional self-organization are characterized by the bifurcation process that 
creates a causal asymmetry within the system, which implies that specific 
interactions become more influential, or even dominate the system (Prigogine & 
Stengers, 1984/2017). In transitional self-organization, this is the appearance of 
hierarchy through an individuated process, whereas in regulative self-organization, 
individuation corresponds to functional integration in which hierarchy is 
characterized by multiple processes that could become dominant depending on the 
context of the functional requirement. In either case, contrary to the common 
misconception that self-organization relates to one-dimensional wholes, 
spontaneous emergence of order does not rule out the fact that some localized 
regions or certain causal cycles within these interactions are more influential than 
the rest of the system. In the paradigm cases of transitional self-organization, such 
as Bénard cell formation and ferromagnetic synchronization, certain patterns 
eventually dominate the whole, that is, an emerging hierarchy is what transforms 
the system. 
In terms of hierarchy, regulative self-organization of the organism is not an 
exception, but rather represents a qualitative difference, as this type of 
organization is a much more complex case of asymmetrical individuation. For 
example, a human individual, as an organism, is self-organized. Yet, it is also 
obvious that there is a structural and organizational hierarchy in this self-organized 
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structure, e.g. the neural cortex has a centralized role in cognitive abilities such as 
analytical thinking. Similarly, even though hormone regulation depends on the 
negative feedback control that is distributed over the human body, this does not 
negate the fact that the hypothalamus is a centralized region of the endocrine 
system. Centralized control mechanisms and regulative networks are integrated 
through specific goal-directed processes. As in the case of hormonal regulation, 
the system conditions and is also conditioned by the homeostatic control. 
Therefore, the hierarchy that results in the form of centralized networks is not in 
conflict with, but on the contrary, is essential for the organism’s regulative self-
organization. 
1.2 Organization at the molecular level 
The emergence of order in molecular processes has been investigated in 
several ways within different areas of study, such as non-equilibrium systems, 
artificial chemistry, and synthetic life. Although diverging both in method and basic 
research problems, these research fields are linked in terms of demonstrating that 
organic matter is not inert. The capacity to assemble is the most essential aspect 
of molecular dynamicity, and in the organization of the organism, this spontaneous 
capacity is utilized. A basic example of this capacity is the processes of polymer 
organization (Bucknall & Anderson, 2003). In this section, I examine the molecular 
level dynamics behind the organization of polymers. Biological form at this level 
emerges, above all, due to the thermodynamic and kinetic basis of stability. Basic 
forms of stereoregularity (see below) develop due to equilibrium conditions, that is, 
thermodynamic control, whereas kinetic control creates a temporary deviation from 
the equilibrium. One aspect of life’s exploitation of the spontaneous potential for 
order is self-assembly that occurs by approaching the thermodynamically favoured 
state without using any external source of energy, although this is not a case of 
transitional self-organization due to far-from-equilibrium conditions. Then, I discuss 
the role of stochasticity in protein folding in order to show that kinetic dynamics are 
not mechanistically precise, but multiply realizable. This is an important aspect in 
terms of providing an alternative account of emergent dynamics. The interactions 
at the molecular level indicate that patterns might emerge due to kinetic factors. 
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Some of the concepts that are used to define organization at the molecular 
level are controversial. The most common cases of structuration at this level are 
self-ordering and self-assembly. Self-ordering refers to the capacity of molecules to 
form stereoregular shapes, such as spherically formed micelles (Abel & Trevors, 
2006), whereas self-assembly refers to the more basic capacity of molecules to 
accumulate in water (Vendruscolo et al., 2003). On the other hand, conceptual 
demarcations between self-ordering and self-organization are disputed. Self-
ordering seems to be a common way of referring to molecular regularity. In some 
studies, the emergence of molecular order is associated with self-organization 
(Luisi, 2006), whereas this kind of usage is criticized by other authors (Abel & 
Trevors, 2006). Restricting the application of the concept of self-organization to the 
individual organization of a system appeals to the dynamics that I associated with 
regulative self-organization. In this context, it is only a whole that can have the 
capacity to organize itself autonomously. Bottom-up construction of order at the 
molecular level only partially contributes to the constitution of self, which is why 
molecules, despite being characterized by a causal capacity to become ordered or 
assembled, cannot organize by themselves (see Section 1.3). Another problem of 
demarcation concerns the notions of self-assembly and self-organization. 
According to one of the proposals for distinguishing them, the former is simply a 
physical integration in equilibrium conditions, whereas the latter depends on far-
from-equilibrium conditions (Misteli, 2001). This aims to distinguish far-from-
equilibrium conditions (as in the constant dynamism of the metabolic function) from 
the formation of structure at equilibrium (as in the formation of phospholipid bilayer, 
see below). In that regard, I agree with the necessity of making a distinction 
between equilibrium and non-equilibrium processes. However, when it is proposed 
that all the non-equilibrium interactions should be referred to as self-organization in 
general, it seems that a possible misconception is to attribute the capacity to self-
organize to the parts of a regulated system. To avoid this misconception, it is 
necessary to clarify the implications of individuation. 
One of the most important factors at molecular level is the spontaneous 
formation of phospholipid bilayers and micelles, which are crucial for cellular 
compartmentalization where the chemical activities necessary for the emergence 
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of life occur. The phospholipid bilayer denotes the molecular structure of the 
cellular membrane, and the micelle, which has a spherical structure, is thought to 
be essential for the formation of protocells in the beginning of life (Luisi, 2006). 
Most organic molecules form stable, crystalline structures in aquatic conditions, 
which are vital for life. These processes are, above all, due to the hydrophobic vs. 
hydrophilic behaviour of the different parts of a compound in an aqueous 
environment. For example, lipid molecules, which include a hydrophilic head and a 
hydrophobic tail, form phospholipid layers due to this dichotomous way of 
interacting with water. Hydrophilic heads interact with water molecules, and 
hydrophobic tails interact with each other, forming the inner part of the bilayer 
sheet (see Figure 3.1a). Similarly, linear backbones of amino acid chains 
spontaneously fold into three-dimensional protein structures due to the molecular 
bonds between the atoms of the side chain. Here, spontaneous folding refers to 
the fact that the relevant process is thermodynamically favourable. As mentioned 
above, the formation of stable molecular structures of life is usually due to 
thermodynamic stability. It follows that these molecular structures spontaneously 
arise as a consequence of the energy flow from a higher energy state towards a 
lower state. Thermodynamic stability might even be sufficient to keep viruses 
intact. Some viruses such as tobacco mosaic virus, after being denatured, can 
reassemble spontaneously upon the required conditions of their stability (Luisi, 
2006, p. 105).38  
The other essential dynamic at the molecular level is kinetic control. Kinetic 
control is based on short-term effects depending on specific interactions at a given 
moment, which is influenced by the statistically expected homogeneity in the long-
term due to thermodynamic control, but results in localized dynamics that are 
crucial for the order of life. For example, chemical reactions occurring at a faster 
rate or requiring lower activation energy are kinetically preferred over those 																																								 																					
38 The spontaneous ordering of the molecules should not be confused with the spontaneous 
formation of life. The problem of the origin of life, yet to be solved, requires several factors, both 
spontaneous and non-spontaneous. On the other hand, the self-ordering of the first molecules of 
life, especially that of amino acids has a crucial role in theories of the origin of life. This is due to the 
fact that amino acids can form spontaneously in nature. The famous Stanley-Miller experiment was 
successful in producing some of the amino acids from inorganic matter. Also, it is found that most 
asteroids include amino acid molecules, suggesting that spontaneous formation of amino acids is 
widespread in the universe. 
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occurring at a lower rate or requiring higher activation energy, even if the latter are 
thermodynamically more stable. In some cases, this determines the ultimate path 
of the chemical reactions because the reactions that are under kinetic control are 
sometimes irreversible. A prominent example of this is enzymatic activity. As is 
known, enzymes catalyse chemical reactions by affecting the kinetic conditions, 
such as enabling the collision of the molecules involved in a reaction. Thus, kinetic 
factors are those due to the relations between the molecules in specific 
configurations, e.g. an attachment between molecules keeping them away from 
equilibrium for a while. In other words, thermodynamics relates to the statistical 
characteristics of the energy flow, as the energy flow and the speed of each 
molecule become more homogenous in time. Whereas kinetic factors relate to the 
interactions as they occur through actual pathways. Thus, kinetic factors can 
sometimes sustain a heterogeneous condition, or create localized order as a non-
equilibrium condition (Luisi, 2006). 
The phospholipid bilayer formation is realized due to thermodynamic flow. The 
bilayer is the material of cellular membranes, and other forms such as micelles and 
reverse micelles are thought to constitute the first compartments of life in which 
autopoietic cycles evolved (Luisi, 2006). Physical properties of the molecules 
Figure 3.1a Self-assembly of phospholipid structures in aqueous solution. 
Hydrophobic tails and hydrophilic heads lead to layered structures (from Luisi 
2006, p. 183). Figure 3.1b Phospholipid forms differentiate partially depending 
on the ratio between V and a x l (from Luisi, 2006, p. 186). 
3.1
a 
3.1
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depending on the ratios of the amounts of components directly influence which 
shapes will be formed (see Figure 3.1b). Micelles and bilayers are 
thermodynamically stable, whereas in other molecular structures such as vesicles, 
thermodynamic and kinetic control co-determine the form of organization. This 
implies that these macromolecules are kinetically trapped in a thermodynamically 
favourable condition as a lower energy state, which is nevertheless not an ideal 
condition corresponding to the lowest energy state (Luisi, 2006, p. 201). One of the 
crucial consequences of this combined function is the role of some molecular 
templates, which can distort the pathway to create specific regular molecular 
shapes. These molecules are then trapped in this form even after the agent that 
acted as a template is removed (Luisi, 2006). 
Thermodynamic stability is the most essential factor at the molecular level. 
However, it is now more widely acknowledged that multiply realizable pathways in 
these processes are the key to the formation of macromolecules. This implies that 
a certain state of a phase transition, or even certain functions, can be reached by 
multiple routes converging at certain functionality. In this way, the stochasticity of 
the processes is utilized to create form, e.g. in protein folding, or in the production 
of immune cells (see Section 2.1). This provides a basis for emergent order, which 
is why the distinction of thermodynamic vs. kinetic control in isolation is not 
sufficient to explain the nature of these molecular processes. Take the example of 
protein folding: contrary to phospholipid bilayer formation, protein folding cannot be 
explained merely by self-assembly, and as a consequence, more sophisticated 
models have been developed in this area. In the past, the folding of the 
polypeptides into a highly complex functional protein within a short duration (up to 
a few microseconds) was considered a paradoxical case. Due to the huge number 
of possible conformations for a protein, it was previously believed that reaching the 
final state by randomly searching between these kinetic conformations should take 
a much longer duration than that observed (Levinthal, 1968). An initial hypothesis 
for the solution of this paradox involved the idea that some intermediates must be 
guiding the folding process, yet “now it is evident that folding must be thought of as 
a stochastic process in which the free energy is minimized through the exploration 
of a very conformational space” (Vendruscolo et al., 2003, p. 1209). This suggests 
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that the formation of a three-dimensional protein shape is not led by one single 
path, but through a multiply realizable pathway that involves both the kinetic and 
thermodynamic factors. 
Stochastically driven protein folding also has implications for interlevel 
causation. For instance, even though the mainstream view considers the amino 
acid chain as the code for specific proteins, this way of formulating of the issue 
might lead to the misconception that the code is a predetermining element and the 
protein shape is a passive outcome. In fact, the actual organizational context 
suggests quite the contrary, since “the folding is also coupled to a vast array of 
other events in the cells, ranging from the trafficking of molecules to specific 
environments to the control and regulation of the cell cycle and cell growth” and 
“unfolded or partly folded proteins may be involved in other functions such as 
translocation across membranes” (Vendruscolo et al., 2003, p. 1210). This reveals 
an interesting relation between regulation at the organism level and spontaneous 
order at the molecular level, which also demonstrates the interplay between 
bottom-up and top-down dynamics of individuation. According to this interplay, the 
molecular dynamics of order create the part, but it is the context of organization 
that enables the part to be utilized. Thus, these parts are analogous to puzzle 
pieces that are used in different combinations, depending on the functional 
requirement. The phase transitions in protein folding does not occur due to precise 
pathways, but due to folding domains, as “it appears that natural sequences are 
designed not just to enable the desired fold to be obtained efficiently, but also to 
minimize the possibility of the formation of alternative folds” (Vendruscolo et al., 
2003, p. 1213). On the other hand, malfunction due to stochasticity seems to be 
the inescapable cost of the contingency that is fundamental for regulative 
organization. For example, misfolding of the proteins is a side effect of the 
stochasticity of protein folding, and diseases such as “Alzheimer, Creutzfeldt-
Jakob's disease, adult-onset diabetes, cystic fibrosis, and many forms of cancer” 
arise as a consequence of this (Vendruscolo et al., 2003, p. 1210). 
The fact that molecular processes are realized through a possibility space 
indicates that biological order is not an issue that can be approached from a 
calculationist viewpoint. Similar to the pre-deterministic conception of the protein 
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formation, a mainstream approach posits that the genetic code is implemented 
through mechanistically precise pathways, while it is becoming obvious in 
contemporary biology that the notion of genes as the blueprints of organization 
does not correspond to an efficient mechanism vis-à-vis regulative self-
organization. In the latter, basic causal processes are instead the feedback loops, 
stochastic transitions, and editing mechanisms, which in turn act upon the gene 
expression in a context-dependent way. All these molecular processes are 
regulated within the self-organized body through an open pathway. 
A last point in this section concerns the context-dependency of the emergent 
dynamics at a molecular level. This point explains only one side of the interplay 
between bottom-up and top-down characteristics of self-organization. Processes 
such as self-ordering partially explain more complicated processes such as protein 
folding, as is evident from the fact that the three-dimensional shape of the protein 
does not survive for a long time out of the body. Without the whole regulative body, 
the capacity of spontaneous dynamics to sustain functionality is significantly 
restricted. This is supported by several experiments demonstrating that the 
molecules of the organism, unlike some alternative macromolecules that are 
created in synthetic biology, are very fragile in vitro. This is in line with the 
presumption that spontaneous order at the molecular level and regulatory networks 
at the individual level complement each other. For example, proteins fold mostly 
due to thermodynamic stability, but the process is enabled and accelerated 
because the relevant cells provide an aqueous environment with the required pH 
level. Moreover, even if some molecular forms such as the phospholipid bilayer 
can be formed independently from the organism’s regulation, the potential of 
thermodynamic stability is utilized in the right context through the regulation of the 
system. At this point, the holistic aspect of regulation in which higher levels 
constitute the surrounding conditions and the context of lower-level interactions is 
crucial. For example, self-accumulation is useful in many cases. Yet, it can also be 
harmful for protein functionality, and therefore some other regulatory mechanisms 
that prevent the accumulation are necessary in some cases (Vendruscolo et al., 
2003). 
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Spontaneously formed functionality in equilibrium dynamics is a basic source 
of order, but in addition to this, a vast possibility area of the molecular interactions 
is investigated within kinematics, which requires taking into account the aspects of 
stochasticity and context-dependency. This requires a revision of the central ideas 
related to thermodynamics, which is a theory that was initially developed based on 
non-living systems. Due to the second law that presumes the increase of entropy, 
a thermodynamically favoured state is considered as equivalent to the micro-state 
disorder. However, it is evident from the formation of the phospholipid bilayer that a 
low-energy state can also serve to create molecular stereoregularity, whose 
contribution to biological order is to be appreciated only by considering the bilayer 
as a potential for the cellular membrane. Therefore, emerging order at the 
molecular level is only functional when it is rightly contextualized within the milieu 
of higher-level organization, and a thermodynamic definition of order and disorder 
might not be reflective of the specific situations of biological functionality. 
1.3 Organization at the cellular and tissue levels 
In this section, I focus on the dynamics of order at the cellular and tissue 
levels. The reason for the specific focus on these lower levels is their role in local 
dynamics of order: Lower-level dynamics provide a basis for individuality, as they 
are utilized by centralized elements that perform interventions across these levels. 
In this sense, considering the complexity of a multicellular organism, which is the 
main focus of this work, the dynamics associated with cellular and tissue levels are 
responsible for the local order, and these dynamics are finalized at the organism 
level due to the strict interdependency between parts. Moreover, morphogenetic 
factors of pattern formation are essential at this scale of organization, which 
demonstrates that the dynamics of spontaneous order and regulation determine 
the form together. 
The generation of the form is an old problem of biology. D’Arcy Wentworth 
Thompson’s classic study, On Growth and Form (1942/2014), focused on the 
question of how the biological form is physically determined from a geometrical 
perspective. Many living things exhibit this structural regularity such as the 
phyllotactic arrangement in plants, logarithmic spirals in some of the shells, twisted 
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form of a ram’s horn, and the common egg shape in most of the egg-laying 
species. Thompson aimed to find the underlying pattern of this kind of regularity, 
and contrary to the Darwinian approach that emphasized the role of selection,39 he 
thought that the patterns are the result of certain physical pathways through 
development and growth that basically determined the morphological properties. 
Thompson’s (1942/2014) research suggests that certain typologies in biology 
emerge as a consequence of certain physical constraints.40 Of course, the growth 
of the organism is already a physical process, since the organism is made of the 
same elements as the rest of the world. Yet, Thompson’s work is based on a 
deeper connection, as he develops an argument for the naturalistic appearance of 
the types of organisms. Just as several physical factors coalescing together 
produce certain landscape patterns, or the atmospheric events lead to the creation 
of snowflakes exhibiting crystal types such as the six edged stellar, certain physical 
processes lead to the formation of biological types. 
The generation of biological form is a highly complex process that is now 
investigated from several approaches, namely, mechano-chemical interactions in 
the development of an embryo, gene expression, epigenetic regulation, responses 
to the environmental cues, etc., which are all the factors that are fundamentally 
related to development and growth. Hence, Thompson’s theoretical framework of 
biological form is not completely obsolete in contemporary research, but rather has 
diversified through these approaches by creating new research topics such as 
morphogenesis and pattern formation. Concerning the formation of patterns, in a 
quite similar manner to Thompson, researchers investigate phenomena such as 
the eyespot pigment patterns appearing on the wings of some butterfly species or 
veneration patterns in the fruit fly wings (Urdy, 2012). 																																								 																					
39 Thompson believed that the role of natural selection is limited, whereas Darwin did accept the 
role of form in generating elements. In any case, here the main difference between Thompson and 
Darwin is reducible to their alternative emphases on different mechanisms as an explanation of 
morphological traits (Gould, 1971; Kauffman, 1993). 
40 Kauffman (1993) claims that the modern study of self-organization is a return to this typological 
way of thinking. With a difference, Thompson remarked on the role of physical factors even as an 
alternative to the role of selection, whereas Kauffman incorporated natural selection into the theory 
of self-organization. According to this synthesis, the former occurs between the typological forms 
that are generated due to the latter. In fact, Thompson is referred to as one of the pioneers of the 
theory of self-organization, too (Bonner, 1996; Urdy, 2012; Bozorgmehr, 2014). 
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Contemporary formulations of these research problems focus on the formation 
of certain non-uniform structures, i.e., how certain physical transformations lead to 
the appearance of certain biological patterns as a consequence of mechanical and 
chemical factors. A shift in modern research has resulted in a deeper consideration 
of the role of regulation, that is, the question of how the holistic control of the 
organism influences the form. In this regard, the formation of patterns due to 
mechanical and chemical dynamics and regulatory networks are strictly integrated 
in so far as it is hard to analyse them separately. This offers strong support to the 
need for approaching this issue from the perspective of organizational levels to 
contextualize the problem of biological pattern formation and local dynamics of 
order. At the individual level, the interconnected networks characterize regulation, 
whereas at lower levels, regulation is accompanied by the spontaneous dynamics, 
e.g. tissue structure that is kept intact as a semi-fluid body or the immiscibility of 
the cells belonging to different tissues (Newman & Comper, 1990). These are the 
dynamics that are local in so far as they do not necessarily depend on, but 
contribute to the centralized organization of the whole. Contrary to the temporal 
multicellularity of Dictyostelium discoideum that was previously discussed, the 
typical multicellular organism can survive only when it remains as a whole or least 
inasmuch as it has the ability to regenerate its parts. This suggests that there is a 
reciprocal relationship between localized dynamics of order and the centralized 
function, as holistic integration is necessary to sustain full functionality in 
multicellular organisms. Within this reciprocity, the parts are morphologically 
integrated but each part on its own is stripped of the capacity to self-maintain as an 
autonomous individual. Thus, the localized dynamics are formatively determinant, 
but not fully determined by regulation because the infrastructural reciprocity of the 
lower-level patterns and processes are partial integrities that are already 
comprised in biological materiality, and reciprocity at the lower levels exists without 
any necessary interlevel causation triggered by homeostatic interventions. This 
does not ignore the fact that the viability of cells and tissues are dependent on 
constant functionality. What must be emphasized is that patterns and reciprocities 
at lower levels might be associated with multiple functions in different ways, 
however they are not necessarily involved in the particular material composition of 
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a single functional structure because, as I will demonstrate in the rest of this work, 
a lower-level part is usually utilized in multiple ways. 
Lower levels of organization are essential for inquiring into the physical 
emergence of order. In this context, some of the problems at these levels are as 
follows: What is the relationship between cellular form and the organization at this 
level (partially dealt with in relation to membrane structure in the previous section)? 
How should downward causality be understood at tissue level, that is, how 
efficiently do the emergent properties at the tissue level, such as the ones that are 
due to tissue geometry and positional information (see below), act on the function 
of the cells as parts? How does the pattern, in other words, the heterogeneous 
form, emerge from a relatively uniform structure through embryo development? 
These kind of questions have not been answered completely, which indicates that 
a physicalist understanding of the organism is still an unsolved issue. Below, I will 
explore some proposed solutions to this problem in the context of their relation to 
self-organization. 
Let me begin with the cellular level organization. In cell biology, the concept of 
self-organization is often mentioned to denote the process of dynamic instability, 
which leads to the formation of certain organelle structures. A paradigm case is the 
processual nature of microtubules in their constant integration and disintegration. 
Microtubules constitute the cytoskeleton, and this dynamic nature enables them to 
govern cellular processes such as cellular division. Beside the cytoskeleton, nuclei 
and Golgi are other examples of organelles that are structurally formed based on 
dynamic instability. For example, the Golgi complex is responsible for packing 
proteins into membrane that has budded from the endoplasmic reticulum, and on 
this basis, it is claimed to be self-organized (Misteli, 2001). Indeed, Golgi is not a 
solid structure that can be understood as distinct from its function, but it is the 
integration of materials through a network in which membranes are delivered, as 
the continuous influx between the endoplasmic reticulum and the Golgi network is 
what keeps the structure intact. This explains why Golgi disassembles during 
mitosis in which this constant influx is interrupted (Misteli, 2001). 
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As mentioned for the molecular level previously, some conceptual clarifications 
of self-organization seem to be necessary. Even though it is quite common to 
describe lower-level components as self-organized (Misteli, 2001, 2009; Sasai 
2013), it should be emphasized that it is the nonlinear processes that exemplify 
self-organization dynamics and not these lower-level components such as 
organelles. Nonlinear dynamics, which I associate with transitional self-
organization, have a role only as an auxiliary element when it comes to the 
organism. In this context, what is regulatively self-organized is the organism as a 
whole, and what is transitionally self-organized in lower levels is processual, but 
not component-based. In most cases, the underlying phenomenon revealed by 
biological studies appealing to the notion of self-organization is emergence as a 
process (see Chapter 4). For example, let us consider the association between 
dynamic instability and self-organization. According to a presumption in this 
context, “self-organization ensures structural stability without loss of plasticity” 
(Misteli, 2001, p. 184). The implicit idea here is that the responsiveness of unstable 
structures enables a dynamic interplay through constant fluctuations and macro 
changes within the organism (Misteli, 2001). The functional role of the 
phenomenon is insightfully put forward; yet again, a conceptual questioning is 
necessary. The main phenomenon in question is dynamic instability, which defines 
the continuous interactional basis of certain structures such as organelles. This is 
related to the processual nature of biological structures, as what characterizes the 
form at a higher level is the constant dynamism at a lower level. However, if the 
processual basis of dynamic instability is to be considered as a reason for 
associating the phenomenon with self-organization, there would be a potential for 
vagueness within the definition. One could argue that the processual basis of 
stabilized forms in living systems is not limited to dynamic instability, and therefore 
there is no possibility of demarcating self-organization in terms of dynamic 
instability. In other words, a liberal attitude toward the usage of the concept of self-
organization might create a backlash in the form of scepticism regarding the 
relevance of self-organization. This is indicative of a lack of philosophical 
clarification on this issue. Within the research on cellular-level dynamics, it seems 
possible that the concept of self-organization appeals to researchers most 
prominently when they are attempting to identify an eccentric situation within the 
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general process-based phenomena (e.g. Urdy, 2012). When dynamic instability is 
attributed to self-organization, the implicit idea is the bottom-up construction of the 
biological form on an interactional basis, usually a network of feedbacks based on 
short-term activations coupled with long-term inhibition (Karsenti, 2008). This kind 
self-organization is associated with de novo assembly of components, which is 
alternative to template-based formation. In the former, specific interactions lead to 
the formation of organelles from scratch, whereas in the latter previous organelles 
are used as a template to build new organelles. It is found out that de novo 
structuration is relevant in the formation of centrioles, chromosome-induced 
spindles, and Golgi (Karsenti, 2008). However, this does not mean that the 
centriole is self-organized in the sense that it can be formed without the context of 
the cellular, tissue, and organism-level dynamics. The basis of self-organization is 
individuation. A component’s capacity for individuation at the cellular level is very 
low and the influence of cellular environment is very high. Regardless of whether 
the dynamics of organelle formation such as centrioles is spontaneous, nonlinear, 
or dynamically stabilized, associating these entities with selfhood would lead to an 
ambiguity concerning the implication of self-organization as an autonomous whole. 
The organism’s regulative self-organization is autonomous, yet a process of 
organelle formation is not. Thus, aside from the underlying processes, the 
organelles such as the centriole, in actual context-dependent relations within an 
organism, should be understood as the sub-elements of regulative self-
organization, not as cases of self-organization themselves. Transitional self-
organization might be involved in the formation of these organelles, but this 
processual factor and the organelle as an entity should not be confused with each 
other. 
This brings us to the problem of contextualizing cellular processes within 
higher levels of biological organization. At the cellular level, cellular shape and 
morphology of the organelles are highly interdependent, which denotes a loop 
between the part and the whole as the basis of dynamic instability (Karsenti, 2008). 
Cells are the chemical factories of the organism, as enzyme activities always occur 
within cells. Bottom-up realization of cellular activity is formally shaped by the 
closure of the membrane, whereas top-down implementation has different 
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dimensions in tissue-level functions vis-à-vis organism-level functions. Thus, 
understanding the dynamics of order at the tissue level would help to reveal how 
the interlevel causation between the cellular and tissue levels is realized. In this 
context, below I discuss tissue-level dynamics by addressing the notions of pattern 
formation and morphogenesis. 
Pattern formation is usually co-determined by the interactions due to 
intracellular activity, cell-to-cell signalling, tissue geometry, and other complex 
factors such as positional information (see below and Chapter 4 for a discussion of 
controversies relating to this account). Pattern formation appears in embryogenesis 
and growth, and it is defined as a synonymous concept of regionalization 
(Waddington, 1956), which refers to the differentiation of tissue parts (Urdy, 2012, 
p. 788). This is one of the processes that are typically attributed to self-organization 
(e.g. Wang, Badea, & Nathans, 2006), and it is not difficult to see the reason 
behind it. These kinds of processes create the form mainly as a consequence of 
the internal interactions between the components, which calls into question the 
preformationist conceptualization that views the ultimate form as the unfolding of 
an essential element within. 
A prominent case of pattern formation is gastrulation, which occurs during the 
early phase of embryo development. Through this process, the exterior layer is 
invaginated and the cells move inward along this invaginated layer, forming a multi-
layered structure. To explain the dynamics behind embryonic development such as 
gastrulation, the role of physical factors such as diffusion and gravity as they are 
constrained into biological processes was studied theoretically (Papaseit, Pochon, 
& Tabony, 2000). These theoretical studies were then supported by empirical 
studies proving that direct physical forces play a role in the developmental 
pathway. For example, the fact that the self-organized development of the embryo 
is influenced by gravity has been demonstrated in space experiments. In altered 
gravity conditions (microgravity), it has been revealed that the lack of Earth’s 
gravity leads to pathological conditions or death of the embryo due to the altering 
of mechanisms such as gene expression (Crawford-Young, 2003). On the other 
hand, molecular biologists usually focus on precise mechanisms in which genes 
deterministically control this type of processes (Urdy, 2012). A recent idea that has 
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begun to gain recognition, however, is a synthesis of genetic determination and 
physical constraints, which I will discuss in the remaining part of this chapter. 
Positional information is a concept that can help to overcome this dilemma 
between gene-centred vs. physicalist understandings, since it is proposed to 
explain developmental effects by considering both the genetic regulation and the 
physical condition of the regional differences. All the cells of the embryo have the 
same genome, yet they differentiate as the embryo transforms into a 
heterogeneous entity. Differentiation is mainly caused by epigenetic mechanisms, 
in which certain parts of the genome are activated, whereas other parts are 
deactivated in each cell. Genes are highly influential in the development of the 
embryo – which is an influence quite different from the classical essentialist 
understanding of genes as the coders of certain proteins. Yet, due to positional 
information, the differentiation of the cells is explained by contextualizing genetic 
regulation in the spatiotemporal condition of each cell. Thus, the term refers to the 
context-dependent determination of pattern development where genetic influence 
is sensitive to the position of cells. During embryo development, each cell reacts to 
its surrounding by assessing its position within the whole, which is basically a 
complex feedback response of the cell. Thereby, spatiotemporal non-uniformity 
acts as a feedback on genetic expression (Urdy, 2012). As a consequence, 
positional information plays a main role in cell differentiation, and indicates a 
complex interplay between genetic regulation and local dynamics of order.  
Positional information illuminates the question of how cells differentiate and 
how the heterogeneous form arises even though each of the cells has the same 
genome. In a way, this heterogeneous response mechanism acts as a formal 
cause during the early phase of development. In the beginning of the embryo 
development, the cells are pluripotent, which defines the capacity of the embryonic 
stem cells to be turned into any type of cells. Pluripotent stem cells basically serve 
as the potentiality basis of development (see Chapter 4). While the context-
dependent feedbacks acts on this potential, cells are shaped into their final form 
due to the spatial and historical interpretation of their relations. Positional 
information therefore creates a basis for formal causation acting upon this 
potential, in which pluripotent cells are the material cause. Thus, it is not the cell as 
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an isolated component of the whole, but the sum of the interrelations between the 
parts of the whole that overrules the developmental path (see Chapter 4). 
This does not solve the emergence of biological form as this problem goes 
beyond the dynamics of cellular differentiation. This requires going back to the 
initial question: How does the integration of genetic regulation and physical 
constraints influence the formation of patterns? The latter element of this 
integration, that is, mechanical and chemical processes, also relates to the extent 
to which the physical pattern is a distinguishable phenomenon, and in which ways 
it is incorporated through the complex genetic regulation. Turing’s (1952) classic 
paper on morphogenesis has proposed an explanation concerning how the 
chemical processes can lead to heterogeneous form that is similar to the case of 
embryonic development. According to the basic model, a reaction-diffusion system 
including at least two chemically interacting components can create the 
heterogeneous form through a fluctuating process of generation. One of these 
interactors catalyses both its own and the other component’s activity, whereas the 
other component has an inhibiting influence on the catalyser. An increase in the 
activity of the catalyser also leads to an increase in the amount of the inhibitor, but 
this initial catalytic activity is then counterbalanced, since the inhibitor has now 
accumulated as well. This dynamic interaction between the catalyser and the 
inhibitor leads to a chaotic fluctuation pattern. The model presumes that inhibitor 
diffuses faster than the catalyser, which will create a spatially nonuniform pattern 
where the densities of each component are asymmetrically localized depending on 
the abovementioned differences between the rates of reaction and diffusion (see 
Newman & Comper, 1990 for details). In this case, heterogeneity is created due to 
a process named diffusion-driven instability.  
Reaction-diffusion models are used to understand the creation of striped 
patterns that are thought to be efficient in the generation of limbs during embryo 
development (Newman & Linde-Medina, 2013, p. 278) and other phenomena such 
as mammalian coat markings, butterfly wing patterns, pigmentation in species such 
as molluscs and zebrafish, etc. (Urdy, 2012). The studies in this area since Turing 
have shown that reaction-diffusion mechanisms can never produce biological form 
on their own. Instead, the basic mechanism is efficient when it is combined with 
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gene expression, e.g., findings have shown that this dynamic can provide the 
variation within the rates of protein synthesis (Urdy, 2012). Since the protein 
synthesis is a consequence of gene expression, this shows that morphogenetic 
pattern is complementary to the factors of genetic determination. 
Patterns appear through the bottom-up organization of the cells, and just like 
the molecular level, stochastic elements are usually effective in the formation of 
tissue patterns at macro scale. For example, in one of the studies based on the 
human mammary epithelial cells (Chanson et al., 2011), researchers established 
the bilayer formation (luminal and myoepithelial layers) of the mammary tissue in 
laboratory conditions. Here, tissue morphogenesis was driven by the 
heterogeneous expression of E-cadherin, which is a protein that enables adhesion 
among cells. Another study has found that global signalling, which is a regulative 
element at the individual level, roughly determines hair patterning in mice (Wang et 
al., 2006). According to this study, the local interaction rule of alignment, which 
presumes that hair follicles force neighbouring ones to align with themselves, 
determines the final shape. The authors state that this is a stochastic process that 
is similar to the alignment of the ferromagnet, since both the electron spins in a 
ferromagnet and the different angles of follicle alignment through the formation of 
the hair pattern spread on a basis of random differentiation (Wang et al., 2006). 
This kind of self-ordering process has strong evidential support from various 
sources, demonstrating that stochasticity can play a major role in the emergence of 
ordered structure through local interactions. These studies have revealed that 
stochasticity at the micro level permeates into the macro, indicating an interlevel 
connection. 
Processes such as morphogenesis and pattern formation concern the 
diachronic basis of emerging order, which means that emergence is not only due to 
the static integration of parts, but it is a specific type of temporality that creates the 
form. In that regard, the mentioned processes exemplify transitions due to 
nonlinear factors, which I categorically defined under transitional self-organization. 
Yet, the dynamics of order can be influential both in transitional and relatively static 
ways. Tissue immiscibility is an example of the latter. Immiscibility denotes the fact 
that “tissues from different sources often behave as distinct fluid phases” and “the 
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mixtures of cells from different tissues will sort out into homotypic islands and 
lakes, and will eventually separate out completely, like a suspension of oil in water” 
(Newman & Comper, 1990, p. 3). The interactions that lead to immiscibility can be 
either in the form of attachment between the same type of cells or excluding the 
cells of different types. The extracellular matrix can also contribute to tissue 
immiscibility by causing the tissue to act as a viscoelastic sheet (Newman et al., 
2003). 
Phenomena such as immiscibility depend on the physical properties of tissues. 
Take the role of diffusion as a physical factor of organization. During pattern 
formation, signal molecules diffuse by creating feed-forward mechanisms, which 
contribute to the emergence of pattern (Newman & Comper, 1990). This implies 
that diffusion as a direct physical factor is constrained through biological 
organization. In this regard, Newman et al. (2003) classify these biophysical factors 
as generic properties, 41  including the aforementioned processes of reaction-
diffusing coupling and tissue immiscibility along with others such as differential 
adhesion, biochemical oscillation, multi-stability, and mechano-chemical 
excitability. According to this approach, these processes are under the influence of 
generic factors in the sense that mechanical or chemical factors directly determine 
their nature, which makes them different from genetic factors that are the products 
of long-term evolution. In the following section, I will explain this distinction in more 
detail as a part of the problem of biological regulation.  
Thus far, I have explained how the physical dynamics of emergent order such 
as the self-assembly of a phospholipid bilayer and patterns formed at the tissue 
level constitute complementary elements of the organism’s organization. I have 
also explained how these lower-level dynamics are encapsulated in regulative self-
organization, and realized due to the autonomy of an individual, which is why they 
cannot be considered to be self-organized per se. In this perspective, levels of 																																								 																					
41 However, this notion is later revised as biogeneric properties due to the following reason: “The 
mechanisms that generate the multilayered initial stages (gastrulae) of animal embryos, pancreatic 
islets, and tetrapod limb buds, are therefore not entirely «generic» in that they are not precisely the 
ones driving similar-appearing outcomes in nonliving systems. They nonetheless can be considered 
‘biogeneric’ in the sense of employing generic physical mechanisms to organize biological materials 
(e.g., aggregates of cells) in novel ways” (Moss & Newman, 2016, p. 104). 
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organization constitute the layered solidification of emergent dynamics as a 
consequence of the organism’s evolution. Thus, the emergent order permeates 
through the levels of organization. This brings us to the main issue of the following 
part of this chapter, as the multicellular organism constitutes the milieu of the 
subsystemic relations. In other words, regulative self-organization in the Kantian 
sense encapsulates the dynamics of spontaneous order at lower levels. The 
appearance and the exploiting of these kinds of capacities indicate that the 
organism’s function is far from being a one-dimensional closure. 
2. Regulative Control at the Organism Level 
In the following sections, I will discuss how different aspects of emergent 
dynamics contribute to the development of unified wholes. This requires clarifying 
two issues. The first issue is how emergent dynamics inherent in organic matter 
are stabilized further due to genetic regulation. This also relates to an evolutionary 
transformation from primitive dynamics of self-organization to biological regulation 
(Newman et al., 2003). The second issue is how centralized mechanisms such as 
genetic regulatory networks, hormonal signals, and immune systems enable the 
consistency of regulative self-organization at the organism level. In addition to 
these two points, it must also be emphasized that local dynamics of order at lower 
levels are unified in the notion of functional integrity. Regulative self-organization of 
an organism leads to an individuated constraint in the form of multiple 
functionalities by exploiting the capacity of the spontaneous dynamics at lower 
levels. Moreover, this type of multiple-levels approach is critical towards the view 
that genetic mechanisms are the ultimate causal agent of biological organization. 
This is because intralevel relations at the molecular, cellular, and tissue level are 
highly influenced by the biophysical nature of the biological order. This approach 
also helps to reveal how centralized networks such as the immune system act 
upon the local dynamics of spontaneous order. 
Organisms are processes (Bateson et al., 2001; Dupré, 2012), and more 
specifically, they are regulatory processes. Based on this perspective, it is the 
processual nature of functions that integrates lower-level dynamics in specific goal-
directed processes. The organism’s functions are triggered by responses to 
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internal and external stimuli through the activity of complex network of feedback 
responses to maintain homeostatic conditions.42 The functions of the organism are 
self-organized, which also requires rejecting the mechanical determinism in favour 
of diachronic emergence. These self-organized functions of the organism are 
realized in the possibility space that is enabled by the synchronicity of causal 
relations (see Chapter 4). In the rest of this chapter, I explain how the processual 
nature of functions can be supported from the perspective of levels of organization. 
The processual nature of function serves as the basis for top-down causation 
acting upon the organism, which determines how organizational potentials at lower 
levels are actualized. Depending on the context of the function, centralized 
mechanisms utilize the rest of the organism as a potential, which can be 
considered as interlevel causation realized as the interventions into the lower-level 
dynamics. 
2.1 Genetic regulation as the constraint of the organism 
In this section, I consider the role of genes in the regulative self-organization of 
the organism. As an alternative to genetic reductionism, Stuart Newman’s 
theoretical perspective regards genes as to the stabilization and the regulatory 
unification of the organism, co-existing with the dynamics of pattern formation due 
to generic properties of the organic matter (Newman et al., 2003). For now, I 
approach this issue in relation to levels of organization, yet I will go back to the 
discussion on the role of genes in the light of Newman’s ideas later. 
In several studies discussing self-organization as a basis of the morphological 
properties, the physical constraint is mentioned due to its role in biological 
organization (Bonner, 1996; Leijnen, Heskes, & Deacon, 2016). Newman and 
Comper (1990) reverse this approach by claiming that the constraint is in fact the 
biological regulation. It is the genetic regulation, by creating organizational 
robustness, that acts upon the roughly shaped form due to morphogenetic 
dynamics. They explain the difference between physical and organizational 
dynamics of the biological form by distinguishing between genetic and generic 																																								 																					
42 Nevertheless, I also emphasized why this homeostatic condition should not be considered as a 
mechanistically precise control of processes, which distinguished this position from autopoiesis. 
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properties. According to this distinction, generic properties refer to the direct 
influence of physical factors, such as the reaction-diffusion coupling (see Section 
1.3). On the other hand, genetic properties refer to the regulatory function of the 
genes acting through genetic circuits and cell-to-cell communications, which 
denote a more precise control at the molecular level. These two types of properties 
are integrated, since the “generic mechanisms are complementary to and 
interdependent with genetic mechanisms” (Newman & Comper, 1990, p. 1). By 
definition, generic properties refer to the properties that are common to all 
organisms. 
The difference between generic and genetic properties is also reflected in the 
evolutionary presumptions with a hypothesis on the origin of life (Newman et al., 
2003). According to this, Darwinian evolution by genetic inheritance was preceded 
by a pre-Darwinian phase of evolution in which morphogens and other direct 
physico-chemical factors were more efficient. Genetic programming appeared in 
the last half billion years of evolution and brought organizational robustness 
through precise regulatory mechanisms. Prior to the strict genetic inheritance, the 
adaptations of organisms were based on physico-chemical parameters that were 
more closely attached to their surroundings (Newman et al., 2003). The first 
metazoan organisms were polygenetic morphotypes in the form of self-organized 
cells acting as viscoelastic sheets. Thus, evolution has proceeded from the 
morphotype to the genotype, and monogenetic organisms are actually the products 
of a later phase (Newman et al., 2003). 
The abovementioned approach portrays the organism with multiple dimensions 
of causal processes, and proposes an alternative solution to the question of the 
stabilization of form by unifying evolutionary and physiological perspectives. 
Causation can appear as reaction-diffusion processes, genetic regulations, or 
direct physical forces such as gravity. This approach to self-organization attempts 
to address the complex coalescence of these causes with different dimensions by 
asking questions such as how the inert cells “spontaneously organize into 
countercurrent microfinger patterns under the influence of gravity” (Newman & 
Comper, 1990, p. 9). Self-organization, in this sense, provides a theoretical basis 
to unify these dimensions. From this perspective, even though it is not always easy 
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to distinguish the roles of spontaneity, physical force, and genetic regulation from 
each other, the role of physical forces such as gravity is now better understood 
(Crawford-Young, 2003). 
The distinction between generic and genetic factors also supports the 
philosophical analysis of interlevel causation within the organism. Generic factors 
can be considered within the scope of bottom-up construction of order, as they 
depend on the utilization of direct mechanical forces. The utilization of mechanical 
forces is a widespread phenomenon, since these forces contribute to several 
organizational processes from creating localized order in tissues to the pattern 
formation and gene expression. For example, growing empirical evidence shows 
that through genetic expression, mechanical forces are canalized into the 
biochemical machinery of cells. Different dimensions of organization diversifying 
within a spectrum from mechanical forces to complex regulatory networks require 
an approach that includes interlevel causation. This kind of interlevel approach has 
been recently applied to understand cancer development (Urdy, 2012). In the 
growth of a tumour, a typical case of malfunction is studied at the cellular level, 
since the tumorous cells diverge from their cyclic development of controlled 
division, and proliferate in great amounts. On the other hand, an alternative theory 
based on the concept of tissue self-organization challenges the standard view of 
somatic mutation theory by questioning the role of cellular mutation as the only 
causal agent of cancer. According to this, some researchers claim that cancer is 
not a disease caused solely by mutations. In fact, patterns at the tissue level are 
also involved, and the tumour is also a result of a malfunction in the interactions 
between cells. This has been demonstrated by the experiments in which a healthy 
tissue structure does not allow the spreading of the cancer cells (e.g., Soto & 
Sonnenschein, 2004; Rubin, 2006). This supports the need to address the issue 
from a perspective including regulative self-organization: Cancer at the tissue-level 
organization is to be investigated due to the emergence of sub-systemic elements 
within the self-organized whole. 
I previously explained how physical forces and morphogenetic dynamics such 
as reaction-diffusion coupling are integrated with gene expression. The regulative 
organization of the organism is realized through the epigenetic mechanisms in 
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which gene activity is highly influenced by the organizational context. In the past, 
genes have only been regarded as the coders of specific proteins, but the current 
view is shifting toward a broader understanding that considers both the interaction 
of genes with the cytoplasm and the environmental effects on the epigenetic 
differentiation of the gene expression (Moss, 2003; Griffiths & Stotz, 2006). As will 
be addressed in detail in the next chapter, only a small percentage of genes that 
are known as exons are used in coding proteins, whereas introns, which are the 
gene sequences that are not used in coding, usually have regulative functions. 
These parts were previously named as junk DNA, as they have been thought to be 
useless. Now, revealing the regulatory function of genes is revolutionizing our 
understanding on the issue. The reciprocity between genetic activity and other 
metabolic activities is better acknowledged with recent studies on epigenetics, thus 
vindicating the self-organization view concerning the organism. In terms of levels of 
organization, the regulatory networks of genes do not necessarily correspond to a 
specific dimension of order, but a biological way of constraining this order. This is 
because genetic activity serves as a kind of distributed interface within the 
organism. Through this regulative activity, interlevel causation by the centralized 
functions and intralevel causation at lower levels are unified. Therefore, genetic 
regulation should be understood as a holistic integration of the organization at 
every level. In summary, Newman’s approach asserts that genes act upon physico-
chemical dynamics of order that are associated with a pre-Darwinian phase of 
evolution. I have argued that this is a viewpoint that helps to reconsider genetics 
due to an organism-level explanation, which will now be continued by examining 
other aspects of centralized regulation. 
2.2 Centralized mechanisms of organization 
The main question that I dealt with in Sections 1.1 and 1.2 was primarily how 
the bottom-up dynamics of order perform laterally. I argued both thermodynamic 
and kinetic factors are central for molecular-level functionality. Moreover, 
morphotypical elements such as pattern formation supervene on molecular 
stability. Then, in Section 2.1, I explained how generic and genetic properties co-
determine the holistic nature of the organization. In this section, I consider the 
centralized elements of organization that engage in vertical implementation of 
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organization. What characterizes the organism’s regulative self-organization is the 
interplay between bottom-up and top-down dynamics, which is caused by the 
asymmetrical character of the regulatory control. As a consequence, not all the 
parts within the organism have the same controlling capacities (Bich, Mossio, Ruiz-
Mirazo, & Moreno, 2016). Systemic functions of the organism, such as the function 
of the immune system, or the functionality that enables the energy circulation within 
the body, are processual downward causes in the organism. This is because all the 
parts behave, trigger, and respond to one another in order to maintain their 
functionality. Therefore, the organism as a process is in fact a complex and 
constant activity of responsiveness against any perturbation. This functionality is 
the downward cause that determines the activity of each part within the organism. 
Before explaining what is meant by functions as downward causes, the 
processual nature of functions should be clarified. In process view, 
spatiotemporality characterizes the materiality. Yet, for the sake of analysis, either 
the spatiality or temporality can be treated as alternative foci when the organism is 
studied as a regulatory process. For example, as the mechanisms such as the 
circadian rhythm characterizes regulation as a process of oscillation, these kind of 
mechanisms can be analysed in a way that temporality is primary, whereas in other 
mechanisms such as genetic regulatory networks, switched on and switched off 
states of genes can be analysed by prioritizing spatiality of the gene activity. 
However, even though circadian rhythm and genetic circuits can be isolated as the 
subjects of scientific research, a philosophical understanding of the organism as a 
process has to consider the fact that analytical reduction of these mechanisms 
either to temporality or spatiality is an empirical operation. Thus, this empirical 
operation should not lead us to move away from the ontological fact that organisms 
are processes. 
The autonomous perspective is helpful as a theoretical framework to explain 
the organism’s individuality by pointing out the integration between centralized 
mechanisms of function and distributed networks of regulation (Moreno & Mossio, 
2015). This approach emphasizes that the centralized mechanisms of biological 
functions depend on the asymmetry between the controlling and the controlled 
(Mossio, Bich, & Moreno, 2013; Bich et al., 2016, p. 236), which I regard as an 
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essential factor. For example, in the chemotactic movement of the bacteria, the 
receptor complex and the signal transduction pathway create the controlling action, 
whereas the movement of flagella is controlled by this element (Bich et al., 2016, p. 
243). This asymmetric consideration can be applied to the functioning of a 
multicellular organism through levels of organization. In this way, lower-level 
phenomena would be incorporated within the organization.43 In biological systems, 
aggregation of parts creates emergent properties that have been discussed in the 
context of various examples in this chapter. On several counts, I identified cases 
where the emergence of order is from the bottom, appearing through local 
interactions, or physical properties such as the immiscibility of tissues, which are 
compositionally integrated, but causally non-identical with the regulatory networks. 
As regulative organization is a product of the interplay between these bottom-up 
dynamics and centralized functions, through the centralized elements, downward 
control is exerted on the organism. Functional circuits constitute the spatial axis of 
this top-down control, whereas the temporal axis is causal loops, actualizing as the 
metabolic oscillations, leading to short-term or long-term periodic changes. Why 
downward causation, instead of the holistic control? At first glance, downward 
causation seems problematic. Since the self-organized organism is individuated, 
and the networks are distributed, one could argue that the control is holistic, but not 
implemented by the top-down mechanisms.  
However, as I argued before, organizational hierarchy and self-organization do 
not exclude each other. At this point, the concept of decoupling, which was first 																																								 																					
43 The autonomous perspective emphasizes the role of micro-regulatory processes such as the lac 
operon mechanism, which enables the regulatory system to shift between the modes of digestion in 
order to increase the energy efficiency (Bich et al., 2016). Nevertheless, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, this approach underestimates the role of emergent order, which in turn paves the 
way to an implicit overemphasis on the regulatory functions. I propose that the role of spontaneous 
dynamics is more prominent, which calls into question the omnipotent efficiency of micro-regulation. 
If the bottom-up emergence of the biological materiality is ignored, one could miscategorise the 
actual dynamics of order by appealing to the cybernetic account of controlling the body. Despite 
appreciating the explanatory value of the autonomous perspective on the hierarchical nature of 
organization in a multicellular organism, these points identify a limitation within this approach 
inherited from the mechanistic tradition. In fact, as mentioned before, autonomous perspective is 
also critical to these preceding theories in many ways, but I believe that the critical stance towards 
the cybernetic notion of organization should be taken a step further. 
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proposed in the theory of cybernetics, and then applied within autopoiesis and the 
autonomous perspective, helps to reveal the downward nature of the regulatory 
systems. Decoupling refers to the situation where some elements of organization 
become independent from the materiality of the causal cycle that it influences, and 
explains the abovementioned asymmetry between controlling and the controlled. 
The specialized control is based on this type of asymmetry, as the regulatory 
network is dynamically decoupled from the functional cycle (Bich et al., 2016). This 
is because the disruption of the functional cycle does not immediately influence the 
controlling system. For example, the hormonal signalling, as a centralized 
mechanism of communication within the organism, is decoupled from the cellular 
processes it affects. A few molecules are sufficient to initiate signalling cascades, 
which is why a small energy investment can sustain the function. In fact, hormone 
production is still dependent on the chemical activities within the cells that are 
regulated by hormones, since a disruption of the cellular activity would eventually 
cause a disruption with hormone production as well. But this relationship of 
dependence is weak, since in the short term, the healthy functioning of hormones 
is decoupled from the materiality of the cellular activity. This asymmetry creates a 
potential for the controlling network to be partially independent from the rest of the 
body. This potential, which is due to being decoupled from the internal, is used to 
regulate the organism depending on external stimuli. Since a small amount of 
hormones is sufficient to create the effect, hormones are highly influential in 
regulative system, but not influenced by the parts to the same extent. Therefore, 
hormones can act in accordance with the holistic needs of the organism, mostly 
determined by the interaction between the internal and the external. Decoupling 
also enables centralization. This is due to the centralized functions of the organism, 
maybe not necessarily to be found at a specific location within, but in the systemic 
behaviour of the centralized, goal-directed processes.  
The role of the brain and the nervous system in centralization of the 
organization is evident, but actually a less salient but more remarkable example is 
the immune system. Below, I discuss the immune system in the context of the 
notion of self-organization. There are three reasons for focusing on this example. 
First, the immune system is a remarkable case that demonstrates how a function is 
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implemented as a top-down cause, and how the individuality is highly dependent 
upon this top-down activity. In the case of immune system, the goal of the function 
is to neutralize possible threats to the body, and the system performs this function 
by self-regulating its activity and improving its capacity by recording the molecular 
traces of previous interactions. Second, the way that the immune system functions 
shows that in self-organization, as well as the semi-autonomous parts of the 
system each performing its task, a correlated activity, corresponding to an 
emergent individuation of the system is essential. Third, the immune system offers 
support to a broader point that is emphasized throughout this chapter, that is, the 
processes of the organism that bases the emergent dynamics of order are not 
mechanistically precise, but essentially stochastic. 
As a reflection of the asymmetry between organizational hierarchy and 
compositional hierarchy, centralized structures such as the immune system are not 
materially composite parts of the body, but they are functionally integrated through 
specific goal-directed activities. For the immune system, the goal-directed activity 
is to detect and regulate potentially harmful pathogens. The centralized function 
depends on distinguishing between the self and the non-self through this activity. 
Failure of this function, as in the autoimmune diseases, occurs when the immune 
system misidentifies healthy tissues as a potential threat. In order to solve the 
questions due to selfhood, since Frank Macfarlane Burnet, who was involved in 
early clinical research on autoimmune diseases, researchers have often been 
interested in the philosophical problems with individuality, cybernetics, and 
information theory (Anderson & Mackay, 2014). 
The body’s immune system creates various types of leukocytes in order to 
cope with invaders consisting of several antigens. An essential challenge for 
destroying invaders is the body’s capacity to distinguish these unwanted cells from 
its own cells and symbiotic microbiota. The immune cells recognize possible 
pathogens with an attachment similar to a key-lock mechanism. However, the 
system cannot produce all the keys (antigen receptors) for any possible lock (new 
antigens) by random differentiation due to the huge number of possible 
combinations of the binding sites. As I explain below, a guided diversification is the 
main strategy to solve this problem by allowing a certain degree of randomness in 
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the production of immune cells. The way that the immune system works proves 
that, instead of precise mechanistic control at the molecular level, functional 
integrity depends on a goal-directed incorporation of lower-level dynamics 
producing organizational variations. 
Atlan and Cohen (2006) remark that the immune system is self-organized, as 
its activity is constantly modified due to the history of interactions with new 
antigens. The immune self is a reference point in the antigen induction. The 
information that is necessary to identify pathogens is produced through the 
interactions: the immune system acquires a distributed memory of the previous 
antigens, T-cells differentiate into more specialized cells according to counteracts, 
and “the receptor repertoire for antigens is somatically generated by random 
genetic recombinations and mutations of the receptor genes” (Atlan & Cohen, 
2006, p. 133). To explain the principles of the immune system, Atlan and Cohen 
(2006) propose that immune interactions can be understood as metaphorical form 
of language, which refers to meaning. In the same way that people require some 
shared history to be able to convey meaning, i.e., the same language, similar 
reference points, contexts, and associations, the meaning in the self-organized 
immune activity is dependent on the historical context of the germ-line that includes 
the evolutionary catalogue of the antigens, and the history of the individual host, as 
the meaning is provided by the combined application of the germ line instruction 
and the individual experience (Atlan & Cohen, 2006). 
Just as the meaning of a sentence is conveyed due to its semantic context in a 
text, the implications of signals within the immune system reflect the evolutionary 
background and the individual’s life history. The interactions between pathogens 
and immune cells are transformed through these processes. Immune cells can 
differentiate pathogens from body’s own cells. Detecting and annihilating 
pathogens is the main goal of the function acting as a downward cause, which 
orchestrates the molecular memory of the system, complex networks of signalling, 
and genetic transcriptions that are practiced in accordance with this background. 
For example, the antigen producing cell and a T-cell communicate with each other. 
According to the analogy, antigen’s epitope (the main element of binding) functions 
as a subject because it is the agent that can differentiate to perform its function 
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through its interaction with the pathogen. On the other hand, the ancillary signal 
functions as a predicate of a meaningful sentence, since it determines the 
instructions given to the subject, the epitome, depending on the specific context of 
the situation. 
Similar to the case of protein folding, antigen production is made through 
exploring a possibility space by constantly using the feedback from actual 
interactions, which occurs by effectively using the internal randomness of the 
system. There are approximately 1010 and 1020 possible antigen combinations, and 
therefore it is impossible to recognize all possible occurrences of antigens in a pre-
determined way (Atlan & Cohen, 2006, p. 127). Alternatively, “the diversity of the 
antigen receptors is fashioned by processes of genetic recombination, mutation, 
and random insertion of nucleotides in the genes that encode the receptors” (Atlan 
& Cohen, 2006, p. 125). New immune cells are “trained” by keeping the record 
from the feedback from interactions with the body’s own cells. Thus, top-down 
exercise of this regulative self-organization is far from exhibiting an omnipresent 
control of a machine-like system. As a result, contrary to noise-reduction approach 
to information (Shannon & Weaver, 1964), it is pointed out that redundancy 
enables synonymous correlations, making the message more robust against noise. 
In this context, a certain degree of noise is shown to be useful to discover novel 
ways of reorganization (Atlan & Cohen, 1998, 2006). 
Atlan’s (1974, 2000) general theoretical approach indicates not only the 
importance of the top-down implementation of the centralized mechanisms, but 
also the role of contingency in regulative activities that have been previously 
discussed in this chapter. Moreover, his perspective calls into question a certain 
way of understanding information considered as a certain catalogue of codes, and 
with it, the notion of the gene as the ultimate bearer of information deterministically 
coding the elements of organization. Instead, information is produced through the 
history of self-organized regulation in an unpredictable environment by exploiting 
the capacity of stochasticity. In the abovementioned example, the meaning 
depends on the stochastic application of the molecular traces from the previous 
interactions. So, obviously, the meaning is not created in a cognitive mechanism, 
but through the alteration of binding sites of the immune cells depending on a 
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constant internal communication within the body that interprets the evolutionary 
background of the interactions. The analogy suggested in this example is also 
consistent with theoretical claims on hierarchical organization by Pattee (1972), 
whose ideas on constraint have been briefly discussed in the preceding chapter. 
Pattee (1972) states that structural constraints are different from hierarchical 
constraints. The former depend on the elimination of the degrees of freedom, 
whereas the latter “select from a set of possible states because of relatively fixed 
but conditional correlations between the particles of the collection” (Pattee, 1972, 
p. 5). He goes on to argue that hierarchical control requires a structure similar to 
language because only these types of systems enable the operations that are still 
based on, but are relatively independent from the physical structure due to 
symbolic nature of interrelations. This also creates an evolutionary potential by 
forming certain rules, which act as a criteria for further change, similar to a 
grammatical structure (Pattee, 1972, p. 10). 
I explain the notions of contingency and potentiality in relation to biological 
functions in more detail in the next chapter. The abovementioned example serves 
as an empirical introduction to this idea. The way the immune system works 
indicates that a specific function of the organism is a goal-directed process, and it 
is a top-down cause, because in the context of the immune system, the goal, which 
is the neutralization of potential pathogens, is primary. Thus, other centralized 
functions and lower-level dynamics are utilized as the auxiliary elements of this 
functionality. This is not to say that the top-down causation of this specific function 
is absolute, since in other contexts of functionality, there could be compromises 
from the main goal of the immune system. For example, during the pregnancy, the 
development of the embryo within the mammalian organism requires this kind of 
compromise, since the existence of the embryo requires a suppression of the 
immune reaction towards the embryo. Self-regulating functions also show that the 
organism’s organization is not fully predetermined, either in the sense of genetic 
predetermination, or in the sense of mechanical determinism. The former is due to 
the fact that the system is constructed by acquiring new information during 
ontogeny, which is in line with Oyama’s (2000) main proposal concerning the 
ontogeny of information. The latter is due to the fact that new capabilities of 
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performing the function is explored in a possibility area in which the system 
improves itself by responding to its own activity. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I considered both the empirical cases and theoretical 
assumptions concerning the emergence of order within the organism. I explained 
why both the bottom-up and top-down dynamics are essential for considering the 
organism as an individuated whole, and criticized some of the issues arising from 
overemphasizing the role of regulative control. Dynamics of order at multiple levels 
of organization suggest that contingency is an essential element of biological 
organization. On the other hand, the regulative self-organization of the organism is 
dependent on multiply realizable pathways, asymmetric control, and centralized 
activities. As a main point, I showed why self-organization is not characterized by 
an integration of equally efficient parts, and why a causal hierarchy depending on 
the context of goal-directed functions acting as downward causes is consistent with 
the organism’s self-organization. In this type of self-organization, the parts are 
interdependent, but the interdependency is inherently causally asymmetric, which 
means that all the parts are not equally dependent on each other, but their 
dependency is subject to the manipulation of functions as a consequence of the 
relation between the organism and its environment. In this organization, parts are 
imperfectly integrated; since they communicate with each other through fulfilling 
the requirements of the homeostatic control. 
Moreover, the way that parts communicate with one another calls into question 
the applicability of precise mechanisms coding the structure of the organism, in so 
far as this understanding does not consider the novel elements of information that 
are produced through the history of interactions. In order to reconceptualise the 
internal communication in the context of immunology, the language metaphor is 
proposed (Atlan & Cohen, 2006). According to this, it is claimed that involvement 
within centralized networks gives the parts the “meaning” of their task. I indicated 
some further implications can be derived based on this perspective, such as how 
meaning could also be relevant for a better understanding of subsystemic agency. 
It is beyond the remit of this thesis to develop a more detailed analysis of the 
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notion of information and meaning. Still, in the last chapter, I will discuss other 
related aspects to this question such as contingency. In this sense, the studies on 
self-organization discussed in this chapter help to dissociate self-organization from 
its cybernetic heritage, which mainly focused on the elimination of contingency and 
understood the organism as a machine (Keller, 2009; Nicholson, 2014). 
Now, in the light of the analysis based on genetic and generic properties, let us 
return to the problem that was defined in Section 1.2, which concerns the physical 
basis of the biological form. The properties of the organisms that Thompson and 
other structuralists have tried to illuminate are referred to as internal properties, or 
physical forces (Bonner, 1996). This traditional approach is maintained today in 
some sense, but a philosophical problem is immediately striking. Aren’t all the 
properties internal and all the forces physical within organisms? Environmental 
influences such as selective pressures are external, but the organism’s properties 
are always internal. Gravity, diffusion, or forces such as cohesive attraction that 
enables the water to move up within a trunk of a tree are directly physical forces, 
but so are complex organizational networks. 
At this point, the categorical understanding of causal processes as either 
generic or genetic factors are relevant for the physicalist understanding of the 
biological organization. Physical forces are incorporated in extraordinary ways 
within organisms, as the organizational context manipulates these forces from 
which a unique area of study emerges that is irreducible to the mechanical 
understanding of these forces in isolation. This emergent context is a history-
dependent case, as is well known, due to evolution. Direct physical forces such as 
gravity are still analysed as distinguishable forces, but this kind of direct role is 
generally limited to acting as either an inducer or contributor to the internal 
organization, which is intrinsically self-organized. Due to this new causal capacity, 
a vectorial analysis of forces has little to do with this new kind of causation. In that 
sense, Kant’s prediction that there cannot be a Newton of the grassblade is still 
relevant. New research areas such as quantum mechanics, physics of nonlinear 
systems, or the methodology of the statistical mechanics have been adapted to 
biology to fill this deficiency. Nevertheless, this does not change the fact that the 
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causation of the organism has an emergent basis, and empirically, this kind of 
application of physics is complementary at best. 
It is the relational context that underlies the emergent causal capacity of 
biology as a modified causation of physical forces. In this chapter, I dealt with the 
role of emergent dynamics within the organism. However, just like self-
organization, emergence is a concept that is subject to philosophical conflicts. In 
that regard, I have not gone into the philosophical problem of emergence directly. 
As will be shown in the next chapter, the problem of diachronic emergence is yet to 
be solved, and the organism’s self-organization can cast new light on this problem. 
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Chapter Four 
Emergence, Temporality of Form, and Potentiality 
 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapters have addressed the historical development of research 
on emergent order and examined various examples concerning the dynamics of 
pattern formation both in non-living and living systems. It was emphasized that 
transitional dynamics of self-organization are restricted to processes of non-
equilibrium conditions; yet they are also incorporated within the organism’s 
regulation. Since the dynamism of a spontaneous transformation is exhausted by 
reaching an end-state, processes of crystallization, convection cells, or chemical 
oscillations cannot have constant organization. Only living systems are 
characterized by dynamic form that incorporates organizational stability and 
perpetuated potential for change. The dynamic form of the organism also indicates 
that the organism is an open process, which is why explaining its organization 
simply due to stabilization and robustness would be insufficient. A perfect stability 
does not characterize the form of the organism. Rather, the organism’s relative 
stability depends on internalizing external contingency. In this sense, the 
investigation of the organism’s organization should explain how both the constant 
dynamism and the individuation throughout the lifespan of the organism are 
reconciled. 
The reconciliation of individuality and constant potential for change requires an 
understanding of the emergent nature of the organism’s organization. Philosophical 
investigation of emergence in relation to part-whole dynamics is useful in this 
sense. A basic approach involves considering emergent properties as caused by a 
rearrangement of parts. This suggests that the contribution of the parts to the 
whole is sensitive to the context of interrelations, and a new arrangement of parts 
might require a redefinition of the causal role of the parts within the system 
(Wimsatt, 1997). Although this kind of emphasis on context-sensitivity is essential, 
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which should be understood in the context of nonlinearity, the philosophical 
implications of emergence are far greater. When it comes to living systems, 
emergence cannot be reduced to a distinction between decomposable parts and 
their interrelations, as this would lead to ignoring the radical implications of 
relationality and potentiality within these systems. Thus, I claim that a thorough 
understanding of emergence lies in the profound nature of relationality. This is 
beyond merely stating that a part’s relational context is what defines its parthood, 
and implies that a whole is nothing but its relations. Furthermore, emergence takes 
place due the potential for these relations to create the dynamic form. This 
transforms the system both by using the system’s own resources and by 
rearranging its association with external conditions. The potentiality of the 
organism, which refers to the idea that alternative network relations within the 
system can perform equivalent functions, is key to the organism’s organization. 
This is an essential aspect that connects the ideas of self-organization with 
emergence. In an organic whole, reciprocal relations that are internal to the system 
have a primary role, as the parts are sensitive to each other, and feedback loops 
determine the regulation of the whole. Thus, living systems can shift between 
alternative organizational states. 
Potentiality is a precondition of regulative self-organization, but to explain the 
latter, it is also necessary to first consider the philosophical problems with 
emergence. A crucial issue is the temporal dimension of organization. The 
underlying dynamics of regulative self-organization are to be found in diachronic 
emergence. On the other hand, it is claimed that emergent properties in the whole 
exist synchronically with the parts, and therefore the emergence of the whole is not 
a matter of causal relations (Kim, 1999; Hulswit, 2005). As a solution to this 
problem, I claim that a synchronous condition embodies diachronicity within it, and 
what we perceive as synchronous is a de facto situation of formal stability. This 
suggests that the organism’s change over time, which is diachronic, is not 
reducible to certain sequential states, as there is a limit to the heterogeneous 
potential of the internal relations. Moreover, I disagree with the abovementioned 
claim by Kim that the existence of the parts and the whole refers only to a 
synchronic relation, but not a diachronic causation. The synchronous condition is 
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nothing but the individuation dynamics, which is the basis of the emergent nature 
of the regulative self-organization. The final element of my argument concerns 
biological oscillations. In the first chapter, I distinguished transitional and regulative 
dynamics of self-organization, and then, throughout this work, I have attempted to 
demonstrate how transitional dynamics due to nonlinear causality are 
encapsulated in the self-regulation of the organism. Biological oscillations appear 
as a case where these nonlinear factors are realized. From the development of the 
embryo to heartbeats and the circadian clock, I consider how these oscillations as 
the rhythm of life determine biological form through which perpetuated potential for 
change and individuation dynamics are reconciled. 
In Section 1, I discuss the philosophical problems with emergence to introduce 
the challenges against the notion of regulative self-organization. One of the 
interpretations of emergence is due to constraints, and in this respect, this section 
is also a continuation of the discussion on constraints that I began in the previous 
chapter. In Section 2, I examine the processual basis of the organism’s form, as 
this serves as a basis for introducing other ideas in the following section such as 
potentiality and temporality. I address the notion of formal cause, which is often 
mentioned in contemporary discussions on the organism. Following this, I consider 
the same problem in terms of relationality and contingency from an evolutionary 
perspective. I close this section by discussing alternative accounts of the 
organism’s form in contemporary philosophy of biology. I critically examine 
developmental systems theory (DST), gene-centric explanation, and structuralism. 
Gene-centric explanation reduces formal cause to genes. Structuralism includes 
certain potential drawbacks due to ignoring the material context of the biological 
relationality. Although DST is distinguished among these approaches due to 
emphasizing the self-organized nature of the organism and promoting epigenesis 
(see Section 3.3), it is criticized for overemphasizing the role of contingency and for 
ignoring the physico-chemical basis of self-organization (Weber & Depew, 2001). 
Finally in Section 3, I focus on the questions that I raised in the preceding sections 
concerning emergence and form. First, this consists of a critique of the mechanistic 
approach, since Newtonian mechanicism does not allow for the identification of the 
dynamics that are specific to biological systems. Second, I explain why the 
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potentiality of biological organization cannot be understood through efficient 
causes. Last, I return to the question of emergence: I explain the abovementioned 
argument concerning diachronic emergence as a realization of nonlinear dynamics. 
In this context, I discuss the role of biological oscillators. 
1. Ways of Emerging 
In discussions of self-organization, it is often emphasized that biological 
systems have emergent properties due to nonlinear interactions (Weber & Depew, 
1996; Thelen, 2002; Witherington, 2014), which is a point that is also central to the 
main arguments of this work. However, without engaging with the underlying 
philosophical problems, the acknowledgment of the role of nonlinearity would only 
be descriptive at best. Therefore, in this section I will offer clarification of the 
concept of emergence; i.e. how it is defined and what kind of philosophical 
questions are related to it. In my analysis, I will show that there are different 
understandings of the concept of emergence, and also different stances within 
each way of understanding. In general, there are three different contexts 
concerning the emergent nature of biological processes, namely: emergence due 
to biological organization vis-à-vis the physical qualities, emergence due to macro 
level as a result of micro level, and finally, emergence due to constitution of a 
whole as a result of the parts that make the whole. In the first context, the 
universality of the laws of nature and its application to biological processes is a 
central problem. An explanation of this issue relates to the history-dependence of 
the evolving systems (Mitchell, 2012). In the second context, the main issue is 
whether the qualitative nature of the macro-level phenomena can be reduced to 
the quantitative at the micro level. The third context, which concerns emergence in 
part-whole relations, is the most controversial of the three as it is associated with 
some currently unsolved dynamics concerning the physicality of the systems. It is 
the processual nature of part-whole relations that paves the way for a new 
understanding of the organism’s self-organization. By analysing the concept of 
emergence in these three contexts, I will show how universal dynamics of 
emergence are instantiated in the ontogeny of the organism, which also 
demonstrates the relevance of the issue for regulative self-organization. This is 
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preliminary to a discussion on the relationality of biological systems in the next 
section. 
In opposition to the account that calls into question the ontological basis of 
emergence based on the synchronic nature of emergent properties (Kim, 1999), I 
agree with the position that emergence is a matter of temporality (Mitchell, 2012). 
In other words, emergence is a diachronic phenomenon. My account of diachronic 
emergence implies that emergence is ontological, which is sometimes referred to 
as strong emergence as opposed to weak emergence (Bedau, 1997, 2002; Wilson, 
2013). Moreover, my position suggests that emergence should be understood by 
looking into the system’s transformation, but not the whole’s capacity at a certain 
moment. Without time, emergent properties can be reduced to a certain micro-
structural state, yet this would not allow us to understand the diachronic aspect of 
the problem. The argument that the whole cannot be reduced to a static 
composition of parts also relates to the self-organization of the organism, as the 
emergent nature of the organism is due to the dynamism of internal relations.  
I begin by considering the question of emergent complexity, which is also 
related to the constraint interpretation of emergence. The emergence of new 
constraints is a feature of evolving systems, and not directly related to the question 
of emergence in ontogeny. Still, constraint interpretation of emergence addresses 
the main problems of this work by focusing on the relational nature of biological 
systems, which will be discussed in more detail in the second part of this chapter. 
This problem relates to an old discussion of whether biological systems are 
reducible to their physical properties or not. Until the nineteenth century, the 
argument for emergence in this context was based on vitalism against mechanism, 
claiming that there has to be more than materiality – an element which is referred 
to as entelekhia, or sometimes, soul – for life to appear.44 Vitalism has lost support 
over time due to scientific progress that has led to a better understanding of the 																																								 																					
44 On the other hand, it is emphasized that vitalism, which was represented by researchers such as 
Driesch, was nothing more than the recognition of the organism as an object of study that is 
fundamentally different from other objects (Goodwin, 1982). Also, as El-Hani and Emmeche (2000) 
point out, it would be wrong to conclude from this that vitalism was out-dated in favour of today’s 
mechanicism. Mechanicism in this controversy is closer to organicism rather than the mechanistic 
approach that is the equivalent of physical reductionism. 
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material components of life, e.g. synthesizing urea by using chemical elements 
derived from the non-living. In the nineteenth century, emergence was addressed 
in line with the consequences of evolutionary theory (Corning, 2012). One of the 
main areas of concern was evolutionary novelty, that is, the possibility of the 
emergence of qualitatively different traits, and above all, the evolution of mind. For 
some theorists, Darwin’s gradualist approach could not sufficiently explain the 
emergence of new levels of organization, so they developed their own theories of 
emergence as part of a holistic approach to the organism. However, emergence 
was overshadowed by reductionism with the advance of genetics from the 1920s, 
as the molecular explanation was preferred over the organicism (Corning, 2012). 
Thus, the problems of organizational novelty and increasing complexity have been 
superseded. 
The discussion since the nineteenth century has involved a controversy 
between reductionism and this time, instead of vitalism, ontological emergentism 
(Emmeche, Køppe, & Stjernfelt, 1997). The new questions concern whether the 
explanation of biological or psychological phenomena can be reduced to physics, 
and whether the physical properties are predictable. Biological and psychological 
phenomena are associated with the emergence of “a whole kind of beings” 
(Emmeche et al., 1997, p. 91), such as the emergence of mind from the physiology 
of brain (Kim, 1996). In the context of the reducibility of biological and cognitive 
phenomena to physics, the properties that are thought to be emergent could be 
addressed as specific arrangements of matter. For example, the human body 
mainly consists of the elements of carbon, oxygen, nitrogen, and hydrogen, and it 
is obvious that only a specific configuration of these elements in a living organism 
enables metabolic activities, or cognitive functions, which are claimed to be 
emergent. Thus, the problem is due to the organization of matter. Wimsatt (1997) 
supports this account by pointing out that emergence primarily concerns the 
rearrangement of parts, as the alternative configurations of the parts lead to 
emergent properties. He adds that this does not contradict material reductionism. A 
specific configuration, which is the biological system in this regard, is emergent in 
the sense that the organizational context, as an actual type of configuration, cannot 
be directly predicted either by defining the physical nature of the constituents, or by 
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considering the laws of nature determining the behaviour of these constituents. 
This approach makes room for emergence due to the complexity of systems, which 
is sometimes called weak emergence (Bedau, 1997, 2002). 
A similar view has been defended in the constraint interpretation of 
emergence, which was introduced by Polanyi (1968) and held by other authors 
such as Pattee (2012). This interpretation depends on “the non-derivability of 
actual states from possible states represented in the physical laws” (Blachowicz, 
2013, p. 22). According to this view, boundary conditions are imposed on the laws 
of nature, either as a physical boundary or as specific rules of mechanism (Pattee, 
2012). For example, the chemical components of biological systems are subject to 
the laws of nature, but what determines the biological system is the morphogenetic 
condition that constitutes the boundary. Another idea in this view is that higher-
level principles control lower-level activities because organization determines the 
circulation of physical components in biological systems. The boundary conditions 
of a complex system are emergent because these conditions are contingent and 
not determined by the laws of nature. On this basis, Blachowicz (2013) points out 
that the laws denote a possibility space depending on the initial conditions. This 
implies that the laws of nature must be understood as restrictions in a system, yet 
they cannot determine the actual condition in which these restrictions apply. 
Blachowicz’s approach can be applied to historically emergent characteristics of 
species due to evolutionary contingency. For example, an elephant cannot fly, and 
the fact that the elephant’s anatomical state does not promote the potential can be 
understood in relation to the laws of physics. On the other hand, the anatomy of 
the elephant is one of the countless potential forms within the possibility space that 
is dependent on the laws of physics, and in this sense, as an evolved form, it is 
historically emergent. 
This approach is based on a distinction between the laws of nature as the 
basis of necessity and historicity as the basis of contingency; hence emergence is 
a consequence of contingency. Nevertheless, the constraint interpretation also 
holds that laws and actualization of causal processes are not completely distinct. 
As Blachowicz (2013) notes, laws can have varying degrees of generality. An 
example of this is the Kepler’s law which states that all planets in the solar system 
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have elliptic trajectories. This is a law that emerges due to the relations between 
planets. Planets are objects in space, and this law is an expression of regularity 
due to the nonlinear relations between these objects. The elliptic trajectory is a 
derivation from more general laws of physics, but it appears as a new constraint 
due to the specific actuality of the system in point. In this sense, it can be argued 
that it is always possible to seek more universal grounds for the laws that apply to 
a system, as is evident in Newton’s laws of gravitation compared to Kepler’s laws. 
However, the search for a more inclusive basis of laws does not rule out the case 
that new constraints emerge locally, which means that laws that are specific to the 
system can be analysed by considering both the universal context of necessity and 
local application of contingency. In the light of this, the constraint interpretation of 
emergence can be formulated as follows. The local emergence of laws within 
subsystems denotes relational necessities, but the law-like expression of 
necessities is not merely a derivation of more inclusive laws because the latter 
cannot imply the former without historicity. As will be shown in the following 
sections, this dialectical relation between contingency and necessity is essential for 
understanding the form of the organism as a relational system that is extended in 
time. 
In this context, my focus is the emergence of new relational patterns within an 
evolving system, which was discussed in the first chapter in relation to the 
emergent nature of the biosphere. In other words, this is the problem of the 
increase of complexity, that is, how it is possible that higher levels of complexity 
are generated out of the lower levels. For example, the beginning of life is a 
problem that reflects this type of emergence. The laws within a nonlinear system 
are path-dependent, which implies that they emerge through the evolution of 
complexity within the system (Mitchell, 2000). This is why the historical 
development of a system is latent with new boundary conditions, hence new 
possibilities. In other words, physical evolution of a nonlinear system develops its 
own necessities and possibilities. New boundaries emerge within the system 
historically, and once they emerge, they become the basis of systemic relations by 
constructively limiting the new conditions of complexity. An account based on the 
historicity of laws is proposed by Mitchell (2012). She argues that there are no 
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universal laws. Laws are determined locally within the evolving subsystems, and 
this is the basis of increasing complexity in the universe. In this sense, not only 
biological organization, but also the laws of physics are emergent (Mitchell, 2000), 
hence the common basis of emergence in biology and physics is the universal 
evolution of complexity. 
The second aspect of emergence that I discuss relates to micro and macro 
states. This is a question that is more directly related to the self-organization in 
ontogeny. Originally, emergent properties at macro level refer to the qualitative 
nature of the system that is irreducible to a certain microstate, but a more 
fundamental phenomenon that underlies this is how qualitative properties emerge 
from quantitative changes. The aggregation of particles has properties that none of 
the particles possess prior to this aggregation, which is why new properties at a 
higher scale are considered emergent. As expressed in the title of a highly 
influential paper by Anderson (1972), “more is different”. Physical properties such 
as colour and surface tension do not exist when there are only a few molecules. 
This is an ontological issue, which means that, it is not a problem due to empirical 
difficulties at a lower level, rather these properties simply don’t exist without the 
aggregation of multiple particles. 
Bedau (2002) claims that an argument for emergence depending on macro-
level properties is questionable because macro and micro levels are in fact 
ontologically identical. According to this idea, any property due to aggregation at 
the macro level is associated with weak emergence. Bedau (2002) gives the 
example of an ocean wave which demolishes a sand castle. In this event, weakly 
emergent macro cause is nothing but the iteration of micro-level causes at a 
different level (Bedau, 2002, p. 36). It is true that only the accumulation of 
molecules creates certain properties, say, a few molecules cannot create a wave. 
On the other hand, what emerges due to aggregation of components is a property 
that can be investigated both at micro and macro scales, and macro-level 
properties are not different from the perspective of micro-level analysis. Therefore, 
it is claimed, there is no macro-level property that is inexplicable at the micro level 
because the real distinction is between aggregate versus singular forms of 
particles. In fact, the emphasis on the physical identicalness of the macro and the 
	 174	
micro is just another way of articulating an objection due to the synchronic nature 
of the emergent properties. 
According to a contrary view, macrostate properties are still emergent because 
the behaviour of the mass at the macro level is not completely determined by a 
certain microstate (Wilson, 2009). Quantum level properties such as the spin of 
particles are eliminated in the analysis of macro-level properties in classical 
mechanics. Certain properties that characterize a specific microstate are 
functionally irrelevant to the ones that are measured as variables at the 
macrostate, as the probabilistic values of the micro-level properties average out 
each other (Wilson, 2009). As was discussed in the first chapter, a similar point 
concerning the emergence of order at a macro scale from disorder at a micro scale 
was made by Schrödinger (1967/2013). An underlying factor of this kind of macro-
level emergence is the individuation of an entity as developing from the 
organization of its particles. In a solid body, the particles are constrained together 
in a way that leads to a loss of degrees of freedom. In this kind of individuation that 
depends on an equilibrium state, compared to a disordered aggregation of 
particles, the body is not dependent on the initial condition, as it acts as a stable 
attractor. On the other hand, it is claimed that this account of emergence is a 
matter of explanation, but not causation, because the elimination of micro-level 
properties implies an extraction of theories (Wilson, 2009). According to this idea, 
the theory (quantum mechanics) for micro-level phenomena lacks a full explanation 
only for the empirical reasons, whereas the theory that explains the macro level 
(classical mechanics) is instrumentally favoured, and in fact complementary to the 
micro-level explanation. 
Reductionist explanations of emergent phenomena usually focus on 
mechanistic explanations of a causal transformation, and this usually relates to a 
precise micro-level analysis depending on localizing specific causal interactions 
underlying functionality (Bechtel & Richardson, 2010). On the other hand, Collier 
(1993) claims that localizing mechanisms has limits, and macro-scale emergence 
is a matter of causation beyond a problem of theory reduction. In a system with 
multiple chaotic attractors, arbitrarily proximate points can evolve into different 
attractors, and therefore “it is impossible to localize the boundary between two 
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attractors” (Collier, 1993, p. 7). Cohesiveness at the macro scale is causally 
insensitive to micro-scale fluctuations, since any randomness at the molecular level 
is eliminated within the attractor states due to averaging of the lower-level random 
collisions. As a result, specific identity of the macro-scale object is not perturbed by 
these collisions, and interactions of the macro scale occur based on distributed 
properties. 
A condition that has a particular importance for biological systems is the 
multiple realizability of the macro-level function. A macrostate condition is multiply 
realizable by a set of microstates, which is also the underlying idea of Boltzmann’s 
well-known formulation of entropy. Most of the biological systems have this type of 
robustness due to multiple realizability, which can be considered a condition of the 
macrostate determination. Organizational robustness might appear because of 
several mechanisms such as the reorganization capacity of causal networks and 
many-to-many relations between structure and function, which is also known as 
degeneracy (see Section 3.2). 45  Also, since the organisms involve enzymatic 
activities that enable both the constant reproduction of their own parts and their 
capacity for regeneration to a certain extent, their macrostate is not only insensitive 
to micro-level perturbations, but it can moreover tolerate the loss of some of its 
parts. On the other hand, one could argue that the multiple realizability of biological 
functionality does not necessarily involve diachronic emergence because a specific 
function does not imply an equivalence of causal mechanisms that are able to 
perform the function. A definite answer to this question requires a comprehensive 
discussion of functions and causes, which goes beyond the remit of this work. 
The final context of emergence that I will discuss in this section, which I think is 
the most essential aspect to understanding the diachronic nature of the problem, is 
due to part-whole relations. This relates to an old question of whether there is a 
causal capacity in the whole that is beyond the sum of its parts. As discussed 
above, specific configurations of the parts lead to emergent properties. Without 
biological organization, carbon, nitrogen, oxygen, and the other elements that 
																																								 																					
45  As will be shown in the last main section of this chapter, in biological systems, multiple 
realizability has a wider basis in the potentiality of regulatory networks. 
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normally constitute the organism are lifeless. The organization that is due to the 
dynamic relations between parts gives the whole its emergent characteristic. 
Certain properties of matter are not merely resultant, but qualitatively different. 
Water has properties that neither hydrogen nor oxygen has by itself. A similar 
situation appears in downward causality through levels of interaction, which was 
discussed in the previous chapter. According to this, a higher-level property arises 
depending on the relations at a lower level, which then feeds back on these 
relations. A highly influential review that criticizes these notions is developed by 
Kim based on a distinction between synchronic versus diachronic understandings 
of emergence. Kim (1999) argues that an emergent property should be 
functionalized (p. 10). This implies a causal explanation of the system’s 
transformation that leads to the emergent property. On this basis, he claims that 
emergent properties can be reduced to an explanation of inputs that create certain 
outputs. Downward causality is the causal influence of the whole over the parts, 
and supposed to be emergent, but Kim objects to this by stating that downward 
causality is a case of synchronic causation. For example, a bird can fly, and its 
different parts gain the capability of flying in the whole, whereas none of these 
parts possess the ability of flying (Kim, 1999, p. 30). However, he argues, the 
relation between the whole and parts in this kind of situation is synchronic because 
it is a compositional relation. The whole as compared to the collection of parts is 
not diachronically emergent because they are in fact the same thing. 
Downward causality is considered synchronic with the composition of parts in 
Kim’s explanation. If the additive effect of the parts within the whole is also 
assumed as effects for each part, this will imply self-causation, which is thought to 
be “an apparent absurdity” (Kim, 1999, p. 28). Thus, Kim’s reference to synchronic 
causation implies a refusal of a type of causation that is deemed problematic. In 
fact, instead of a problematic mode of causation, it is stated that the synchronic 
context of emergence does not actually refer to a causal relation, as there is no 
causation actualizing in time (Emmeche et al., 1997). Kim’s argument does not rule 
out all possibilities for emergence, as emergence is also addressed as a diachronic 
phenomenon. In Kim’s account, however, there is no place for diachronic 
emergence, either, because the emergent property is considered a functional 
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derivative of the inputs. Mitchell (2012) objects this by stating that this point is not 
enough to refuse emergence. She argues that the self-causation which Kim found 
absurd is in fact a common feature of biological systems, as they are determined 
by self-organization and feedback. She gives examples of emergence from the 
self-organized behaviour of the organisms living in colonies, in which higher-level 
properties emerge due to feedback relations within the system. Similarly, abrupt 
changes in cellular activity are due to positive feedback that creates a threshold 
response (Mitchell, 2012, p. 181). In fact, I discussed similar examples in the 
previous chapters in order to vindicate this viewpoint of self-organization, and 
therefore I believe that Mitchell’s criticism is fair. But I also find Kim’s emphasis on 
the synchronic nature of emergent properties useful. As will be discussed in the 
third main section, Kim’s remark contributes to my distinction between diachronic 
and synchronic contexts of emergence. 
I stated before that emergence can be properly defined only by considering the 
aspect of temporality. Anjum and Mumford (2017) insist on the ontological meaning 
of emergence in relation to temporality. They state that “the coming together of the 
parts to form a whole involves a transformation of the parts through their 
interaction” (Anjum and Mumford, 2017, p. 7). They emphasize that the emergence 
of downward causality is a matter of causation beyond constitution, as the whole 
gains an autonomous capacity over its parts. Downward causation emerges within 
a system, and transforms the parts in a context-dependent way. As a consequence 
of this process, the whole has an emergent nature. Anjum and Mumford (2011, 
2017) mainly discuss emergence, not self-organization, but they point to the 
common basis that emergence is a matter of temporality, which is a crucial aspect 
of the issue. Furthermore, they oppose the Humean understanding of causation 
that suggests a cause diachronically precedes its effect. In their view, cause and 
effect are synchronic, as they both extend simultaneously, and the exhaustion of 
the effect takes time. Based on this, they rule out the claim that emergence is 
epiphenomenal. Recall that one of the key points in the critique of emergence by 
Kim (1999) is that there is no involvement of causation in the synchronous part-
whole relationship. Since Anjum and Mumford (2011) argue that causal relations 
are synchronic, in their perspective, there is no reason to assume that 
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synchronicity of composition is exempt from causation. On the contrary, “emergent 
properties are sustained through the on-going activity; that is, through the causal 
process of interaction of the parts” (Anjum & Mumford, 2017, p. 9).  
Nevertheless, the main premise of this argument that cause and effect extend 
synchronously is controversial. Hansson Wahlberg (2017) criticizes their account of 
synchronous causation, which presumes that cause and effect are instantaneous. 
He notices that this implies that no passage of time is required between the cause 
and the effect, which contradicts the principle of special relativity that nothing can 
propagate faster than the speed of light. Therefore, according to him, Anjum and 
Mumford’s (2011) claim that causal powers pass around spatial distance cannot be 
true. Hansson Wahlberg (2017) also suggests that if sequential causation is 
dismissed, objects can have no powers. A final verdict concerning Anjum and 
Mumford’s argument would require a discussion in the context of the relevant 
theories in physics, whereas this type of discussion concerning the nature of 
causation is beyond the scope of this work. On the other hand, although the 
abovementioned criticism demonstrates that there are certain explanatory gaps in 
Anjum and Mumford’s argument, I think their remarks can still be useful. I will 
return to their argument in the last section, and defend a revised version of their 
view on causal relations that does not necessarily involve a synchrony between 
cause and effect. Concerning emergence, Anjum and Mumford’s claim highlights 
the diachronic aspect of the problem and the transformative role of downward 
causality. In this sense, their theory offers support to the processual account of 
organization. 
Emergence in part-whole relations is a problem of dynamic relationships. In 
terms of a static understanding of part-whole relations, the whole is an 
epiphenomenal term that implies a specific composition of parts. At first glance, 
emergence can be denied despite a process approach to this compositionality. 
One can argue that nothing is emergent because the outputs that are supposed to 
be emergent are deterministic consequences of the inputs (which I have suggested 
is implicit in Kim’s argument), as the sum of components and interrelations are 
reducible to these inputs. For example, concerning the wholeness of an organism, 
developmental processes, physiological activities, or cognitive processes can all be 
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considered as responses to specific inputs, either as short-term effects such as 
stimulation or as long-term effects such as the “genetic codes”. It follows from this 
perspective of mechanical predeterminism that the emergent nature of causal 
processes would be easily superseded. Yet, I believe that this kind of aggregation-
based consideration of the system as the parts plus interrelations will result in a 
misleading approach that strips the system in focus from its temporality, and that 
ignores the synergetic consequences of the internal relations. The 
abovementioned approach of composition disregards one crucial detail. When 
something is defined as a whole, this refers to a determinate thing with a form. 
However, the determinateness of the whole consists in a dichotomy between the 
form in its frozen state and the form in its constant dynamism. A conception of part-
whole relations that is limited to composition is dependent on the notion of an 
object with a strict form directed toward a certain trajectory. This does not provide 
an adequate understanding of the internal dynamism of the organism. In the case 
of organisms, the form is dynamic, as the whole is determined by a complex 
network of feedback relations. This makes the issue inconsistent with a static 
account of compositionality and a neat analysis of inputs that contribute to the 
emergent properties, which brings us to the problem of dynamic form that I address 
below. 
2. The Form of the Organism 
Diachronic emergence paves the way for a radical ontological ground for self-
organization in so far as it shows emergence is not merely a problem of 
composition. However, describing the concept that way does not offer an ultimate 
solution, but only brings the problem into a new dimension. As discussed above, 
the main difficulty is the paradoxical implications from the synchronous condition 
between emergence within a system and the parts that constitute the system. A 
possible solution lies in the dynamic form of the organism, which involves the idea 
that the organism’s form extends over time. In the following sections, I will discuss 
specific problems of the organism’s dynamic form. The first problem is 
hylomorphism, which denotes a dual approach to an entity based on matter and 
form (Section 2.1). The second problem is relationality in the context of 
contingency and necessity (Section 2.2). The third problem relates to two theories 
	 180	
that propose opposite explanations for the organism’s form, which are genetic 
reductionism and developmental systems theory (Section 2.3). The aim of 
discussing these issues is to examine how the notion of form is understood 
philosophically, and how different approaches are applied in biology, which will 
provide a basis to develop my own perspective on this issue. My main argument is 
that the organism’s form has a relational basis which is determined by the 
response of the organism towards both internal and external contingencies. 
Relationality denotes a basis of necessity that emerges between different 
variables, which is in fact a different way of expressing the constraint interpretation 
of emergence that has been explained in the preceding section. Furthermore, there 
is a constant potentiality in the dynamic form, which makes the self-organization of 
the organism different from non-living self-organization that is temporary. 
2.1 Hylomorphism 
Form can be explained in different ways, namely, as an abstraction of the 
structural properties, a precondition of individuation, a type of organization 
performing a specific function, etc. In this section, I will focus on the idea of formal 
cause, as it is a notion that is often appealed to as an explanation of downward 
causality, the emergent nature of biological organization, and self-organization 
(e.g. Delbrück, 1971; Rosen, 1991; El Hani & Emmeche, 2000; Moreno, 2000). 
Despite the widespread appeal to formal cause in these diverse explanations of 
life’s organization, the extent to which these accounts accurately portray the 
original ideas, or even the original questions, is questionable. In the context of 
Aristotelian philosophy, formal cause explains the form as a way of shaping the 
potentiality within material cause, although form is not a distinguishable element in 
a real entity. Hylomorphism, which is a concept that originates from the words form 
and matter in Greek, expresses this duality. Below, I will discuss the explanatory 
value as well as some potential problems of this Aristotelian notion in the context of 
its application in modern approaches towards the organism. It seems that there are 
two main problems. Firstly, the modern scientific approach is based on efficient 
causes, which is why reconciling Aristotle’s pluralistic account of causation with the 
one-dimensional modern approach would be problematic. Secondly, it is not clear 
that the formal cause can be applied in isolation from the broader cosmological 
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claims of Aristotelian philosophy (Hulswit, 2005). The formal cause is applicable 
due to its connection to teleological explanation, since it is closely related to the 
final cause in this approach. On the other hand, organization refers to a dynamic 
structure with a function, and this in turn implies a question of purposeful activity. 
Also, it is true that modern approaches to the organism are not always hostile to 
teleology, as there are cases where purposeful activity is considered necessary for 
organization (Pittendrigh, 1993) and teleology is reformulated within materialist 
approaches (Monod, 1972). Nevertheless, this is a limited purposiveness localized 
in the organism. It should also be noted that final cause is a concept beyond 
purposiveness (Falcon, 2015), as it is originally defined in the face of the question 
of why something has occurred, which is an issue that relates to both living and 
non-living systems. Furthermore, contemporary understandings of self-organization 
are inconsistent with the cosmological underpinnings of Aristotelian hylomorphism, 
since the former interprets final cause or any equivalent of the final cause due to 
local dynamics, whereas the latter acknowledges this only in a universal context. 
In the Aristotelian view, the form refers to the shape of an entity as opposed to 
its material. In a well-known example given by Aristotle, the form of a bronze statue 
is due to what is made from the bronze: formal cause is the shape given, and 
material cause is the bronze  (Metaphysics, trans. 2016). This notion of form as 
distinct from materiality provides a basis for the modern concept of organization 
and the relational properties that are applied to matter as abstract qualities 
(DiFrisco, 2014). For example, the qualities of the living system which are 
associated with minimal conditions of life, e.g. metabolic closure, homeostasis, 
compartmentalization (although a controversial one) are structural properties that 
apply to all living systems. In a more specific approach, form can be associated 
with functionality, e.g. the form of the fin of a marine animal that is convenient for 
its swimming function. 
Aristotle’s understanding of form can be interpreted as a dynamic condition 
that is crucial for biological organization. Concerning living things, Aristotle defined 
the form of the organism as to what is essential to its organization, but not due to 
its static shape at a certain moment. According to Aristotle, “matter is potentiality, 
while form is actuality” (De Anima 412a9). The soul of a living thing is its form, and 
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it is an actuality of the natural body (412a22). Moreover, formal cause is consistent 
with the modern conception of organization due to its connection with functionality, 
since it is closely linked with final cause. Final cause internally determines self-
moving entities in line with a mature actualization of form, as a seed has the 
potentiality to grow to become a tree (412b27). 
In this respect, Aristotle’s distinction between types of causation seems 
applicable in terms of the modern approaches to function and organization. 
However, there is no consensus among contemporary references to formal cause 
on how different types of causes relate to each other. Rosen (1991), who tried to 
formalize the structural basis of the organism depending on category theory, 
argued that formal cause must be reconsidered to overcome the limitations of the 
Newtonian science and its basis in efficient causation. He claims that the organism 
is closed to the effects of efficient causes due to the relationality of its structure. 
According to him, the initial conditions of a system are equivalent to material cause 
(Rosen, 2000). In response to Rosen, Pattee (2012) identifies how the initial 
conditions are also a matter of measurement. One should not ignore the context 
where a measurement is chosen by an agent, and thus there is a teleological and 
subjective element in the measurement. The interpretation of Aristotle’s four 
causes also differs in other interpretations. For example, López-Moratalla and 
Cerezo (2011) define biological identity as the increasing form, which implies that 
form is acquired (similar to the emphasis of DST), and claim that efficient cause 
and formal cause are unified in the material causation of the organism, whereas 
Salthe (1993) emphasizes the connection between final cause and formal cause in 
relation to the organism’s individuality. In another interpretation, Emmeche, Køppe, 
and Stjernfelt (2000) propose applying an Aristotelian account of causality by 
replacing final causality with functional causality. These views are generally 
developed by emphasizing multiple levels of organization, but formal cause is also 
used to support the contrary position of gene-centric explanation. Delbrück (1971), 
who is the inspirational source of Schrödinger’s preformationist concept of life, has 
claimed that genes represent the Aristotelian notion of unmoved mover. The 
unmoved mover is a concept which denotes something that moves other things 
without itself being moved (Metaphysics, trans. 2016)
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misinterpretation of the original idea, as Aristotle’s notion depends on a downward 
determination of the form due to final cause, but not an upward determination as 
suggested in genotype-phenotype mapping.  
In these modern interpretations of formal cause, form is usually associated with 
the emergent aspect of biological organization and the role of downward causality. 
Although these aspects are significant in terms of understanding self-organization, 
a serious drawback emerges from appealing to formal cause in relation to 
downward causality, as pointed out by Hulswit (2005). This criticism focuses on the 
potential difficulties with the applicability of the notion of formal cause because of 
the wider implications of the worldview that this notion originates from. First, he 
calls downward causality into question, which has certain parallel aspects with 
Kim’s (1999) approach. Hulswit (2005) claims that downward causality is 
problematic when it is taken as a causal principle. A global pattern that emerges in 
a system does not really create a causal effect on the parts, since the whole is 
already identical with the parts. Therefore, according to him, what is meant by 
downward causation is in fact “downward determination” (Hulswit, 2005, p. 282). 
The criticism of formal cause is developed on this basis, as the form is in fact a 
way of determination. Theories about formal cause should not bypass this 
distinction between efficient causes and formal determination. He points out that in 
today’s science, causal interactions, including the ones that are attributed to 
downward causality, are explained due to universal laws. There is a sharp contrast 
between the Aristotelian plurality of causal explanations and the modern-era 
mechanistic explanation based on the laws of nature. Therefore, he argues, one 
cannot apply the Aristotelian solution without dealing with the ambiguities this 
introduces because of the inconsistency between these two worldviews. 
Hulswit (2005) acknowledges that downward causality and formal cause might 
have a role in an approach that is alternative to what he calls “the substance 
addiction” of Western philosophy, which ignores the processual nature of things (p. 
283). Yet, he calls attention to the fact that an emphasis on formal cause also 
implies a fundamental change in our perspective on causation, and without dealing 
with this, the Aristotelian notion of form cannot provide a solution in a scientific 
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world in which only efficient causes are recognized. He criticizes using the concept 
of self-organization in biology on the same basis. 
Can Aristotle’s formal cause be a basis for the organism’s self-organization? 
Matthen and Hankinson (1993) point out that “Aristotle’s universe is a self-
maintaining structure” (p. 425). Contrary to the modern scientific approach that 
explains the properties of the whole by appealing to the properties of the parts, 
Aristotle’s explanation is anti-reductionist since the form of the whole determines 
the parts (Matthen & Hankinson, 1993, p. 426). The parts affect the whole, too, but 
this takes place by the material causation, which is subordinated to formal 
causation. The change in the form is triggered by the incongruence between 
things’ ideal location and current location. Thus, things tend to their place, i.e. they 
move in order to realize their idealized condition, which is a reflection of final 
causation. Time is conceptualized through motion, and motion occurs due to telos, 
which is essential for finalizing the hylomorphic unity in an entity. Temporality is 
involved as a part of the explanation due to final causation, hence the question of 
dynamic form is implied in final causation. There are answers for the problems of 
form and change, once the underlying final cause is understood. On the other 
hand, it is important to note that final cause is not necessarily due to the aims of 
purposeful agents, but it is the cause that refers to the question of for the sake of 
which a thing has come to be (Nussbaum, 1978; Vinci & Robert, 2005, p. 211). 
Van de Vijver (2013) points out that in Aristotle’s philosophy, there is the 
developmentalism of the one, whereas in Evolutionary Systems Theory and 
modern theory of self-organization, there is the “developmentalism of the many” (p. 
248). In the former, the role of chance and spontaneity in the production of living 
things is precluded, and form is determined in a cosmological hierarchy which is 
ultimately determined by final cause. However, according to today’s understanding 
of self-organization, development is inherently contingent (Salthe, 1993), and the 
structure cannot be a full, undistorted expression of the form. Therefore, Van de 
Vijver concludes that the Aristotelian view is not a self-organizational one. I think 
this interpretation of Aristotle shows why formal cause is not consistent with the 
levels of organization in the contemporary approach. In Aristotelian philosophy, 
there is room for self-organization, due to the self-motion of animals and to the idea 
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of epigenesis (see Section 3.3). Yet, these are all based on a universal teleology. 
So, Aristotle’s account supports a cosmological self-organization, and local self-
organization only exists in so far as it is included in this universally complete 
teleology. Modern theory admits that matter has the capacity to organize at all 
scales, but the relation between the local and the more inclusive levels are not 
necessarily associated via the final causation. In this sense, the modern approach 
might involve a unity of self-organization as a network of ecosystemic “islands” 
which all have their context-dependent transformations, as their self-organization is 
dependent on constraints that appear locally in developmental processes. 
In another interpretation by Rieppel (1990), material and efficient causes are 
considered as proximate, realized in ontogeny. Whereas formal and final causes 
are in line with functional explanation, that is, tinkering with the generated 
structures in accordance with natural selection. This approach seems to provide an 
interpretation that attributes a global scope to the formal cause and a local role to 
the efficient cause. However, this approach does not really reflect the Aristotelian 
view. For Aristotle, it is not evolved traits, but self-motility, that is tied to a 
universally forming principle. Thus, even though the causal influence of natural 
selection with shaping the organism’s form might be justifiable in its own way of 
thinking, one should also consider whether this really reflects the initial 
philosophical issues that were addressed in relation to the notion of formal cause. 
The endorsement of four types of causes usually originates in the criticism of 
mechanistic explanation. Witherington (2011) states that in modern science, which 
is influenced by Newton and Descartes, positional identification and prediction of 
an object’s trajectory are the main commitments of causation. Yet, this attitude is 
challenged in favour of a causal pluralism in new approaches such as general 
systems theory. According to the Aristotelian four causes, form and function are 
considered in the context of a thing’s coming into being. The four types of causes, 
according to Witherington, are different ways of abstracting patterns, which 
suggests that causal pluralism is in fact a matter of explanation: “Formal and final 
causes do not cause the way efficient causes cause . . . but order our sense of the 
directional flow of development” (Witherington, 2011, p. 74). In this way, the 
problem leads to the old dilemma between causation and explanation. Claiming 
	 186	
that four causes do not indeed cause, but “order our sense” suggests a similar 
position to Kant’s claim that teleology is not a constitutive, but a regulative element 
(Kant, 1790/2008). In this regard, the main disagreement is whether the four 
causes are explanatorily reducible, that is, whether formal cause can be reduced to 
efficient causes, or it is irreducibly complementary. As a view that can be 
interpreted as in favour of the latter, Pattee (2012) says that different ways of 
explaining the world, such as deterministic versus statistical explanation, or 
necessity versus chance, are complementary, implying that both sides of the 
conceptual distinctions are necessary in order to explain natural phenomena. Can 
we say that matter and form, or Aristotelian four causes, are complementary in a 
similar way? Or, shall we retreat to a position that, similar to Kim’s (1999) attitude 
towards emergence, formal cause is epiphenomenal, that is, an explanation due to 
the formal cause can be reduced to an explanation due to the efficient cause? The 
answer depends on how we contextualize form in regards to biological 
organization. In the following section, I will try to answer this question. 
2.2 Relationality and contingency 
In this section, I focus on the structuralist context of form.46 According to 
structuralism, form is the abstract pattern that is represented by a relational model, 
which is usually thought to be mathematically analysable (Goodwin, 2000). Since 
structuralism is regarded as an approach that justifies the formal cause (Rosen, 
1991), philosophical issues concerning this Aristotelian idea must be clarified. In 
the previous section, I dealt with some problems surrounding the Aristotelian 
origins of formal causation, i.e. referring to formal cause without addressing its 
broader relation to Aristotelian cosmology, and the inconsistency between the 
Aristotelian worldview and the modern theories of self-organization. As the central 
question in my discussion concerns the form of the organism, but not Aristotle’s 
formal cause, the main idea behind formal cause that form is the precondition of an 																																								 																					
46  There are various approaches to form in the contemporary analyses. The understandings 
concerning information contributed to these alternative approaches. For example, in the semiotic 
analysis that is based on Peirce’s triadic systems, form refers to signs that are not matter itself, but 
the representation of matter (Queiroz & El-Hani, 2006). This concept of form is put forward by 
considering the relationship between the sender and the receiver of information. Different contexts 
of form are not necessarily mutually exclusive of each other; instead, they are different applications 
of the relevant philosophical idea that goes back to the Platonic notion of form. 
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individuated system can be re-contextualized by opposing its bipolar hylomorphic 
context in which form and matter are the complementary notions that underlie real 
entities (Simondon, 2009). Form and matter are indistinguishable aspects of 
individuation, whereas they are subjectively distinguished depending on the 
analysis of organizational complexity. Based on this idea, I make a further claim: I 
argue that matter cannot be dissociated from its organizational context because 
relationality determines the nature of things. Not only the biological, but also the 
physical is dependent on organization. Therefore, what is identified as the matter 
that is formed through organizational context is in fact nothing but a label that 
disguises where analysis stops revealing the relational basis of things by 
decomposing the organization further. As will be shown in the third section, this 
radical conception of relationality is essential to acknowledge the emergent nature 
of the organism. After making these claims concerning relationality, I focus on the 
relation between contingency and form with respect to the historicity of biological 
systems. This will serve as a basis to criticize a pure formalist interpretation of 
structuralism that reduces the organism to abstract relationality. The main issue 
that I deal with here is the evolutionary aspect of contingency, which is necessary 
to understand the ontogenetic aspect of self-organization. There are two points that 
I emphasize. First, contingency is an irreducible element in the form of a system,47 
and second, structure should be considered in the context of abstract necessities 
within interdependency relationships. 
A main theme of the structuralist approach is the relational properties that 
appear as interdependent features of organisms. For example, allometric 
relationships that consider the ratios between anatomical parts or other relations 
such as the one between the metabolic rate and the size of the organism are in this 
category. These relational properties are also investigated across phylogenetic 
differences. Comparative anatomy deals with the morphological similarities and 
differences between species. From the structuralist perspective, comparative 
analysis must consider the appearance of a Bauplan, which refers to a consistent 
																																								 																					
47 In fact, that contingency is an irreducible element of biological organization was already pointed 
out in the previous chapter. The discussion in this section can be considered as a continuation of 
this argument in relation to form. 
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set of morphological traits. The notion of Bauplan implies that robust forms persist 
through evolutionary change, or the evolutionary path tends to converge to formal 
robustness. In comparative analysis, functional explanation considers the adaptive 
nature of certain traits and why they are selected individually, while leaving the 
issue of diversification of these Baupläne merely to random mutations. On the 
other hand, another research tradition that is represented by biologists such as 
D’Arcy Thompson has emphasized that form is constrained by certain 
developmental and physical constraints. For this reason, the evolution of species is 
not due to the exploration of a continuum of potential forms in which traits can co-
exist within any combination, but on the contrary, only certain types are involved as 
consistent forms in the possibility space of evolution. In a pre-Darwinian 
conceptualization, these generative principles were referred to as the laws of form 
(Denton & Marshall, 2001). 
There are two elements that I believe to be important within the structuralist 
approach. The first one involves the physical basis of form, as the laws of physics 
determine the consequences of certain sets of features. For example, as the mass 
of an animal increases, the ratio of the thickness of bones to the bodyweight that is 
required to hold the animal becomes higher, so that the bone has to be 
proportionally thicker. This is a direct consequence of the law that the gravitational 
force on the animal increases exponentially as its mass increases. Second, the 
construction of the form is relational and processual, appearing as the constraints 
of the morphogenetic field. Consequently, what makes the whole possible as a 
Bauplan depends on whether it is a consistent developmental process. Thus, a 
partial characteristic can only be involved in a consistent form, but not in any type 
of combinations. These two points are crucial to understand why form is a matter of 
the lifespan of the organism. Considering form as a consistent developmental 
process has implications that lead us to appeal to the idea of morphogenesis. This 
connection will be examined in the following sections. 
How should we understand the physical basis of relationality? DiFrisco (2014) 
remarks that the models of living systems begin either with matter as constituting 
the basis for a bottom-up approach, e.g. the definite conditions of life such as 
biomolecules, or with form as the basis for a top-down approach, which refers to 
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the abstract relational properties of life. I believe that this is basically true, except 
the fact that “matter” is contextual, too. This means that what is defined as matter 
such as biomolecules can also be subject to a relational analysis, as the 
decomposition of part-whole dynamics can go further down the levels of 
organization. For example, carbon is an element that is involved in biomolecules. It 
is not exactly appropriate to consider carbon atoms as matter vis-à-vis biological 
organization, which depends on the relations higher than the atomic level. 
Considering atoms as the matter of the system as opposed to levels of 
organization only means that the analysis of organization stops at the atomic level 
without going into the sub-atomic level, acknowledging the latter under the cover of 
the physical properties of carbon, e.g. carbon is an element that is capable of 
making four covalent bonds, the most common isotope of carbon in nature includes 
six protons and six neutrons, etc. However, ontologically, the physical properties of 
carbon are a manifestation of organization at the sub-atomic level, as the capability 
of making four covalent bonds in this case is determined by the orbital structure of 
the electrons, which is a matter of organization as well, since it is determined by 
the internal relationality of an atom.48 All there is in the world that is known as 
matter has an organizational context, and this is why things are nothing but their 
relations. Therefore, a structuralist attitude towards form does not necessarily 
depend on a certain level as a distinguishable dimension of matter aside from 
biological organization, but it is based on focusing on the relational necessities that 
are imposed on sub-level components. 
An abstraction of this relationality implies that the structural basis of 
organization is not limited to certain material components, or certain historical 
appearances of species. However, this does not mean that there is a pure form of 
abstract relationality that can be examined without considering the actuality of 
living systems. Concerning the tension between the abstract and the actual, 
Rosen’s (1991) attitude seems to represent an extreme bias toward the former. His 																																								 																					
48 As a more telling example of relationality at the sub-atomic level, it is claimed that modern 
physics shows that sub-atomic particles have no intrinsic properties, e.g. a neutrino and an electron 
are actually the same thing in a symmetrical state, and they become differentiated only due to their 
relational context in the interconnected unity of the atom, as the electron’s interaction with the Higgs 
particle gives its mass (Schlemm, 2003, p. 65, as cited in Smolin, 1997). 
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mathematical work, which was developed within elementary category theory, an 
area of mathematics that is used to map the transformations between sets, only 
considered this relational and abstract basis of form. Rosen (1991) criticized 
Newtonian dynamical analysis for being reductionist as it aims “to throw away the 
organization and keep the underlying matter”. In contrast, his relational approach 
intends to “throw away the matter, and keep the underlying organization” (Rosen, 
1991, p. 119). Rosen’s main strategy to achieve this is by developing a purely 
syntactical language, as a sublanguage of scientific modelling within natural 
language that includes both syntactic and semantic elements (DiFrisco, 2014, p. 
510). 
Pattee (2007) criticizes Rosen’s approach for being extremely structuralist, 
aiming to get rid of materiality. He states that Rosen tried to reveal the abstract 
nature of self-replicating systems by ignoring the empirical aspect of this issue, as 
“he was not concerned with the possible material realizations of formal models” 
(Pattee, 2007, p. 2275). Pattee opposes this type of extremism and insists that a 
living system is an actual one, and therefore should be considered in a materialist 
approach in contrast with Rosen’s formalism. Pattee (2007) obviously refers to the 
empirical aspect of biology here, and in addition to this emphasis, I think we can 
also interpret actuality in relation to the historical context of living systems. An 
actual living system, in contrast with abstract schemes, establishes real relations 
with its environment. Thus, an understanding of ontogeny requires considering not 
only abstract interrelationality but also specific spatial and temporal settings of 
these real relations. Therefore, the historicity and actuality of a system is beyond 
the scope of a formalized analysis of temporality.49 
																																								 																					
49 As discussed in the first section, Blachowicz (2013) was making a similar argument about 
emergence by pointing out that laws of nature cannot determine historicity per se, and an element 
of contingency always needs to be added to the system in focus for the laws to operate. Within the 
theoretical tools that are used to analyse this historical entity, the laws of nature denote relational 
necessities, and the attribution to necessity suggests that, prima facie, they are unchanging and not 
subject to contingency. However, as a matter of fact, the precondition of necessity for relationality is 
also subject to historical change, since the laws that determine the consequences of relations are 
also products of a universal evolution that constitutes the background of all causal relations. This is 
based on Mitchell’s (2000) views on the laws of nature in many ways, and the implicit opposition of 
the distinction between ceteris paribus laws that are peculiar to “special sciences” such as biology 
and the laws of physics that refer to deterministic relations. But I will not go into the details of this 
argument. 
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The abovementioned approach can also be applied to evolutionary 
contingency. The form of a specific species is constrained by relational necessities 
that are the reflections of the laws of physics, but form is also a product of 
evolution. As emphasized by the evolutionary contingency thesis, evolution is 
primarily a historical and contingent process (Beatty, 2006). For example, an 
elephant’s bones must be thicker proportionally to its size, which is a consequence 
of physical necessities. However, the elephant as an animal with bones and flesh, 
and a material entity that is actual in a specific time and location, is also a product 
of contingent historical conditions. In this example, biological contingency and 
physical necessity are relative: The former is contingent in so far as it is the 
theoretical field of a later stage of evolving complexity, whereas this does not entail 
that the latter is not also subject to historicity. 
Is there a tendency in the approach of relationality and self-organization to get 
rid of the historicity of organisms? This is a question of whether referring to the 
universal, structural, and deterministic as opposed to accidental changes requires 
denying the role of the latter in the organization or not. There are different stances 
on this issue. I have mentioned Rosen’s attitude, which is an extreme attitude 
based on abstract relationalism, considering form as exempt from historicity. 
Kauffman (1993) has also claimed that self-organization is an abstract 
characteristic, which involves a tendency for spontaneous order. Yet, his theory is 
based on an expectation of specific patterns of relationality that appear within 
actual systems which does not necessarily deny the role of historicity. Other 
researchers such as Newman and Goodwin, despite focusing on the structuralist 
aspect of organization in their research, have emphasized the role of contingent 
elements such as frozen accidents, which are the specific contingent events in the 
evolutionary history that determine the fate of later forms (Goodwin & Webster, 
1996; Newman, 2003; Newman & Bhat, 2009). 
The relational basis of self-organization can involve both the law-like 
characteristics of form, which I referred to relational necessities, and contingency 
that appears both in evolutionary history and in ontogeny.50 Here, contingency 																																								 																					
50 At this point, one might wonder why such a phrase as relational necessity is required, as there is 
already a notion called “structural constraints”. As an answer, I refer the reader to the discussion on 
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refers to the accidental aspect of the form, which is not only due to factors such as 
frozen accidents in evolution, but also history-dependency of biological systems. 
Consider the lifespan of an organism. The form of the organism is never a perfect 
materialization of a Bauplan, but rather it is affected by multiple events through the 
organism’s lifetime which might leave their marks on form as epigenetic 
differentiations. We cannot think of a Bauplan that is distinct from the contingent 
actualization of the organism it relates to, since contingent factors such as 
epigenetic differentiation are not necessarily a diversion from an exact form, but an 
inherent part of the form of the organism. We can speak of the potential states of 
form that precede specific contingent actualizations, e.g. the epigenetic mechanism 
of methylation that is capable of silencing or activating specific genes is there 
before any contingency actually appears. However, this potential in the organism 
cannot correspond to the form per se. Thus, relational necessities are imposed on 
a possibility space, which is why contingency cannot be eliminated. They cannot 
be addressed due to pure context-independent structuralism either because 
relationality is in fact realized as the tendency to form structures, or as the self-
maintenance of already formed structures. Therefore, contingency is an 
unavoidable aspect of the organism’s form. As Ramírez-Trejo, Demarest, Van 
Poucke, and Van De Vijver (2016) point out,  “there is no form without history; no 
synchrony without diachrony; no being without becoming” (p. 370). 
On the other hand, the critique of formal structuralism on the grounds of 
ignoring the role of contingency could fall into a straw man argument without 
clarifying the issue of temporality within organization. In fact, structuralism does not 
deny the aspect of temporality within organization on any account. An analysis of 
the structure can deal with the role of temporality that is abstracted from 
materiality, yet this involves a notion of time that is quite different from the 
historicity of a system within its actual relations with the world. The problem arises 
when the reflections of the historical context are ignored. Here, contingency refers 
to unprecedented events and the coalescence of several factors from multiple 																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 																										
the constraint interpretation of emergence in the first section, according to which a constraint has 
both a law-like aspect and a contingency aspect due to the actuality of the condition. Due to this 
double-edged description of the constraint, I distinguish the aspect of necessity from a structural 
constraint. 
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sources of causation that make an exact predetermination impossible. I will discuss 
the role of contingency in biological processes more in the following section. 
2.3 A critical analysis: DST, genetic reductionism, and structuralism 
In the previous section, I discussed the ways that form is abstracted from 
material conditions, and how the structuralist claim is built upon this abstract 
organizational basis. In this section, I will address how the question of form is 
explained in different theoretical approaches in biology. Since the form of the 
organism is one of the main issues in this chapter, it is essential to justify the 
organism as a nexus of form from an organizational viewpoint. In other words, the 
question is what makes the organism special as a level of organization in which 
form is stabilized. There are multiple levels of biological organization from 
molecules to ecosystems. According to gene-centric explanation, genes are the 
origin of form, whereas developmental systems theory (DST) refutes prioritizing the 
genetic level by emphasizing the epigenetic and environmental aspects of 
inheritance. One of the main ideas of DST is that biological form is not 
predetermined by genes, but rather is acquired through systemic interactions. DST 
helps to acknowledge that there are multiple causal elements in the emergence of 
the organism’s form. Nevertheless, its perspective is biased towards the contingent 
aspect of development as it ignores the relational necessity that was discussed in 
the previous section, which leads to an overstatement of the importance of 
contingency. Moreover, DST has been criticized for offering a holistic approach 
towards levels of organization (Godfrey-Smith, 2001; Van Speybroeck, 2000). 
These two criticisms converge on the deficiency of DST concerning the analysis of 
the stabilizing elements of organization. In the light of these remarks, I argue that 
neither the gene-centric approach nor DST provides a sufficient explanation for the 
peculiar dynamics of organization within the organism. These two approaches 
constitute a dichotomy between micro-reductionism in the former and macro-
reductionism in the latter. After this analysis, I focus on another comparison, which 
is between DST and structuralism (also see Section 2). I propose reconciling the 
roles of contingency, which is emphasized by DST, and internal constraints, which 
is emphasized by structuralism. 
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Let me begin with the discussion of the gene-centric approach, which is 
objected for several reasons. The relevant criticisms state that only a small 
percentage of genes are involved in direct coding of proteins, most genes are part 
of regulative networks, and that the essentialist conception of genes is problematic 
(Griffiths & Stotz, 2006). Moreover, it has been shown that the morphogenetic 
nature of the organism can persist without the involvement of genes (Goodwin, 
2001). The contrary approach of DST claims that the form of the organism is not 
predetermined or coded by genes, but acquired due to the developmental sources 
of several inheritance systems. The advantages of DST are that it is critical of the 
classical nature/nurture distinction, and that it promotes the importance of 
epigenesis. A main argument that is developed along these lines is that the life 
cycle is reconstructed due to self-organization of the organism (Griffiths & Gray, 
1997). On the other hand, despite this positive contribution, the macro-reductionist 
attitude of DST (Robert, Hall, & Olson, 2001; Van Speybroeck, 2000) hinders the 
possibility of justifying this claim concerning self-organization. 
According to gene-centric explanation, which was popularized by Dawkins 
(1989), genes carry the information that codes the organism. This view is criticized 
by different perspectives including epigenetics, systems biology, and 
morphogenesis. A main criticism targets the implicit claim that there are specific 
genes for each specific phenotypic trait. This is also reflected in popular 
considerations, such as in the “gene for obesity”, although this kind of phrase is far 
from reflective of reality. The biggest problem is that this specific understanding 
bears the traces of the Mendelian analysis that is based on correlations between 
the frequency of certain phenotypic traits and certain alleles in a population. 
Although several internal and external factors are involved in the expression of 
genes and the emergence of phenotypic traits, this Mendelian notion of a gene still 
survives in the “gene for X” way of thinking. According to the contemporary 
understanding, the underlying phenomenon in the idea of genetic coding is the 
formation of a three-dimensional shape of a protein out of the amino acid 
sequence. However, only certain parts of genes that are known as exons are 
encoded in RNAs, and the amount of genes that directly code proteins is even 
smaller. In most vertebrate species, genes that are coding proteins constitute only 
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a small section of the genome. The proportion of coding DNA is so small in 
humans that it only makes approximately 1% of the genome (Venter et al., 2001; 
Moss, 2006), whereas it is now known that non-coding DNA usually has regulatory 
functions. These regulatory functions are performed by more complex networks 
that are highly dependent on other elements such as RNA. Basically, gene 
regulation is “encoded in the way the DNA sequence is folded up with proteins to 
form chromatin structures” (Boi, 2011, p. 206). Contrary to the idea that phenotypic 
traits are directly coded by genes, these properties are influenced by a complex 
interaction of several factors, including morphogenetic factors, cell-to-cell 
interactions, de novo formation of the organelles, epigenetic regulation, etc. 
Although some of the gene sequences can be associated with specific higher-level 
properties, this is almost never a one-to-one mapping between the genotype and 
the phenotype because a type of higher-level entity such as a membrane can be 
coded by a set of genetic sequences that consists of several different variations 
(Moss, 2003). 
Genes are expressed according to their interactions with other genes, which 
means that their function is context-dependent within the genome. Therefore, an 
essentialist definition of the gene is problematic (Griffiths & Stotz, 2006). It is the 
interaction between the genes, cytoplasm, and signalling networks across the 
cellular membranes that determine the context of genetic expression. In this sense, 
self-organization at the organism level is antithetical to genetic reductionism. 
Moreover, genes are turned off or turned on due to epigenetic mechanisms, which 
are influenced by environmental factors. Two common cases of epigenetic 
regulation are DNA methylation, in which a gene is silenced by a methyl group, and 
histone modifications, which affect the quantitative level of gene transcription. 
Another reason that the gene-centric view is problematic is the self-organized 
nature of development. Certain regulatory genes are found in several multicellular 
species, suggesting that these genes have been kept due to their role in 
morphogenetic development. Thus, genes don’t program the organism out of 
nothing, but they are part of a process in which physical forces are turned into 
dynamic patterns (Newman & Bhat, 2009; Newman & Linde-Medina, 2013). 
Furthermore, the experimental studies on Acetabularia have shown that 
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morphogenetic development can occur independent from genes (Goodwin, 2001, 
pp. 78-83). Acetubularia is a huge single-celled organism living in subtropical 
waters. In these experiments, it is found that when the organism is split, the part of 
the organism which is without the nucleus, hence without genes, is capable of 
regenerating itself to a certain degree. This occurs as a process of dynamical 
patterning due to the calcium gradient in water. It is not possible to find similar 
examples in multicellular organisms that are more complex. This is due to the fact 
that morphogenetic patterning is not sufficient to establish form without the 
stabilization of genes (Newman, 2012). In summary, genes are the molecular 
sources of developmental pathways, which remain inert in the absence of other 
organizational processes. Hence, they are activated in a context-dependent way, 
and cannot be the sole source of determination for form. 
Although it is claimed that genes constitute the formal cause of biological 
systems (Moreno & Umerez, 2000, p. 109), in the light of the ideas of Newman 
previously discussed, it is more appropriate to consider genes as the stabilizers of 
form. The notion of the genes as the formal cause leads to a preformationist 
conception of form. Goodwin (1987) remarks that preformationism based on 
genetic determinism reduces self-organization to a self-assembly process. In this 
kind of reductionism, it is supposed that “genetic program determines the 
molecular constituents of the organism”, and the interactions between these 
constituents are explained due to “short-ranged forces of crystallization and self-
assembly” (Goodwin, 1987, p. 168). In this approach, material composition is 
supposed to determine the form similar to the spreading of crystallization 
(Schrödinger, 1967/2013; Delbrück, 1971; Monod, 1972). Goodwin (1987) refutes 
this claim, as it presumes a one-to-one organizational determination between the 
molecular-level and higher-level organization reducing a higher-level principle to 
the atomistic composition. This contradicts with the polymorphism at the molecular, 
cellular, and tissue levels of life, in which same atomic composition can produce 
different types of organization. Genes by themselves cannot act as the formal 
cause, as this would ignore the other dynamics of form at the higher levels. 
Moreover, organizational pathways are not one-to-one, but one-to-many. 
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Therefore, self-assembly plus genetic programming cannot be a sufficient 
explanation for biological form. 
As a contrary view, DST explains development and evolution by appealing to a 
pluralistic notion of causation and by emphasizing that any kind of continuity, 
whether internal or external, can be a developmental source. It is argued that 
genes are not the only source of information, but any kind of contingent source, 
due to culture, constructed niches, epigenetic traits, etc., can be an input through 
the ontogeny of information (Oyama et al., 2000). DST does not claim that these 
sources contribute equally to the change of systems. Instead, it argues that 
inheritance is context-sensitive, as different inputs can be more prominent 
depending on the contingency of the situation in focus (Oyama, 2001a). 
Can DST provide a theoretical basis for the self-organization of the organism? 
Weber and Depew (2001) state that they agree with Griffiths and Gray (1997), who 
are proponents of DST, about the organism’s self-organized characteristic as a 
consequence not only of genes, but also behavioural, social, and environmental 
factors of inheritance. Nevertheless, they argue that more emphasis is needed on 
the bottom-up characteristic of this self-organization. The organism is formed by 
the autocatalytic closure of the replicating molecules, and the dissipative, self-
organized nature of biological processes is a fundamental physico-chemical 
condition. In a similar vein to Newman & Comper (1990), they point out that genes 
are not packed with information in the semantic sense, but stabilize the organism’s 
development, enabling inheritance and natural selection (Weber & Depew, 2001, p. 
245). From this viewpoint, DST seems consistent with the general ideas of self-
organization. 
On the other hand, DST has been criticized for its holistic approach (Godfrey-
Smith, 2001; Lewontin, 2003; Lamm, 2014). A main problem is that the 
concomitance of myriad internal and external causal factors of development does 
not answer the question of why the organism is a focus of development. The 
organism’s life cycle depends on the self-maintenance of its form, and even though 
it is true that multiple co-existing developmental cycles co-exist, this does not solve 
the question of how self-organization occurs at the level of the organism. As a reply 
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to this criticism, Oyama (2001b) claims that DST analyses an interaction within the 
context of the system by considering the interdependency and “reciprocal 
contingency” of causal relations (p. 182). According to this, the organism and its 
environment are interpenetrated, hence the dichotomy of the internal and external 
is called into question. This reply is not sufficient to save DST from the criticism of 
its holism, which offers a macro-reductionist attitude against the micro-
reductionism of the gene-centric explanation. The underlying reason is DST’s 
attitude of blurring the distinction between the organism and its environment. In 
contrast with DST, regulative self-organization involves considering the organism 
as a nexus of numerous causal factors within biological complexity. As I explain 
below, this is due to the internal relationality that is essential for the individuality of 
the organism. 
Thus far, I discussed DST due to its opposition to gene-centrism. Now I will 
attempt to clarify the issues with contingency and organicism by making another 
comparative analysis, which involves DST versus structuralism. As contextualized 
in DST, contingency appears as an anti-thesis of the structuralist approach. The 
approach of DST is unable to unify the features of contingency and formal stability, 
since the emphasis on historicity and contingency appears by antagonizing the 
structuralist claim that there are laws of form. However, only extreme 
interpretations of these two approaches, in the former, appraising contingency by 
ignoring relational necessity, and in the latter, focusing on the “design” 
characteristics of the organism as if “the design nature” can be stripped from its 
historical contingency, makes the reconciliation impossible. This does not mean 
that an emphasis either on contingency or relationality (organizational constraints) 
per se is wrong, but my criticism targets extreme accounts on either side that 
exaggerate the role of one of these features in isolation from the other and thus 
departs from the dialectical unity of contingency and relationality. 
Even though the reciprocal contingency of several developmental cycles is the 
case in ecosystems, emphasizing this fact alone is not sufficient to clarify the core 
ideas of self-organization. There are two reasons for my criticism. First, 
contingency is only one aspect of the emergent form, yet relational necessities are 
as crucial as contingency. Second, self-organization cannot be explained due to a 
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contingent coupling between the internal and the external. Instead, it depends on 
the internalization of contingency, which makes the organism relatively free from 
dependence on external conditions. Below, I will clarify the first idea, whereas the 
second idea will be discussed in the last main section of this chapter. 
As explained in the previous sections, contingency is related to the historicity of 
biological systems in which several causal factors coming together in a random 
way determine the direction of development. The historical and contingent nature 
of the biological form is pointed out in DST (Bateson et al., 2001) as well as in the 
evolutionary contingency thesis (Beatty, 2006). Intertwined life cycles of cellular 
reproduction, organism, ecological dynamics, etc. constitute intertwined 
fluctuations in a way that makes these systems open to novel ways of organization. 
Thus, form should be understood in the context of temporal stabilities of material 
individuation through this global flow within ecosystems. In this sense, the 
emphasis on historicity and contingency within DST is correct. The requirements 
within the relationship between the organism and its environment cannot be 
represented by any idealized form, and thus not only internal constraints, but also 
external factor of the selection pressure cannot determine the form per se. On the 
other hand, biological form is also a consistent unity of parts as a consequence of 
relational necessities that negatively determine the whole. For this reason, internal 
constraints must be considered in relation to the capacity for autonomy that is 
specific to organisms. Structuralism helps to overcome possible deficiencies that 
can appear when the form is analysed by only due to a contingent coupling 
between the organism and environment, or to a contingent concatenation of 
multiple causal factors. Thus, a synthesis of ontogenetic contingency that is 
represented by DST and relational necessity that is represented by structuralism is 
essential to understand how the biological form is embodied through the lifespan of 
the organism. Relational necessities are fundamental, whereas they cannot be 
thought of as distinct from the incorporation of contingency that is the basis of 
phenotypic plasticity and homeostasis. 
In summary, the main problem is that neither the micro-reductionism of genetic 
determinism, nor the macro-reductionism of DST provides a final answer to the 
problem of how the organism’s form is dynamically sustained. A crucial aspect that 
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requires explanation is that the organism is a cause by itself, beyond a mechanistic 
unification of the internal and the external (Lewontin, 2003). The form is gained and 
preserved in its self-organized condition, and the activity of the organism is 
basically the sum of responses to keep the form intact. As Lewontin (2001) 
emphasized, genes cannot organize anything, as they are not active components 
by themselves. Contrary to the gene-centric view, new approaches in biology such 
as DST emphasize the role of other cellular and intracellular elements that 
collectively determine the organization. In principle, this kind of emphasis is 
necessary. On the other hand, the question then becomes, how does a stable 
genetic sequence become an instruction for a dynamic and differentiated whole? 
The answer can be found in the organizational capacity of the whole. The 
organism’s organizational potential allows it to internalize contingency, thereby 
making the accidental factors essential to its organization. 
In Section 2 in general, I have addressed the reflections of hylomorphism for 
understanding the organism’s form as well as interpretations of the formal cause. I 
have discussed how some of these interpretations deviate from the original 
concerns in Aristotle’s philosophy. I have also discussed the emphasis on 
contingency in DST as opposed to the alternatives of genetic reductionism and 
structuralism. Section 2 can be read as the expression of a critical stance that has 
endeavoured to navigate and clarify the tension between the complementary 
notions of necessity and contingency. This has mostly focused on abstract 
principles concerning biological organization, whereas the alternative of regulative 
self-organization has not yet been discussed. In the remaining part of this chapter, 
I will deal with this issue, in particular, by delving into the role of temporality. As I 
have already mentioned, the implication of temporality in the abovementioned 
approaches to form is a controversial aspect of the problem, as this is seen in 
Pattee’s criticism of Rosen for developing a timeless relational concept of the 
organism (Pattee, 2007, p. 2274). To deal with this type of deficiency, it is 
necessary to understand how relationality is realized. 
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3. Temporality of Self-organization 
In the following sections, I return to the question of what makes biological self-
organization unique. Some of the main themes of systems biology are “the 
emphasis on distributed causality, the emergence of form on various scales, the 
causal interdependencies, and the lack of absolute distinctions between causes 
and effects” (Oyama, 2001b, p. 184). These identify the aspects of biological 
causation that are necessary for understanding the regulatory nature of self-
organization. Yet, these aspects of causal relations are also present in non-living 
self-organization. Hence, these causal features point to a necessary, but not a 
sufficient condition of biological self-organization. 
Unlike non-living forms of organization, organisms have a specific internal 
condition, which is a continuous potential for change. The cases of non-living self-
organization due to far-from-equilibrium conditions such as the Belousov-
Zhabotinsky reactions, Bénard cells, and flames are limited to the event, whereas 
biological systems are characterized by a capacity of reorganization, a high degree 
of functional integration, and combinatory potential. These conditions are specific 
to the organism’s organization, and they provide a basis for the emergence of 
ontogeny as a history-dependent process (Salthe, 1989). On the other hand, I 
stated in the first chapter that the transitional dynamics that directly appear in 
certain non-living systems are also present within the organism in a more complex 
way. Now, I explain the ways that these emergent dynamics are involved in the 
regulative system of the organism that determines the conditions of individuation. 
Firstly, a critique of the mechanistic approach is necessary, as a demarcation of 
the internal conditions of a system is not possible within this perspective. After this 
critique, a non-mechanistic description of the organism’s organization is associated 
with its potentiality. Through the part-whole relations of the organism, relations 
determine the identity of the components involved. This also underlies the 
organism’s high capacity to keep a certain developmental stability condition in the 
face of perturbations. Finally, a re-evaluation of the philosophical question of 
emergence is undertaken. As a reply to the criticism based on the synchronic 
character of the part-whole relationship (Kim, 1999), it is suggested that 
synchronicity in fact denotes a limit to a temporalized conception of a whole. 
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Moreover, as an epilogue, biological oscillation is discussed as an example of 
incorporating nonlinear dynamics. This demonstrates how nonlinear dynamics are 
incorporated within regulation. 
3.1 The critique of the mechanistic approach 
A critique of the mechanistic approach is necessary before discussing how 
temporality is involved in the organism’s self-organization. This critique calls into 
question the Newtonian way of modelling that has been historically developed to 
analyse non-living systems. The Newtonian basis of modern science, its 
inappropriateness for biology in particular, has been a topic of discussion since 
Kant. Theoreticians such as Robert Rosen, Howard H. Pattee, René Thom, Brian 
Goodwin, and Ilya Prigogine have made similar remarks on the necessity of 
questioning the established approaches to causality, usually pointing to the 
inadequacy of the Newtonian approach, and sometimes in search of possible 
alternatives such as neo-Aristotelian attitudes (e.g. Casti et al., 1989). 
Preferences among models reflect our expectations, insights, and sometimes 
hypotheses on the nature of things. On the other hand, once a model is applied, 
the results are restrained by a limited practice in line with the ad hoc problems of 
the relevant model. Thus, it is important to recognize how the empirical results of 
any model are theory-laden. Although the Newtonian way of modelling was 
developed in relation to physics, a hidden implication involves that it can be 
universally applied – usually due to a reductionist approach. This reveals why this 
issue is relevant in the context of biology. The Newtonian understanding of causal 
relations has influenced biological research via mechanistic explanation. This is 
problematic for biology, all other potential problems aside, due to the questionable 
basis of causation in this worldview. Moreover, this constitutes an obstacle to 
understanding biological self-organization.51 In fact, mechanistic explanation is a 
vague notion with different ways of defining the main issues. The origin of this 
philosophical account is Cartesian philosophy, which considers the motion of inert 																																								 																					
51 Mechanisms in biology might be perceived in different contexts: actual causal interactions as 
opposed to statistic correlations, machine-like conception, mechanicism as opposed to vitalism, or 
deterministic modelling of systems. The target of my critique here is limited to the Newtonian basis 
of causal explanation. 
	 203	
physical objects as distinct from mind and purposeful activities. One of the main 
ideas of the Cartesian philosophy is the machine metaphor for organisms, which 
has been criticized due to the applications in first order cybernetics (Simondon, 
2011) and more recent approaches (Nicholson, 2014). On the other hand, not all 
types of mechanistic explanations appeal to this metaphor. A new philosophical 
approach has emerged during the post-positivistic area which considered 
mechanistic explanation as opposed to functional explanation (Craver & Tabery, 
2017). This approach discussed issues such as the underlying mechanisms of the 
behaviour of a complex system, subsystems of a causal structure, and levels of 
organization. A main idea in this approach is that mechanisms are decomposable 
elements that can be localized within the organism. However, this leads to different 
philosophical problems, namely: decomposability requires prioritizing specific 
functions (Craver, 2007), not all the mechanisms can be localized, nonlinearity of 
causal interactions requires different considerations (Bechtel & Richardson, 2010), 
etc. Considering organisms as nearly decomposable systems involves the idea of 
modularity, which is a question that is closely connected with self-organization. I 
will address the criticism of this concept in the next section, but now I will examine 
more general problems of the mechanistic approach. 
There might be certain explanatory benefits within the modern discussion of 
mechanisms in biology due to notions such as modularity, while the problems with 
mechanistic explanation as a general scientific approach will be discussed 
specifically in relation to self-organization. The problem is essentially due to 
endorsing certain claims about causation that reflect a certain attitude in physics, 
such as the externality of causes, inertness of non-living matter, and uniqueness of 
efficient causation. Such claims limit the role of biological research to merely 
revealing specific configurations of matter. Can mechanistic explanation be exempt 
from these inherent questions related to causation? I think the answer is negative, 
since there is no neutral ground in terms of understanding the physicality of a 
system. In so far as there are postulates such as the atomistic components of a 
whole, the explanation would be under the influence of theoretical positions that 
are necessary to justify these claims. As I will try to show below, this brings several 
drawbacks with it. 
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Cartesian philosophy and Newtonian physics are regarded as two intellectual 
sources of the mechanistic approach. However, only the former proposes that 
matter is inert, whereas the latter has been associated with self-organized 
characteristics of the systems. With Newton’s discovery of gravitational force, it 
was understood that matter can exert forces beyond direct collision, which inspired 
epigenesists to find similar forces in biology (Farley, 1977; Moss, 2003; Roe, 
2003).52 This indicates that mechanistic explanation is not necessarily in opposition 
with ideas regarding a general theory of self-organization. On the other hand, 
negative sides in terms of the applicability to a contemporary account of the 
organism’s self-organization are overwhelming, as the Newtonian understanding of 
causality has more fundamental problems. This approach considers only the 
efficient causes of systems with atomic components in which the internal change of 
a system can induce a sudden change beyond the system (action at a distance). 
All of the assumptions implicit here have been either refuted or called into question 
in later scientific developments. Efficient causes apply to laws of motion, yet it is 
now quite questionable that other types of causation can be invalidated. Field 
theory in electromagnetism offers a notion of law that is temporally symmetrical, 
and gravitational field theory has developed the notion of deformation of the space-
time geometry, hence this has required interpretation of fields in relation to 
potentiality and formal cause (Harré & Madden, 1973), which are not compatible 
with efficient causation. Atomism is still relevant in today’s physics, but obviously 
the theory has been constantly revised since the seventeenth century when atoms 
were merely considered as particles with stable extension, and the philosophical 
implications such as essentialism remain controversial today. Finally, the 
instantaneous effect of a change in a system, which implies the idea of action at a 
distance, is refuted in today’s science due to the maximum speed limit of any 
particle in the universe, which corresponds to the speed of light in vacuum. A 
detailed discussion of these ideas is beyond the scope of this work, but these brief 
comments are given only to point out the controversial basis of mechanistic 
conception. 
																																								 																					
52 See the first chapter for Lee Smolin’s ideas on the relation between gravity and self-organization. 
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In the Newtonian worldview, time and space are considered absolute 
properties of the world, which enables an exhaustive mechanistic analysis of a 
system’s transformation from the viewpoint of an external observer. On the other 
hand, this absolute notion is questioned by relativity theory, which suggests that 
time and space are relational categories. This means that there is no privileged 
observer that represents a universal reference system for measuring time, but 
instead time is affected by the distribution of matter, and the dynamics of material 
systems are interactions within space-time geometry. Jaeger, Irons, and Monk 
(2008) hypothesize that the relativity principle can be applied to positional 
information in biology. They point out that positional information, which refers to the 
cells’ responsiveness depending on their position in the developmental field, 
cannot explain how the cells scale their size in proportion to the average size of the 
tissue and the ability of tolerating perturbations (Jaeger et al., 2008, p. 3175). 
According to the initial theory of positional information, it is supposed that there is a 
feed-forward process in which the role of cells is restricted to interpreting this 
information: As the morphogen spreads from a local source, the differentiation of 
cells depends on specific ways of responding to linearly decreasing morphogen 
gradient (by activating specific target genes) due to thresholds through the gradient 
(Wolpert, 1968). Although the notion has “proven invaluable for guiding 
experimental research on pattern formation in developing fields” (Jaeger et al., 
2008, p. 3176; also see Chapter 3), and later nonlinear degradation of morphogens 
have been introduced to revise the theory, this was not sufficient to explain the 
underlying dynamics of differentiation. In contrast to the initial idea that morphogen 
gradient determines the cell response, but is unaffected by it, it is found in recent 
studies that regulatory feedbacks play a critical role in the developmental process 
in several ways, e.g. cellular responses affect the morphogen gradient, signalling 
activities lead to desensitisation of cell receptors, interaction between target genes 
restrict the other genes’ activities, or signalling of the morphogens lead to cellular 
proliferation (Jaeger et al., 2008, pp. 3177-3179). Jaeger et al. (2008) points out 
that the classical understanding of positional information presupposes a 
unidirectional causation from the field to the cells, and this is in line with Newtonian 
mechanics, “where the relative positions of bodies are determined with reference to 
the static geometry of space that is itself unaffected by any objects or processes 
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that are referred to it” (p. 3179). In classical mechanics, the geometry of space in 
which objects are located is flat, inert, and unaffected by mass, whereas according 
to general relativity, there is a dynamic space-time metric that is influenced by 
mass. In a similar way to the logic of general relativity, there is a dynamic 
interaction between tissue geometry and cellular activity due to feedback regulation 
at different layers, e.g. morphogens lead to the proliferation of cells, which alters 
the size of the tissue, and this in turn affects the cellular specification. Jaeger et al. 
(2008) claim that this reflects a parallelism with the feedback between space-time 
geometry and mass-energy distribution in the general theory of relativity. On this 
basis, they propose to extend the theory of positional specification by including the 
dynamic state of the developmental field according to which the processual nature 
of biological space-time is taken into account.53 
This proposal for a revised perspective by Jaeger et al. (2008) also has 
remarkable implications for the epistemological aspect of mechanistic explanation 
and its critics. The classical understanding of positional information in Wolpert’s 
model is developed to respond to a lack of mechanistic understanding of the 
underlying reasons (Wolpert, 1968, 1969). However, a problem in Wolpert’s term is 
the difficulty of establishing a common ground between the development of the cell 
and the organism. As Goodwin (1987) points out, “the fertilized egg is both a cell 
and a developing organism” and “it is an organism insofar as it is totality 
describable by a field; it is a cell insofar as it embodies the specific constraints” (p. 
176). He goes on to claim that acknowledging the organism as a self-organizing 
field solves this problem (Goodwin, 1987, p. 177). In this sense, Goodwin’s self-
organization theory puts forward a structuralist account against the gene-
mechanistic explanatory project (Winther, 2011, p. 415). As a consequence, 
Goodwin and Cohen (1969) suggest a revision of Wolpert’s model, stating that 
positional information presumes that every cell has access to a clock and can read 
a map, whereas according to their model, “the map arises from wave-like 
propagation of activity from localized clocks or pacemakers”, as the “individual cells 																																								 																					
53 The authors also remark some challenges in this comparison: General laws are relevant for the 
theory of relativity, whereas laws are thought to be non-existent for biological processes. Also, 
mass-energy is conserved in the physical model, whereas biological systems are 
thermodynamically open (Jaeger et al., 2008, pp. 3180-3181). 
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are supposed temporally organized” (p. 49). Along the main lines of mechanistic 
explanation and its critique in favour of self-organization, it is possible to see both 
the traces of a criticism of the gene-mechanical explanation and a tension between 
efficient causes in the former and a temporal understanding of form in the latter. 
The abovementioned view by Jaeger et al. (2008) puts forward an alternative that 
focuses on the interactivity of form and matter due to the implications of 
temporality, and contributes to the criticism of Newtonian mechanicism on the 
same lines as Goodwin (see Section 3.3 for Goodwin’s general approach). Rosen’s 
theory on anticipatory systems depends on a similar interactivity between 
information and time, as it claims that biological organization depends on how time 
is internalized within the organism and passed between generations (Rosen & 
Kineman, 2005, p. 407). 
Despite the unjustifiable basis, the standard mechanistic modelling approach 
that reduces causation to attaining velocity vectors to points in a phase space 
continues to shape our worldview, thereby permeating into scientific and 
philosophical discussions. As pointed out by the proponents of self-organization in 
different areas, e.g. Prigogine & Stengers, (1984/2017), Kauffman (2000), and 
Smolin (2013), whose ideas were briefly explained in the first chapter, a high 
intellectual cost of this limitation is the neglect of the implications of temporality in 
complex systems. Due to the analysis of trajectories as closed and deterministic 
systems depending on initial conditions and the laws of nature, temporality is 
reduced to a logical implication because it is presumed that the outputs of a closed 
deterministic system are already given by the inputs (Smolin, 2013). As to the 
closedness of a system, a major problem in a mechanistic approach that creates a 
drawback for understanding self-organization is the lack of objective criteria for 
making a distinction between internal and external conditions. Organisms are open 
thermodynamic systems, which means that there is exchange of energy and 
material between the system and its environment. However, it is also true that 
“organisms are open systems that handle flows of matter and energy by means of 
and for the maintenance of their metabolism” (Soto et al., 2016, p. 79), which 
makes organisms relatively independent from external conditions. This partial 
independence from external conditions co-exists with the openness of the system, 
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which requires an analysis of the dynamic basis of internality. Mechanistic analysis 
is not capable of explaining the physical basis of this specific condition because 
this type of modelling cannot offer any objective criterion as to the boundaries of a 
closed system. In this type of analysis, a certain number of degrees of freedom are 
considered within isolated conditions, and the rest of the world is ignored. There is 
no way to establish the objective difference between internal and external 
conditions of an interaction, and there cannot be any intertwined levels of 
organization other than composition. According to this one-dimensional approach, 
different mechanisms correspond to different parts of composition within a complex 
system, but the change of the system that is constituted by these mechanisms is to 
be analysed as a single trajectory. Therefore, mechanistic approaches cannot offer 
an explanation in terms of the dynamics of individuation other than the continuous 
co-existence of internal and external conditions. 
Restricting self-organization to an approach that only considers internal 
dynamics cannot be an alternative to this one-dimensionality, either. Instead, the 
objective criterion of individuation is necessary to understand how external 
contingency is internalized. Externally, the organism interacts with its environment 
as a whole, but internally, the whole is the mediator of causation at multiple levels, 
whose functional integration is enabled by feedback regulations. As a 
consequence of this, a self-organized organism is a system in which the degrees of 
sensitivity of the parts towards each other change over time, since internal 
elements can be induced by each other. The objection to the mechanistic approach 
through the abovementioned lines does not depend on an actual state of the 
internal, such as the membrane closure that marks the internal unconditionally. On 
the contrary, it refers to a claim that the internal state of a system is not simply a 
matter of composition, but temporal characteristics of organization determine what 
is internal in the context-dependent situation. Due to this dynamism, the boundary 
of individuality is conditional, defined due to the processes involved, and 
intertwined internalities appear throughout the sub-systems of the organism. If this 
crucial element of interactivity between material processes and the geometric basis 
of organization is ignored, then the analysis of self-organization would not be able 
to overcome the limitations of the mechanistic approach which were previously 
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discussed. Thereby, organisms would be considered as the natural extension of 
their environment, simply a deterministic correlative to the ecosystem, without any 
acknowledgment of their causal agency. 
3.2 Potentiality of the organization 
In the previous section, I criticized the mechanistic approach due to its 
questionable basis of causation in general, and for not having a sound basis to 
make a distinction between the internal and the external. An essential condition of 
internality and individuality in a living system is a certain degree of causal 
insensitivity to perturbations. Causal insensitivity does not mean that the system in 
question is causally detached from the external, but it shows that a one-
dimensional causal connectedness is not representative of actual biological 
processes. This condition is also the basis of organizational robustness. In this 
section, I will argue that robustness is due to the potentiality of biological systems, 
and potentiality is a distinguishing aspect of regulative self-organization. 
Specifically, I claim that degeneracy within biological systems is indicative of 
causal potentials. The studies on potentiality in living systems can be traced back 
to Hans Driesch (see below), whereas the relevant philosophical implications have 
not been sufficiently discussed. The discussion of potentiality is a continuation of 
the criticism of the mechanistic approach in so far as this approach reduces causal 
relations to the actual states of systems. 
Biological systems cannot be understood as unitary causal pathways because 
they consist of causal networks in which alternative forms of interconnectivity 
appear as functionally equivalent. This is known as the degeneracy of biological 
systems, but I suggest that degeneracy should be considered as part of the 
potentiality of biological interactions. Degeneracy refers to “the ability of elements 
that are structurally different to perform the same function or yield the same output” 
(Edelman & Gally, 2001, p. 13763). It is the “capacity to produce the same result 
by different strategies, in contrast to a redundant system in which the same result 
is produced by the same strategy” (Greenspan, 2001, p. 385). As it appears due to 
the alternative forms of interdependency within living systems, degeneracy calls 
into question the neat separation of causal contributions. Degeneracy is a main 
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source of gene flexibility, but it is also relevant to other biological functions such as 
the immune system and the nervous system (Edelman & Gally, 2001; Greenspan, 
2001). 
Mitchell (2008) discusses degeneracy with respect to questioning the 
modularity of biological systems. Modularity denotes the degree of separability or 
variability of a subset of a system without leading to any change in the functional 
relations within other parts. In biological 
systems, a modular unit refers to structures 
that are internally stable and partially 
independent from other parts. Specifically, 
Mitchell (2008) questions Woodward’s (2005) 
formulation of modularity as a type of causal 
invariance, that is, a causal relationship within 
a system that does not intervene with other 
causal relations when it is changed. Along with 
invariance and insensitivity (see Woodward, 
1997; Woodward, 2006), modularity forms the 
basis of Woodward’s interventionist account of 
causation. In a causal relationship that is 
defined according to interventions, a change in 
the variable Y occurs due to a change in the 
value of X, and this relation remains invariant 
in different contexts. This implies that only a 
specific sort of change that occurs as an 
intervention in X is reflected as an effect in Y 
(Woodward, 2005, p. 94). As will be shown 
below, Mitchell’s (2008) account is also critical 
of modularity. 
The example that Mitchell (2008) puts forward is concerned with genome 
flexibility. According to the idea of modularity, if the intervention (in the case below, 
knocking out the gene) does not lead to a change in the causal network, then it is 
considered as causally detached from the network. However, certain cases of 
Figure 4.1 The knockout 
experiment. Represents the re-
organization of the network (from 
Greenspan, 2001, also cited in 
Mitchell, 2008). 
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knockout experiments show that this might not be the case. The general technique 
in knockout experiments involves the removal of a specific gene sequence, usually 
from a mouse genome, so that scientists can make a controlled experiment 
focusing on the causal contribution of the gene that has been knocked out. In most 
of the knockout experiments, the subsequent lack of the gene either results in 
phenotypic differences or non-viable organisms. Whereas in some cases, when a 
specific gene is removed, the genetic network recovers its function by making new 
connections among the other genes (Mitchell, 2008, p. 700; see Figure 4.1). 
Therefore, this example shows that there might be cases which prima facie meet 
the criterion of modularity, since a change in the subset of a system does not lead 
to a perturbation in the rest of the network, whereas the underlying causal pattern 
is different. This is a case of degeneracy in the genome, as the gene that has been 
knocked out was not redundant, but a functional part of the regulatory network. In 
the new situation, the network recovers its function by reorganization, thereby 
maintaining the phenotypic function. This demonstrates that some marginal cases 
exhibit a conflict in terms of Woodward’s (2005) interventionist causality. 54 
Functionally equivalent cases prove that causal interventions should be 
reconsidered in the light of feedback loops and complex network dynamics. This 
shows that the causal sensitivity of the internal networks is context-dependent. In 
certain cases, “a starting mutation sensitizes the system for further genetic 
perturbations”, and other mutations can be activated by a sensitized background 
(Greenspan, 2001, p. 384). 
Degeneracy is actually a concept that denotes a common characteristic of 
living systems which are highly relational, metastable, and hierarchical. It follows 
that the causal role of the part is determined by its interrelations. Through the 																																								 																					
54 In fact, I believe that this example does not necessarily call into question modularity, albeit hinting 
at the complexity of the problem.  The example given concerns Woodward’s (2005) interventionist 
notion by showing that some of the cases appearing as modularity formally might not be so, yet it is 
not proving that any case of modularity would be inconsistent. Moreover, the actual case of 
modularity concerns the degree of decomposability, which points out an asymmetry in the 
interconnectivity of a system. Certain modules at different levels, such as gene sequences, or 
subcellular structures, are evolutionarily preserved, and higher functionalities have appeared by 
reshuffling these units (Moss, 2001; Schlosser & Wagner, 2004). In this regard, I believe that the 
original concept in biology might be useful to understand the causal implications of the difference 
between the internal and the external. It is also discussed in relation to the contingency and self-
organized regulation of the organism (Moss, 2001). 
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levels of organization, the complex nature of interrelations creates a combinatory 
potential, whereby different combinations of causal networks can be functional and 
some of these alternatives can be functionally equivalent. Degeneracy is effective 
at different levels from genotype to phenotype. At the genetic level, 64 different 
combinations of nucleotide triplets code for 23 amino acids (Maleszka, Mason, & 
Barron, 2013). For instance, although albumin is a functional protein that is not 
redundant, it is found out that some healthy human individuals lack this protein. 
This shows that certain adjustments have tolerated the lack of protein (Edelman & 
Gally, 2001), and “the RNA polymerase holoenzyme that catalyzes RNA synthesis 
itself appears not to be a single, well defined entity but, rather, is a degenerate 
population of complexes with different polypeptide chain compositions” (Edelman & 
Gally, 2001, p. 13764). Several other cases of degeneracy have been discovered 
at different levels of organization from the genetic level to body movements. 
Organisms can utilize degeneracy. In bacteria, environmental settings stimulate the 
genetic code with degeneracy into forming robust networks, thereby producing 
adaptive results such as increased rate of protein synthesis (Maleszka et al., 
2013). 
This combinatory potential of the interconnectivity of parts proves the common 
phenomenon that various strategies can be used to perform the same function, 
and therefore a specific part that seems as redundant might be involved in an 
alternative type of functionality that is latent in the actual system. Functionally 
equivalent causal pathways can be found in cellular differentiation, epigenetic 
regulation, or metabolic activities, and they show the potentiality of organization in 
biological systems. This also indicates that it is not the parts by themselves, but the 
ways that parts are interrelated through developmental and epigenetic processes 
that determines the organism as a whole. The regulatory nature of epigenetic 
integration provides a high level of flexibility that is required for the coordinated and 
context-dependent expression of multitudes of genes (Maleszka et al., 2013, p. 
194). Therefore, the organism constitutes a potential of different network 
interactions, which cannot be reduced to an actual state of the organization. 
Although this aspect of organisms has been revealed since quite early studies in 
biology, it is underemphasized because phenomena such as degeneracy are 
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sometimes overlooked due to the reductionist bias in scientific theories (Maleszka 
et al., 2013). 
Degeneracy refers to a many-to-one relation between the components and the 
function, whereas the complementary notion of degeneracy is pluripotentiality, in 
which one component can be used in different functions (Maleszka et al., 2013). 
Historically, pluripotentiality has been put forward as opposed to preformationism. 
The issue has been contested in a classic controversy between Wilhelm Roux and 
Hans Driesch in the nineteenth century.55 In his experiments with frog blastomere 
(the embryo cells at the early stage), Roux took out one cell and observed that the 
remaining cells developed into a deficient embryo. This led Roux to conclude that 
cellular differentiation is mechanically predetermined, agreeing with Weismann’s 
germ theory that some essential parts within the cells fully control the development. 
On the other hand, Driesch found out the opposite. According to him, each 
blastomere had the capacity to develop into a full embryo, and it is the whole 
organization that determined the development of each cell. Today, the latter view is 
vindicated (Bechtel & Richardson, 2010). Preformationism is refuted, since it has 
been shown that the development of the embryo is not an exact unfolding process. 
Instead, the cells at the beginning phase are pluripotent, meaning that they all have 
the capacity to differentiate into any part of the body. Later developments in stem 
cell research is based on the pluripotential capacity of cells, as it has been found 
out that cells can differentiate or return to the initial undifferentiated state. This 
shows that the components of the developmental process have the potential to be 
utilized in different pathways, which is a potential that is realized by the induction 
from other cells as a consequence of interrelations. In fact, interrelations dominate 
the development of parts through the self-driven process, as the parts’ identity is 
determined within the processual context. 
Pluripotentiality is not limited to stem cells. It has been shown that neural cells 
keep their developmental plasticity throughout their lifespan. This means that cells 
can be recruited in alternative functional networks, which can also be used to 																																								 																					
55 Driesch mentioned the self-regulation of the organism’s development, and used the concept of 
field in embryology for the first time. In this sense, he has been considered as one of the pioneers 
of self-organization (Goodwin, 1987). 
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regain a certain function after damage to the system. This interactive complexity 
between degeneracy and pluripotentiality is likened to a bowtie, in which “many 
inputs funnel into a thin knot of interlocking networks and subsequently many 
corresponding outputs fan out” (Maleszka et al., 2013). Components of the living 
system can be utilized in different ways, which implies the emergence of a 
combinatory potential. The possibilities of the organizational bowtie converge at a 
certain layer, as the networks also appear as structural constraints, and then re-
expands because the number of alternative viable forms increases once 
interconnectivity is established. All these examples show that biological function is 
not sensitively dependent upon a specific configuration of components. On the 
contrary, regulatory networks have the capacity to re-stabilize themselves, or 
invent novel forms of organization in a dynamic way. 
How should we interpret this in terms of self-organization? At this point, I will 
return to the problem of emergence in part-whole relations and the criticism of the 
mechanistic approach. As mentioned in the first section, Kim suggests that 
functionalizing the inputs and outputs of a system reveals the epiphenomenal 
nature of emergence. Depending on the potentiality of living systems, Kim’s 
critique of emergence can be challenged. What Kim’s (1999) analysis in fact 
suggests is to reduce the emergent system to a mechanistic understanding of a 
dynamic system. However, the capacity for reorganization is an emergent property 
due to the potentiality of the system, which is why the causal model of physics that 
concerns a single causal trajectory is inadequate. The biological system is not a 
causal pathway that can be reduced to a single process, but a distributed network 
that has alternative capacities of interconnectivity, in which the causal role of the 
parts is context-sensitive (Greenspan, 2001, p. 384). Thus, the high interactivity of 
biological systems calls into question the idea that a subset of a system can be 
causally analyzed in isolation, which is borrowed from Newtonian physics. The 
mechanistic approach in biology does not provide a sufficient explanatory basis in 
the face of the potentiality of biological systems. 
One could still argue that the potentiality of biological systems does not rule out 
the idea of mechanical predetermination, since physical transformation of a system 
is sensitively dependent on the initial conditions. This potentiality is also dependent 
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on the functional equivalence of alternative developmental pathways, that is, 
multiple realizability of the function. None of these features exclude the possibility 
of mechanical predetermination in principle. A discussion of this would concern the 
interpretation of potentiality in physics, and I will not develop such an argument, 
since I have already discussed some general problems with causation in the 
previous section. Recall, I offered a critical analysis of the mechanistic worldview 
on the basis of its negative implications for theories of biological processes. 
Let us consider the mapping between genotype and phenotype. Can we 
assume that in the causal process of the organism’s life cycle, the phenotype at tn 
is the function of the genotype at tn-1? Sure enough, the phenotype is an output in 
so far as it is a result of the interaction between the genotype and environmental 
conditions. Even though different theoretical approaches emphasize either the role 
of genes, or the role of environmental factors, there is a consensus that the 
genotype provides the norm reaction. In other words, the genotype provides the 
developmental source of traits differing depending on the environmental influence. 
Based on this, the proponent of mechanistic determination could insist that if one 
could specify all the genetic and environmental inputs, then it would be possible to 
predict the deterministic output in the phenotype. However, even if this were 
possible, it would hardly give an idea concerning the potentiality aspect of 
biological systems that emerges due to relationality. Mechanical determinism 
reflects certain expectations, and in this case, potentiality is not included in the 
mindset of this specific way of modeling causal relations because it is not a 
concept that is evident in the actual condition of efficient causes. 
The potentiality of organization is the underlying reason for robustness in living 
systems. The overwhelming role of relational networks enables the organism to 
reconfigure its internal conditions. In this section, I have addressed the ways in 
which potentiality characterizes regulative self-organization and why it is 
contradictory to the mechanistic explanation of regulation. Although this is also 
indicative of the emergent nature of biological processes, the content of this 
section was not directly related to diachronic emergence or the temporality of form. 
Rather, this section considered degeneracy as a capacity that manifests a 
fundamental property of causal relations, namely, potentiality. In the following 
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section, I will consider the emergent nature of biological processes as the final 
element of my argument on self-organization. 
3.3 Synchronic and diachronic conditions of self-organization 
In the previous sections, I explained how relationality determines form, and 
how many-to-many relations that create multiplicity between structure and function 
lead to an expansion of the possibility space of organization, making the 
organization more robust. This also enables the discovery of novel functions in 
evolution due to the combinatory potential of lower-level elements. I think self-
organization can be a viable theory in so far as it is developed as a modern system 
of epigenesis, which involves the incorporation of new organizational possibilities 
during the ontogenetic process. Regulative self-organization in organisms is 
capable of constantly maintaining its potential for change which is constituted by a 
network of processes. This is contrary to a system where its self-organization is 
solely due to spontaneous factors and limited to a specific process. The underlying 
reason of this constant potential, which also relates to the question of how the form 
of the organism extends over time, still needs to be answered. In this section, I will 
attempt to answer these questions both by considering the previous discussions 
within this work and by introducing a new claim about the temporality of form. I 
propose that there are two essential aspects of temporality due to the organism’s 
dynamic form, which are diachronic and synchronic. The diachronic condition 
refers to the transformative role of relational processes throughout the organism’s 
lifespan. Thus, the diachronic condition is associated with organism’s change in 
time as a self-organizing field. The synchronic condition refers to a limit condition of 
temporality that is realized through the interplay between internal and external 
sources of organization, in which the organism can incorporate external novelties. I 
argue that the way that diachronic and synchronic conditions are coupled enables 
the organism’s constant potential for change. This is an issue of how the recursive, 
stable, and transitional dynamics are materialized in the organism. In this context, I 
will discuss the role of biological oscillation that is crucial both for developmental 
processes and physiological regulation. Oscillation appears both in non-living and 
living processes, and it is significant as it reveals how transitional self-organization 
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within non-living processes is connected to regulative self-organization within the 
organism. 
Let me begin by addressing the issue through Brian Goodwin’s ideas on self-
organization. As explained in the previous section, Goodwin rejects the gene-
centric explanation and focuses on the role of developmental constraints. In this 
approach, the constitution of the whole is not a matter of co-existence of 
decomposable parts, rather it is a matter of generating heterogeneity. The 
organism is a self-organizing field, which suggests a formalizable structure 
(Goodwin focuses on the mathematical description of this formality), and thus, a 
consistent whole from the beginning of the process to the end. This is because the 
organism’s internal relations can remain invariant through the systemic 
transformation of the whole (Goodwin, 1987). This notion of self-organization 
primarily focuses on the developmental stability of the embryo, but let us consider 
applying this notion to the internal stability that persists throughout the whole 
lifespan of the organism. The organism undergoes several alterations through its 
lifetime, which are due to both stochastic factors and epigenetic differentiations 
depending on environmental cues. On the other hand, certain characteristics 
remain invariant vis-à-vis the variable conditions that are contingent. Sure enough, 
this condition of the organism depends on being a product of evolution. However, 
as the mentioned property is a type of plasticity, the emerging phenotypic process 
of the organism cannot be strictly determined by genes. In other words, the 
organism’s development is open to external contingencies in the sense that it 
incorporates these factors. For example, in the case of developmental conversion, 
the organism uses the inputs from the environment to follow alternative genetic 
programs (Smith-Gill, 1983). The organism’s organization is also capable of coping 
with novel conditions (see Chapter 3). 
My emphasis at this point involves the idea that, beyond a specific case of 
plasticity during a certain stage of development, this loose understanding of 
plasticity as an interface between changing and unchanging characteristics of the 
organism is an inherent property of form that is maintained throughout the lifespan. 
Goodwin begins from the totality of form, both in the spatial and temporal sense, 
and addresses the lower-level elements such as cells in relation to developmental 
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constraints (see previous section). By applying Goodwin’s approach to self-
organization to the whole lifespan of the organism, it could be possible to give a 
four-dimensional account of form that is inclusive of temporality, as the organism is 
a self-organizing field throughout its lifetime. Therefore, the form extends in time as 
well as in space. However, if the element of contingency that I emphasized is not 
considered, then a potential pitfall for the revised approach involves a 
conceptualization of form as an unfolding of a predetermined process. This is 
because a lifespan that is isolated from external and internal contingency can only 
be characterized by a deterministic growth. But on the contrary, contingency exists, 
which is why the lifespan is not characterized by a deterministic growth, but a 
relative invariance into which contingency is incorporated. Temporality cannot be 
reduced to spatial relationality in a pure structuralist approach. This means that 
relationality cannot be simplified as a mechanistic process of the unfolding of the 
form in which time is neutralized through deterministic mappings of the 
developmental trajectories. As emphasized in the critique of the mechanistic 
approach, historicity and contingency cannot be excluded from the causal 
explanation depending on relational necessities, which would result in ignoring the 
real implications of temporality due to the openness of processes. 
Goodwin (1987) points out that the organism is the unit of organization and the 
long-term determination of form is due to the morphogenetic transformation of the 
whole. On the other hand, the co-existence of contingency and formal stability 
must be understood in relation to the internal-external relationship. Recall that in 
Section 2.3, I explained that, instead of a direct coupling between the organism 
and the environment, contingency is internalized. Through the lifespan, neither the 
internal relationality nor the internal-external relation can remain invariant. What 
remains consistent is the organism’s constant potential for organization. Internally, 
we can speak of a causal closure in the sense of causal circularity of the 
reproduction of parts, which is emphasized by the autonomous perspective 
(Moreno & Mossio, 2015), whereas the organization of the organism is still an open 
process, and is maintained by internalizing external contingency. Self-modifying 
systems are autonomous, but they don’t have closure, as they constantly seek new 
relations with their environment (Salthe, 2001). The organism can never be 
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perfectly pre-adapted to environmental conditions due to the novelty of events. As 
we have seen in the example of the immune system in the third chapter, the 
organism must cope with unprecedented events through its lifetime. 
A better conceptualization of dynamic form that is extended in time would 
require considering it as an interface between its internal consistency and external 
contingency. The form is sustained to the extent that the external contingency is 
amassed within the form, which is evident from the phenotypic plasticity. For 
example, brain functions can be altered in order to adapt to new conditions 
throughout the lifetime, i.e. cells can be associated with new functions, or the 
location that performs a specific function might change. This high degree of 
plasticity is also a basis for cognitive abilities such as learning and memory. 
Furthermore, plasticity can be manifested as the regaining of a specific function by 
reorganization when there is damage to the system.56 
The lifespan of the organism is a process of the formation of heterogeneity 
characterized by the sequential solidification of organizational possibilities at 
multiple levels. The organism has different degrees of fluidity because it possesses 
both short-term and long-term mechanisms in order to adapt to changing 
conditions. This suggests a hierarchy of organization in the spatiotemporal 
differentiation, and different degrees of interactivity with external conditions. 
Heterogeneity first appears in embryonic development in which the temporal 
sequence of the events is directly reflected in the lifetime characteristics of the form 
due to the segmental differentiation of parts, cellular differentiation of the 
pluripotent cells, bifurcation events, etc. In this process, genes contribute to the 
stabilization of form, but they also provide a developmental source that can be 
utilized in different ways due to mechanisms such as alternative splicing, without 
being able to create organizational dynamism by themselves. Changes in the 
phenotype due to epigenetic regulation create a further condition of differentiation. 
As a relatively synchronic condition of the organism’s dynamic form, metabolic 
regulation emerges as the most fluid level of change, but this is also where the 
																																								 																					
56 For this reason, it is claimed that the brain in vertebrates (backboned animals) is in a constant 
process of embryogenesis (Ruyer, 2016). 
	 220	
homeostatic condition is related to the mediation between the internal and the 
external. All these causal factors at different levels are coupled in self-regulation. 
For example, cellular regulation occurs due to genetics, epigenetics, and metabolic 
processes (Roux-Rouquie, 2000), and nonlinear dynamics are utilized in different 
ways at these levels. Beside the morphogenetic characteristic of the 
developmental processes, nonlinear processes are also involved in the self-
organization of metabolic activities utilizing ATP such as the self-organization of 
the cytoskeleton (Kirschner, Gerhart, & Mitchison, 2000). The hierarchy in the 
temporalization of the organization is evident here. Certain fundamental causation 
patterns, such as positive and negative feedbacks, are general at all these levels, 
whereas the underlying dynamics of the realization of form are quite different at 
each level with different paces, and different degrees of fluidity. What I mean by 
different degrees of fluidity depends on the reversible, relatively reversible, and 
irreversible aspects that appear while responding to external conditions. For 
example, a contingent change in temperature might trigger homeostatic responses 
for thermoregulation in a mammal, whereas it might play a role in determining the 
sex during the embryonic development of a reptile. These two correspond to 
distinctive and qualitatively different ways of responding the environment, which 
have dramatically different consequences for the dynamicity of form. 
The abovementioned description is indicative of the temporal nature of 
organization. This raises the following question: As an open process, how does the 
organism’s form extend in time through its consistent activity of self-regulation, and 
in particular, how is it possible that contingency and relational necessity are unified 
within the form? I think the answer lies in epigenesis. Epigenesis is the idea that 
form is acquired progressively as an adaptive process (Moss, 2003), while it is not 
pre-existent in the initial state of the organism. The origin of the idea can be traced 
to Aristotle, whereas the modern context in biology dates back to the eighteenth 
century, when the controversy between preformationism and epigenesis was a 
major issue in embryology. The discovery of the pluripotentiality of cells helped to 
refute preformationism in favour of epigenesis, but as we have seen, other theories 
of implicit preformationism still survive in genetic reductionism. On the other hand, 
epigenesis also relates to a metaphysical question beyond development, 
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concerning the emergence of form over time (Maienschein, 2017). This is why, to 
promote epigenesis against preformationism, it is necessary to discuss it in a 
broader context. In the context of ontogeny, this additional claim corresponds to 
showing how the emergent aspect of form is due to the openness of living 
processes. Otherwise, time-extended form would be reducible to a certain state 
through the organism’s transformation; thereby an implicit idea of predeterminism 
would be permissible. 
The question is whether it is possible to offer an approach that can incorporate 
both epigenesis and morphogenesis. Without epigenesis, the diachronic condition 
of morphogenesis would be reduced to a predeterminist unfolding of the form. On 
the contrary, epigenesis depends on the condition of being unformed at a certain 
time, but simultaneously including the potential to be formed, which is a synchronic 
condition. Below, I will explore this idea further. 
In the first section, I discussed the argument by Anjum and Mumford (2017) 
that defends the emergence of downward causality due to the synchronicity of 
cause-effect relations. I also considered the controversial aspects of this position. 
My argument concerning the emergent nature of the organism originates from this 
claim about synchronicity, yet it is slightly different from Anjum and Mumford’s 
position. It is not exactly dependent on the claim that causation is synchronous, 
which requires a discussion of some problems such as non-locality, but it is based 
on merging synchronic and diachronic aspects of temporality within the explanation 
of living systems. I claim that a radical notion of relationality implies that the 
supposedly atomistic elements are not isolated from their relational and temporal 
context within the system. In other words, components of a whole cannot be 
thought of as instantaneous entities that constitute the whole in a merely 
compositional relation. To explain this, I will return to the ideas developed in the 
previous chapter. I discussed organizational hierarchy as something different from 
composition in the sense that the organization is more than an ordinary 
aggregation of parts. My argument involved a notion of organizational types that 
are characterized by the bio-generic properties of living systems. The idea I am 
proposing here is complementary to that claim. Beyond pointing out that living 
systems necessarily involve organizational hierarchy, I argue that no material 
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aggregation is possible without an association of cross-level dynamics in one way 
or another. Some of the phenomena might seem merely flat, lowest-level relations 
between the parts. However, this appearance is misleading, as there is always an 
underlying relationality that leads to the emergence of organization. This idea 
depends on the profound conception of relationality that I explained in Section 2.2, 
where I conveyed the idea that what is known as matter cannot be exempt from 
context-dependent positioning of parts and a certain degree of organization. 
Based on this, I define the synchronic condition as an irreducible limit of 
diachronicity in which multiple diachronic processes at different levels coincide in a 
partially unformed, but responsive state. In this sense, it refers to non-directionality 
of organization at a certain time period, which is why it is not necessarily 
characterized by a frozen moment, but a relative condition in the face of diachronic 
change. In every instantiation of stability, or in any short-term temporality, there is 
an irreducible limit to localizing compositional elements because interrelations are 
heterogeneously extended in time. Thus, the synchronic condition is a synergetic 
situation in which relationality, that is, the potential interconnectivities between the 
components of the system, determines the transformative nature of the causal 
relations. Within this condition, these interrelations are characterized by partially 
unformed, thus under-individuated heterogeneity, in which diachronic temporality is 
not actual, but only a projection. Despite Kim’s (1999) criticism of emergence, this 
synchronic condition cannot be formulated as an input-output function because the 
latter requires an atomistic conception of the components where the initial state 
and the end-state can be distinguished within a trajectory. However, the synchronic 
condition is based on the claim that there is a limit to the decomposability of a 
system into sequential moments and atomistic elements, since these atomistic 
elements cannot be thought of as isolated from their temporality. This objection 
also relates to a critique of reducing a macro condition to its micro-level elements. 
In a way of thinking that is limited to composition, the notion of micro-level element 
always requires a supposed state of instantaneity, a momentary but frozen 
imagination of the parts, that is stripped from their temporality. However, this also 
implies isolating compositionality from its causal context. 
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This claim is based on the idea that a self-organized system has the capability 
to exploit contingently arising opportunities within the complex asymmetry of its 
relations. The underlying dynamics of this are the selection and utilization of lower-
level dynamics at a higher level (Salthe, 1989; El-Hani & Emmeche, 2000; 
Emmeche, 2004; Haken, 2013; Longo & Montévil, 2014; Witherington, 2014), 
which is opposed to the predeterminist notion of biological organization. As an 
emergent aspect of organization, both the synergy of the interrelations within the 
system and the condition of metastability in which the synergetic situation can shift 
the organism into alternative states is emphasized (Simondon, 2009; see Section 
3.2). According to this, potentiality for change is latent in a certain state, and novel 
situations of relationality can appear. In relation to metastability, this dynamism 
corresponds to coupling the functional requirements emerging in diachronic 
condition and the organizational solution hidden in the synchronic condition. 
Therefore, in the case of ontogeny, the synchronic condition is a limit to the 
minimizing of the temporality of organization which appears as a type of mediation 
between the internal and the external. In this hierarchical system that involves 
functional relations, the irreducibility of lower-level potentials indicates a condition 
of unformedness that becomes a source for multiply realizable states where the 
diachronic dynamics of individuation can select their own actuality. The centralized 
networks of organization which enable goal-directed processes to act as downward 
causes (see Chapter 3) find organizational possibilities within this irreducibly 
heterogeneous condition of materiality. 
These two conditions of temporality are relative to each other. In actuality, the 
synchronic condition cannot be considered without diachronicity because of the 
unavoidable aspect of temporality. On the other hand, even though the synchronic 
condition is irreducible, it appears as a processual stability, mostly depending on 
the recursive nature of causal interactions in biological systems. This processual 
nature of synchrony is consistent with the observation that any part-whole relation 
that appears in a synchronous condition is also dependent on the diachronic 
condition of the organization. The diachronicity underlying synchronous conditions 
is highlighted by Nakajima’s (2004) assertion that “the transformation identifies the 
unity of the process based on the identity of pattern, not the identity of individual 
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participants” (p. 518). For example, a cell’s synchronic constitution depends on the 
constant replacement of the constituents with new ones, or a synchronic organism 
depends on constant multiplication and death of cells. These elements point to the 
irreducible characteristic of diachronic organization hidden in the instantaneous 
condition of the biological entity (Nakajima, 2004). It follows that an idealization of 
synchronicity and diachronicity, which in fact results in a neutralization of these 
factors, should be rejected. The synchronic condition does not emerge as an ideal, 
but as a de facto situation that is defined in relation to the diachronic aspect. Here, 
the ideal condition of diachronicity refers to an extension in time without this 
minimal condition of heterogeneity at a lower level, and the ideal condition of 
synchronicity refers to an extension in space without temporality, i.e. a frozen state. 
The impossibility of the neutralized conditions of diachronicity and synchonicity is 
due to the inevitable temporality of systems, which means that these two aspects 
must be co-existent at the basic micro level. Therefore, there is a limit to the 
reducibility of the spatiotemporal nature of the organism to either atomistic (spatial 
reductionism) or momentary (temporal reductionism) elements of the system. 
According to a similar distinction, the synchronic type of regulation occurs by 
neutralizing perturbations and keeping the system in a homeostatic condition, 
whereas the diachronic type appears when parameters of the system reach a limit, 
thereby a change in the organizational state occurs (Roux-Rouquie, 2000). I think 
this distinction could potentially be consistent with my account explained above, if it 
is also conceded that the synchrony is a de facto condition, and that the diachronic 
type of regulation is defined relatively. This relativity of stability accords with the 
account of levels of organization that I discussed in the previous chapter. 
Remember that a higher-level process is perceived as stable because the 
frequency of change is less (Simon, 1962). If this is understood in relation to the 
synchronous condition, then it must be concluded that the organism is 
synchronously stable relative to its ongoing cellular replacement within, whereas it 
is dynamic relative to the population it belongs to. In addition to this relativity of 
stability across different levels of organization, the basis of self-organization is that 
these processes with different frequency rates are coupled with each other. This 
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enables the organism to simultaneously cope with a constantly fluctuating 
environment and keep its internal condition intact.  
De facto condition of synchronicity is due to the relational realization of these 
two conditions depending on the individuation of the process. Individuation is a 
byproduct of the hierarchical nature of relational systems, in which the part and the 
whole are determined in relation to each other due to the nonlinearity of causal 
relations. In other words, there is no substance in materiality and nothing exists but 
relationality. Recall that one of the approaches to emergence presupposes that 
emergence does not have to contradict reduction (Wimsatt, 1997). Here, my 
argument concerning a “strong” notion of emergence calls into question the 
parthood that is subject to configurations. If relationality determines what the parts 
are, and there is a basic level of irreducibility in the spatiotemporal characteristic of 
relationality, then this means that the argument based only on the synchronic 
condition between the parts and the whole is incorrect. There is a causal 
asymmetry between the parts and the whole due to the temporality of the 
organization. This asymmetry originates from the overwhelming nature of 
relationality that acts on the individuated parts. Thus, as previously explained, the 
synchronic condition cannot be understood in any frozen moment. Parts are 
considered as decomposable elements, but in fact, the idea of an isolated part is a 
fiction based on abstracting parts in alternative combinations of causal relations.  
On this basis of temporality, it is possible to offer an approach of epigenesis 
concerning the ontogeny of the organism. Novelty in ontogeny can co-exist with the 
relative invariance of the diachronic condition. This is because either by 
reorganization, by a transition of cellular determination from an unformed state 
(Newman & Forgacs, 2005), or through physiological changes, new possibilities 
that are organizationally robust can be discovered. Moreover, biological 
organization can respond to uncertainty in different ways, which creates an 
expansion of possibilities. 
I have already established that the organism’s form is extended in time. In 
contrast to non-living entities, an organism’s form at a certain stage is highly 
correlated with the temporality of organization throughout its whole lifespan. Now, 
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let me explain how this condition of synchronicity is realized in the organism, and 
how it relates to the question of regulative self-organization. I have argued that an 
ideal condition of synchronicity is not possible, but also that the synchronic 
condition in biological systems emerges based on the recursive nature of internal 
processes of the organism. De facto synchronicity is due to the constant re-
production of the self, which is reinforced by the directional nature of organization, 
that is, the capacity to adopt different states. This dual condition is the underlying 
reason why a synchronic condition uniquely creates a potential for internal 
transformation by enabling new pathways for the self-maintenance of form in 
organisms. 
The basis of this is the role of negative and positive feedback loops within the 
body, which are usually coupled with each other. The importance of positive 
feedback is evident in the formation of autocatalytic reactions, which requires their 
own products to accelerate themselves. On the other hand, negative feedback is 
essential for processes of oscillation. These feedback relations are evident at 
various biological levels including metabolic processes, cellular differentiation, and 
the regulation of gene transcription (Roux-Rouquie, 2000). In this sense, biological 
oscillation has a special role in terms of coupling different rhythms of change within 
the system. Oscillation is a pattern that unifies recursive and history-dependent 
dynamics of change at different levels, performing different functions. Biological 
oscillators that are internal to the organism have a fundamental role in regulative 
self-organization, as they become the temporal anchors of more fluid processes 
that are built upon a developmental basis. This is because biological rhythms are 
relatively robust symmetries, and “the organism is tuned to (and expects) their 
iteration” (Longo & Montévil, 2014, p. 102). Moreover, the sources of rhythmicity 
that are endogenous to the organism are synchronized with each other – and in 
many cases, rhythms are dependent on external sources such as the diurnal 
motion of the Earth. 
In previous chapters, I defined the transitional type of self-organization merely 
based on nonlinear elements from the organism’s self-organization, but also 
highlighted that nonlinearity is incorporated in regulative self-organization. In this 
chapter, I objected to an idealized understanding of synchronic condition by 
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arguing that it involves a limit condition due to the processual nature of things. 
Now, I would like to focus on how these two conditions, namely, nonlinear 
dynamics and temporality of form are realized in living systems. Thus, I will 
examine some examples of oscillations in the organism’s self-organization. These 
examples also help to explain how diachronic and synchronic conditions are 
coupled, as different rates of rhythmicity as well as recursive and history-
dependent interactions are interrelated through a network of endogenous 
oscillators. As a consequence, dynamic form is dependent on the unification of 
fluctuations with different frequencies. Since oscillation is a common pattern in both 
living and non-living systems of self-organization, its role in biological processes 
exemplifies the involvement of nonlinear elements in regulative self-organization. 
For instance, oscillations in circadian clocks demonstrate how external contingency 
can be internalized. 
Oscillations are rhythmic patterns that can occur as a result of delay or 
nonlinearity in feedback loops (Bechtel & Richardson, 2010). Biological rhythmicity 
is vital for the organism, as it has a fundamental role in the functioning of the heart, 
brainwaves, respiratory behavior, circadian rhythm, etc. It also appears as 
regularities at population level such as reproduction cycles. Bodily oscillators are 
key to understanding how biological form depends on the unification of different 
rhythms, and how the relative stability of form is coupled with more dynamic 
processes. Due to oscillators, organizational processes at different levels are tuned 
with each other, e.g. heart rate is co-determined by the organ and the regulative 
mechanisms of the whole organism (Longo & Montévil, 2014, p. 183). 
Synchronization dynamics and nonlinear interactions explain how the fluid layer of 
organization in physiology is tuned with genetic expression due to oscillators in 
developmental processes. Oscillations through developmental processes serve as 
a clock that determines how temporality is directly expressed in the material 
realization of the form, whereas physiological oscillation is a bridge between 
external fluctuations and the organism’s internal pacemakers. 
Biological oscillators have a main role in the developmental phenomenon 
known as heterochrony. This concept refers to the role of developmental timing in 
determining the form of the organism, as the beginning, ending, duration, or rate of 
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developmental processes are reflected in the basic characteristics of the body plan 
(Reilly, Wiley, & Meinhardt, 1997). The role of developmental clock mechanisms 
has proven that heterochrony is involved in the embryo’s measuring time (Keyte & 
Smith, 2014), and oscillatory patterns are highly influential in the timing of 
development. For instance, the oscillator that is involved in the development of the 
snake embryo is much accelerated compared to the mouse embryo, which leads to 
longer vertebrae in the former (Held, 2014). It has been observed that in the case 
of ectopic embryo development, body segments can be formed without the 
oscillation serving as a clock, which is explained by a lower-level self-organization 
due to cell-to-cell communication that creates the somites (body segments). In 
normal embryo development, the role of oscillation is to couple the wave behaviour 
of the whole with the timely subdivision of each body segment (Dias, de Almeida, 
Belmonte, Glazier, & Stern, 2014). 
Oscillation of the calcium level in the cytoplasm is shown to be a factor in gene 
transcription, as it is found that the frequency of oscillation creates specific patterns 
of transcription (Roux-Rouquie, 2000, p. 3). Moreover, dynamic states of cells can 
be induced via the epigenetic mechanism of cell type switching. A cell can have 
different steady states, and these alternative states can be induced by the 
microenvironment of the cell, as the autoregulatory transcription is performed via 
signaling transduction pathways out of the cell (Newman & Forgacs, 2005, p. 59). 
When cells of a multicellular organism divide, they inherit not only their 
components as they are, but also their dynamical states, which “can be transient, 
stable, unstable, oscillatory, or chaotic (Newman & Forgacs, 2005, p. 53). These 
states are referred to as epigenetic states, since the inheritance between cells is 
not due to the sequence of genes, but dynamic biochemical states. Dynamic states 
are not always directly inherited, and sometimes certain interfering factors during 
cellular division can divert the cells from the current attractor state to another. The 
propagation of certain epigenetic states is essential to the creation of diverse 
cellular types during development. Oscillation is a main pattern as an inherited 
cellular state, as this type of cellular state is involved in cyclic processes in 
development that might create synchronization, clustering, or symmetry breaking. 
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The role of biological oscillation is not limited to development. The circadian 
clock is a key example of the autoregulatory characteristic of the physiological 
organization. The key function of the circadian clock is to regulate the biological 
activities of the organism throughout the 24-hour cycle. The circadian clock is self-
sustaining, which means that it keeps its periodicity even if there is no external 
input (Sancar et al., 2010). Biological activities that are regulated by the circadian 
clock continue with a period that is close to 24 hours in the laboratory conditions of 
constant darkness. The circadian period is effective at multiple levels of 
organization from the behaviour of mammals to enzyme activities (Pittendrigh, 
1993). The underlying mechanism includes a main endogenous oscillator and 
peripheral oscillators, sustained by feedback loops and several internal and 
environmental inputs. In mammals, the central controller of circadian rhythm is the 
suprachiasmatic nucleus, which is a part of the brain situated in the hypothalamus. 
Internal oscillators of the clock are synchronized within a structured hierarchy, and 
even one cell can have more than one oscillator (Roenneberg & Merrow, 2001). 
Pacemaker cells can keep their rhythmicity in vitro, but this is different from 
networks. Therefore, rhythmicity is generated at the cellular level, but adjusted at 
the organism level (Roenneberg & Merrow, 2001, p. 1687). Hormonal rhythms, 
sleeping behaviour, heart rate, and as revealed more recently, DNA repairing 
activity (Hogenesch, 2009; Sancar et al., 2010) are regulated according to the 
circadian clock, which uses mainly endogenous oscillators but also environmental 
inputs such as light to adjust the clock of the organism. This type of re-adjustment 
between different oscillation periods is known as entrainment (Golombek & 
Rosenstein, 2010). Moreover, it has been found that the genetic networks that 
constitute the clock have an active reorganization capacity after specific genes are 
knocked out (Baggs et al., 2009), which is quite similar to the examples of the 
knockout experiments that were discussed in the previous section. 
As a self-sustained process, outputs of the circadian rhythm, such as the 
secretion of melatonin hormone, which regulates sleeping, can affect the receptors 
of the circadian clock. Input variables of this rhythm can also be under the control 
of the circadian clock (Golombek & Rosenstein, 2010). Pittendrigh (1993), who is 
one of the pioneers of research on circadian clocks, asks why organisms need a 
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daily rhythm to regulate their activities. As an answer, he points to “organization 
that exploits the reliability of the external day as a time-reference and whose goal 
is an appropriate sequencing of diverse internal events rather than the concurrence 
of internal and external events” (Pittendrigh, 1993, pp. 30-31). The evolution of an 
internal clock mechanism gave an anticipatory advantage for predictable changes 
(Golombek & Rosenstein, 2010). According to a hypothesis, the first circadian 
clock might have evolved in ancient aquatic organisms to regulate their vertical 
movement in order to avoid the harmful effects of UV light (Pittendrigh, 1993). The 
discovery of the genetic connection between the repairing activity against UV 
radiation and circadian regulation supports this hypothesis (Sancar et al. 2010). 
The role of oscillatory clocks in development, epigenetic regulation, and 
physiology reveals how time is embraced internally. Based on this, claiming that 
time for the organism is subjective would be an excessive claim that would share a 
similar idealism with autopoiesis. Yet, it would be reasonable to conclude that time 
has a subjective aspect that is realized through the ontological distinction between 
the internal and the external. Above, I defined the synchronic and diachronic 
conditions as relative to each other. In this sense, for example, entrainment in the 
circadian oscillators is a synchronic condition relative to the role of the oscillatory 
clock in developmental segmentation, which in contrast corresponds to a 
diachronic condition. This is because the realization of the former appears as a 
bridging between short-term stabilization of the internal physiology and the external 
fluctuations. The latter is diachronic in so far as temporality is materialized in the 
body segments, which implies a lifetime influence within the diachronic extension. 
In the examples of oscillation discussed in this section, it also becomes apparent 
that the coupling of different paces of change determines the dynamic nature of the 
organism’s form that is extended in time. On this basis, more solidified and more 
fluid aspects of biological organization become united, allowing the co-existence of 
the contingency and relationality elements. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I examined the philosophical problem of emergence in the 
context of the organism’s self-organization. I concluded that emergence is 
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ontological, as it is based on the processual and relational nature of causal 
relations. The constraint interpretation suggests that emergence depends on the 
contingent formation of relationality. This implies that universal laws only determine 
the necessitarian basis of relationality. Yet, relational dynamics within a local 
system are not exhaustively predetermined by the laws of nature, hence they are 
emergent. Self-organization supports the arguments for emergence on the basis of 
individuation. The process of individuation refers to the contingent formation of 
reciprocal relations, which leads to the creation of coherent structures. The 
emergent nature of the organism involves more complex processes compared to 
non-living systems. The organism can use its internal potentiality throughout its 
individuation. This characteristic of the organism supports the idea of diachronic 
emergence. The organism’s synchronic condition cannot be considered as distinct 
from diachronicity. On the other hand, although diachronicity is based on 
individuated processes, individuation is limited by the synchronic condition that 
disguises the unformed state, which is the source of potentiality. My argument 
concerning the synchronic irreducibility of a time sequence of organization needs 
to be supported by further empirical sources in addition to my focus on oscillation. 
Moreover, my account should be scrutinized in relation to other philosophical 
problems, such as the further implications this has for the levels of organization. 
Another conclusion of this chapter relates to the notion of dynamic form. 
Formal causation is not applicable to the organism’s self-organization without 
engaging with its broader context in Aristotle’s philosophy. Therefore, 
contemporary appeals to formal causation are problematic. Form and matter do not 
correspond to ontologically distinguishable aspects of organization. Form 
originates in the individuated characteristic of relationality, which depends on the 
temporary nature of processes, but not absolute properties. An atomistic 
conception of matter associates the notion with static entities at the lowest level 
within the hierarchy of organization. However, since matter is always relational and 
processual, this understanding of ultimate particularity is incorrect. In the context of 
biological form, dialectical unity of contingency and relationality is essential. On this 
basis, I criticized approaches that are biased towards reducing the explanation to 
either side of these co-existent features. Genetic reductionism ignores the 
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contingency aspect by adopting a preformationist perspective. An interpretation of 
structuralism that is solely based on the laws of form also disregards contingency 
within the historicity of organisms. On the other side, DST is problematic, as it 
exaggerates the role of contingency and underestimates the underlying factors of 
formal stability. In addition to these theories in biology, I critically examined the 
historical and philosophical basis of mechanistic explanation. Mechanistic 
approaches cannot explain biological processes because the way it models causal 
relations is inconclusive in terms of embracing the implications of recent scientific 
developments and the causal nature of biological processes. Therefore, it is 
necessary to seek out a new scientific approach that considers the fundamental 
claims for causation that reside in biological processes. 
I offered an account of self-organization that emphasizes the potentiality of 
interrelations as opposed to accounts that attempt to eliminate the emergent 
aspect of biological organization. My primary aim was to demonstrate that 
temporality plays an irreducible role in organization. I also argued that regulative 
self-organization needs to be defined due its unique characteristics in ontogeny. 
On this basis, I claimed that there are several ontological connections between the 
universal dynamics of emergence and the way that temporality is embraced in the 
organism. I have demonstrated that the transitional dynamics of self-organization 
permeate into both biological and non-biological systems. This supports the idea of 
the universality of self-organization. 
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General Conclusions 
 
 
  Lifetime is a child at play, moving pieces in a game. Kingship belongs to the child. 
Heraclitus, Fragments, XCIV 
 
In this thesis, I discussed the self-organization of the organism in the light of a 
relational ontology. The two postulates that I adopted due to this ontology were: i. 
everything is relational and there are no absolute properties that can be realized in 
isolation, and ii. there is a limit to spatially and temporally decompose a synchronic 
condition, i.e. an unformed processuality underlies individuality. These postulates 
were the bases of my inquiry into various forms of biological processes. 
Concerning the organism’s organization, I claimed that ontogeny is a process of 
individuation. Individuation refers to the general tendency for self-organization due 
to the establishment of reciprocal relations in a condition of multiplicity. I have 
demonstrated the validity of this description of self-organization by explaining 
various theories, models, and experiments in biology. This analysis also covered 
the examination of research in physics to a certain extent. My main motivation was 
to prove that emergence is ontological by drawing support from the theory of self-
organization. This was contrasted with the position that reduces emergence to an 
empirical issue concerning the configuration of parts within a whole. An atomistic 
conception of lower-level components underlies this type of reductionist attitude 
toward emergence. Instead, I defended a process philosophy, and drew attention 
to the problems posed by the atomistic and mechanistic conception of causal 
relations. As an alternative, my account of potentiality helps to overcome these 
problems by identifying how they are derived from an inconsistency between 
mechanicism and biological relationality. On the other hand, the irreducible 
synchronic condition of living processes, which refers to the unshaped fundamental 
	 234	
level of individuation, is the underlying theme of potentiality. The organism’s 
hierarchical organization serves to utilize the potentiality that arises within lower 
levels. The coupling of the synchronic condition to the diachronic elements is key 
to understand how the contingency and the lifespan organizational robustness can 
co-exist within the dynamic form. The synchronic condition is temporally 
irreducible, heterogeneous, and partially unformed, including potentiality for 
multiple states. The diachronic condition is the sum of organizational processes 
including homeostatic control, medium-term and long-term determinations, 
centralized functions, anticipatory elements, and so on. This temporally extended 
condition finds its organizational potentials within the synchronic state, which 
denotes the current actualization of the lifespan development that is under constant 
individuation. As suggested by Gilbert Simondon, individuation implies an 
unachieved state of individuality. 
The theoretical account that I developed from these principles was applied to 
the notion of regulative dynamics of self-organization within the organism. This 
systematic view justifies diachronic emergence in the context of scientific theories. 
The organism is in a far-from-equilibrium condition, and a constant energy flow is 
necessary for its survival. The organism’s form is dynamic throughout the energy 
flow. Continuity of form is double-edged, as it is based on tolerating perturbations 
as well as utilizing contingent factors to expand its organizational possibilities. This 
double-edged dynamicity of form has interesting implications in terms of 
contingency and relationality in a broader context. The constraint interpretation of 
emergence correctly identifies that the laws of physics cannot predetermine the 
actuality of causal relations (Polanyi, 1968; Blachowicz, 2013). This leads to the 
idea that relationality, which is the ontological condition of organizational 
constraints, has an irreducible aspect of contingency. Relationality also has an 
aspect of necessity due to the law-like nature of causal relations. However, the 
aspect of historical contingency is not directly imposed by the laws of nature, as 
the latter is context-free. When this idea is applied to the form of the organism, it 
would be possible to reveal the close link between contingency and emergence. 
On the one hand, in so far as an entity is organizationally stable, its relationality is 
to be deduced as a direct application of the laws of nature. On the other hand, 
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organizational dynamism provides openness by enabling the discovery of new 
internal relationalities, and the emergent relational wholes become detached from 
simplistic expressions of physical necessities determined by the laws of nature.57 
Thus, the organism’s potentiality serves to continuously invent its own form through 
a process of individuation. This is the condition of epigenesis within the organism’s 
form, which also indicates that universal dynamics of emergence are involved in 
the processes of ontogeny. 
The claim that the organism uses its potentiality that I asserted above and 
previously brings with it the philosophical questions around the notion of agency. 
Even though I did not refer to this concept extensively throughout this work, the 
indirect expressions that evoke the notion of agency are also quite controversial. 
This is mostly because agency is often thought to be within the scope of a theory of 
action dealing with the phenomena based on mental representations. Therefore, 
extending the notion by including non-cognitive situations is found to be 
problematic. While conceding that human agency marks a philosophical area that 
can be investigated per se, I believe that presupposing agency as restricted within 
human acts disguises an assumption of the existence of an ontological rift – or at 
least an ontological leap – between human agency and its naturalistic basis. This 
kind of ontological rift might reflect a sceptical attitude towards the scientifically 
illuminable connection between human agency and its naturalistic basis, e.g., this 
kind of sceptic might believe that evolutionary background of cognitive abilities has 
nothing to with the analysis of normative and practical standpoints. Or, a 
reductionist attitude attempting to explain – or explain away – the emergent 
aspects of human agency might underlie this misconception of the ontological rift, 
as this kind of reductionist would believe that in so far as a mechanistic explanation 
of the human agency is provided, any philosophical issue that is related to it, e.g. 
the reconciliation of the teleological nature of mind with naturalistic explanations, 
could also be resolved by untangling all these issues through the established 
understanding of causation. 
																																								 																					
57 As mentioned before, a radical interpretation of this idea suggests that established relationality is 
a new law-like situation (Mitchell, 2000). 
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However, the notion of self-organization also involves questioning these strong 
philosophical convictions. Also, self-organization provides possible explanations for 
cognition and human agency. Therefore, it could be possible to reach new 
understandings of causation by applying self-organization to the questions of 
human agency. This also paves the way to a unified perspective bridging agency 
and a naturalistic analysis of complex systems without reducing the former to the 
latter. Agency is due to emergent properties of matter, and considering the multi-
dimensional emergence of complexity from the primitive conditions of Earth to 
living systems and social structures, agency also reflects a capacity within matter 
for the appearance of qualitatively new dimensions of evolution. Vice versa of the 
abovementioned reasoning from the self-organized nature of human agency to 
new types of causation is also true: different complex systems involving 
extraordinary causal powers share a common ground with human agency. 
Autopoiesis has asserted this claim for organisms in general, as it is argued in this 
theory that simple organisms such as bacteria exhibit agency without mental 
representations comparable to those of humans (see Chapter 2). From the 
perspective of a generalized view of self-organization, agency is an extensive 
phenomenon due to an individual’s capacity to act upon itself as well as upon the 
external conditions, and the agency due to human mind is an advanced 
manifestation of this capacity. Sure enough, one can adhere to a narrow context of 
agency that is defined on the basis of deliberate acts, but this restricted description 
would reflect just the tip of the iceberg. It should be emphasized once again that 
goal-directed activities of the organism have a wider scope than intentional 
actions.58  
The abovementioned ideas can be justified depending on empirical studies and 
theories regarding living systems and processes of self-organization. Emergent 
order in the ontogeny of the organism is evident in the materialization of nonlinear 
dynamics. The emergence of attractor states, self-organized criticality, the 
formation of patterns, and the building of complexity within an ecosystem are 
																																								 																					
58 Embryonic induction is a good example of this. Spemann’s experiments have shown how the 
cells of a transplanted embryo are capable of becoming organizers by recruiting cells from the host 
embryo (see Niehrs (2011) for details). 
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determined by an unprecedented development of reciprocal relations. In this 
regard, they fall into the category of transitional self-organization. On the other 
hand, the organism’s self-organization is regulative because the organism, as a 
product of evolution, involves a special condition of organization. From the 
beginning of embryological development, the organism is determined by 
organizational constraints. The organism uses inherent potentials via an 
organizational hierarchy in which there is a reciprocal relation between bottom-up 
emergence by spontaneous dynamics of order and top-down determination by 
centralized functions. Cellular differentiation also exemplifies lifespan potentiality. 
Moreover, the organization of the organism incorporates nonlinear dynamics, 
which is evident in the role of biological oscillators in cell states, developmental 
rhythms, and circadian clocks. 
I argue that this sufficiently demonstrates that emergence is ontological. An 
emergent condition corresponds to real novelty that is not preformed. However, 
there are differences between the strengths of the subsidiary claims that I have 
made. Certain ideas in relational ontology are quite obvious: Nonlinear systems 
indicate that the reciprocal relation between a component and the system it 
belongs to is context-dependent. Reciprocal relations are widespread and 
fundamental in living systems. Nevertheless, when it comes to the question of 
radical implications of relationality, the issue is rather controversial. I claimed that 
relationality negates both the notion of absolute properties, and that things are the 
sum of their relations. These claims suggest that relational ontology has profound 
implications concerning the nature of reality. Thus, my argument requires 
additional support from a discussion of relational ontology based on the relevant 
ideas in general philosophy of science (and philosophy of physics in particular). 
This was beyond the scope of my thesis, as I could only briefly engage with this 
area in the introduction and the fourth chapter. A similar point can be made in 
relation to process philosophy. My claims that temporality of the synchronic 
condition of the organism is not reducible, and that it is connected to the diachronic 
elements of organization need more verification by an examination of the studies in 
physics. This is a claim that I made depending on the processual nature of things, 
but it can be criticized for falling into a tautology due to the circular nature of 
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reasoning between process ontology and irreducible synchronicity. I attempted to 
avoid this kind of circularity by emphasizing that the empirical findings concerning 
the relational and processual nature of biological systems in fact support 
arguments relating to the nature of causation. As emphasized by the proponents of 
relational biology, certain causal capacities only emerge in living systems. 
Therefore, research in biology cannot be deemed subsidiary to physics, and there 
is potential scientific support for a process ontology also in biological research. 
As a final theme of this concluding chapter, I will suggest some potential paths 
that can be developed based on the philosophical investigation in this thesis. One 
of these expansions could be the application of the idea of potentiality to functions. 
The philosophy of functions is a wide topic that involves discussions concerning 
artefacts and the adaptive traits of living systems. Functions have been discussed 
in relation to issues that have been addressed in this thesis, including biological 
autonomy (Mossio, Saborido, & Moreno, 2009), natural selection (Wright, 1973, 
1976), and self-maintenance of living systems (McLaughlin, 2001). Two different 
accounts of functions involve: i. etiological theories, which depend on an analysis 
of the history of adaptive traits, and ii. dispositional theories, which depend on the 
current performance of the function (Wouters, 2005). There have been attempts to 
overcome the dilemmas due to this dual nature of explanation and develop a 
unified theory of functions (Godfrey-Smith, 1994; Mossio et al., 2009; Artiga, 2011). 
Wright (1973) proposed an etiological theory of functions based on selected 
effects. According to this idea, a cause-effect relation might turn into a function 
when the effect of the cause enables the causal agent to persist in time. In 
Teleological Explanation (1976), Wright developed this idea further by attempting 
to offer a naturalistic account of teleology. He added the condition of the 
indeterminacy of mechanical causes in this analysis. Concerning biological 
processes, Wright applied this idea only to natural selection. However, I believe 
that this theory of functions can include a wider scope of biological processes. 
Also, beyond an etiological theory of function, there is a possibility to reformulate 
relevant ideas as a unified theory of functions. Wright’s ideas can be interpreted in 
terms of a theory of potentiality. Similar to Wright’s emphasis on the indeterminacy 
of mechanical causes, the potentiality view that I promoted in this thesis involves a 
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certain degree of indeterminacy that is inherent within individuals. Moreover, the 
understanding of centralized functions within the organizational hierarchy depends 
on an idea that lower-level dynamics constitute organizational potentials, and an 
internal selection operates due to goal-directed operations of the organism’s 
functionality. In this way, selected effects can be considered in the context of the 
organism’s organization. 
The theory of Waddington provides another possible way to further develop the 
claims in this thesis. Waddington coined the term “epigenetics” as a combination of 
the words of epigenesis and genetics. He pioneered a comprehensive application 
of the idea of potentiality to biological processes. Waddington considered the 
genotype as a set of potentialities that are actualized through development (Van 
Speybroeck, 2002, p. 69). In this sense, Waddington’s theory involves the 
expanding of Driesch’s view defending the potentiality of embryonic cells against 
preformationism. Waddington was influenced by Whitehead’s philosophy that 
promoted the ideas of potentiality and relationality (Gare, 2017). It is claimed that 
Waddington’s support for this philosophy might have contributed to his exclusion 
from the orthodox circles of neo-Darwinism in his day (Peterson, 2011). 
Waddington’s approach relates to the problems of this thesis due to both 
dimensions that I explained in the introduction: the dimension of philosophy of 
biology that includes the critique of neo-Darwinism and the dimension of the theory 
of causation that includes the idea of potentiality. Thus, related ideas in the 
accounts of Waddington’s biology and Whitehead’s philosophy deserve more 
attention in order to make a strong case in favour of potentiality and relationality. 
The final theoretical path that might contribute to the expansion of the ideas in 
this thesis is biosemiotics, which was pioneered by Friedrich S. Rotschild, Charles 
Peirce, Charles Morris, Thomas Sebeok, and Jacob von Uexküll. More recent 
applications of biosemiotics involve an investigation of living systems due to an 
emphasis on their information-dependent characteristic (El-Hani & Emmeche, 
2000; Queiroz, Emmeche, Kull, 2007; Kull & El-Hani, 2011). A study of 
biosemiotics could be promising due to the understanding of potentiality within this 
theory. According to the Peircean understanding of potentiality, the universalist 
conception of the laws of nature is misleading. Instead, the local law-like principles 
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are implemented within the mediating system. There are alternative stabilizations 
of the form within the tripartite interactions between the sign, the interpreter, and 
the object, which are all relatively determined. The alternative interpretations that 
appeal to tripartite relationality identify how a synergetic variability can be exploited 
by the whole system in which these elements are involved. Based on this view, 
Stanley N. Salthe (1985, 1993) proposed a theory of organizational hierarchy 
concerning living systems, and pointed out that self-organization is a multi-level 
phenomenon (Salthe, 2013). He also investigated the universal implications of the 
idea of self-organization. Salthe states that self-organization relates to systems that 
change both evolutionarily and developmentally. Self-organization denotes an 
inner directive power within the system, and it is originally a Hegelian idea as an 
alternative to the Newtonian understanding of causality (Salthe, 1989, p. 201). An 
analysis of Salthe’s approach to self-organization requires engaging with its 
Peircean basis, which can be accomplished only within a project mainly focusing 
on the issue, due to the depth of its theoretical origins. 
This thesis addressed the philosophical issues with self-organization with an 
aim of emphasizing the need for a new theoretical perspective in biology. Although 
there is a vast literature appealing to the notions of self-organization, emergence, 
and potentiality,59 some of the relevant studies in fact tend to neutralize the causal 
implications of these concepts and suggest going back to the view of mechanical 
determinism. To avoid this, a philosophical discussion of relationality must involve 
a questioning of the established understandings of causation perpetuating under 
the misleading cover of common sense. Even when it is considered that certain 
presuppositions concerning causation are based on either a priori knowledge or 
direct empirical analyses, 60  it is highly likely that certain convictions due to 
traditions in history of science and daily understandings of the world permeate our 
background assumptions. A good way to prevent this burden is to bite the bullet 
and admit that observation is theory-laden. Then, it would be possible to recognize 
																																								 																					
59 Potentiality is not as popular as the other two concepts, whereas ideas related to potentiality are 
gaining more attention due to studies discussing dispositions, possibilities, and causal powers. 
60 Obviously, these are in contrast with each other. Still, both exclude the involvement of previous 
theories in different ways. 
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traditionally constructed aspects of our claims about causality, which creates an 
opportunity to deconstruct them. The denial of self-organization is mostly led by the 
conviction that something cannot act upon itself. Processes of individuation 
suggest the contrary. 
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